hose, on the contrary,who thought that small establishments were best calculated both for the continuance of peace, and for the renewal of war if it should be necessary, would have also an opportunity of delivering their sentiments. The words in his majesty's speech are general, as they ought to be; and the question is left entirely open to future consideration, and the extent of the establishment will be such as the house may from the circumstances of the country think right. One of the gentlemen who had preceded him seemed to consider the tone of the address too warlike, considering the great power of France upon the Continent. Another, on the contrary, who seemed for the same reason to consider it too pacific, spoke of the declining state of our manufactories, and thought that on that account, we should be induced to re-commence the war: he hoped however that it would never be considered a ground for going to war, because our manufactures were not in as prosperous a state as we could wish. Those who disapproved of the peace altogether, might be consistent, if they now wished to break it: but those who joined in the general approbation it met with, both from the parliament and the country, could hardly now, with consistency, view the definitive treaty in a light very different from what they did when it was first made. It was obvious, that if we renewed the war with France, the most natural way of carrying it en with success, would be again to take possession of those places which we had ceded. Now to give up places, merely to take them again, would place both the makers and

approvers of the peace, in a very ridiculous point of view. However ardently he wished to see peace preserved throughout Europe, yet he would by no means say, that we were not justified in going to war on a mere point of honour; but Lefore he could assent to this country provoking a war on the ground of its injured honour, he must have the case made out, and proved to his satisfaction. He would allow, that the preservation of national honour, as well as the principles of self defence, often made wars unavoidable; if however, at the present moment, no such strong case could be made out, he thought that there could not be a time, in which circumstances were less favourable to beginning a war.

He wished to know whether France was for ever to be considered our rival? Whether we were to be always, even when apparently at peace, in such a state of rivality as bordered upon hostility? This country appeared to him, never to have a fairer chance of superiority, than at the epoch of the present peace. As to the French navy, the most timid had ceased to dread it. The general objects of the French government were, it appeared to him, to revive commerce, and improve its commercial and manufacturing system, by imitating the means which have raised this country. ought such rivalship to give us any alarm? We had gotten the start of them, and would doubtless be abje long to keep the lead. Every step that France takes in this course, will be an advantage to the manufactures and commerce of this country. In a contest of this kind with France, we had every prospect of being successful. The case must

.

If so,

therefore

lete large fortunes in a few years of war. He would rather from his soul that the blood of his fellow creatures should flow to gratify the ambition of an Alexander, than that certain persons should infamously make it the source to enrich their coffers. We had terminated the war in which we had been so long engaged, happily; we had preserved our antient dominions, and had acquired others; in other respects we had not been so fortunate, as Europe was still left in an unsatisfactory state. He sincerely hoped however, that administration still approved of the peace they had made. (A cry of hear, hear.) Some supposed that ministers only made peace because their administration was young, and they wished to secure it: he for his part should impute to them no such unworthy motives, and was convinced that they then acted with sincerity. The power of France was certainly greater than he or any Englishman could wish it, but that was no ground for going to war. Although we might not be pleased with the provisions of the treaty of Luneville, yet at the time it was concluded we were not in a situation to interfere at all in settling the affairs of Germany. It would be monstrous then, if after having positively refused to have any thing to do with the treaty of Luneville, we were now to quarrel about the execution of the details of that treaty between France and the emperor of Germany. He concluded by hoping that the sense of the nation might be to retain the advantages of the peace they had made.

Mr. Canning said, there was one point which must be pretty universally approved of, namely, the system of preparation which ministers

He

thought it necessary to adopt. had generally approved of the peace which had been made, but if every thing was conciliation on our side, and we shewed a disposition to bear every insult from the French govern ment, in such case the conduct of government was blameable. If eiter ministers had instigated the unfortunate Swiss to a hopeless resistance, or if they only made a weak and ill-judged remonstrance in their favour, in such case their conduct was very blameable. How they had acted in those respects could be collected from no other source but public report. He certainly at the present time approved of the measure of recruiting our exhausted army, and dismantled fleet. It was when Piedmont was incorporated with France that our army was disbanded, and the allotments of Germany were perhaps the effect of our dismantling our navy. He could not but totally disagree with Mr. Fox, who attributed all the calamities of the war to the late administration; and he was prepared to maintain that the situation of the country was not so calamitous as it was represented, at the time when his majesty's late ministers retired from office. It was that administration who had planned the armament which the quarrel with the northern nations made necessary; and it was that administration who prepared and sent forth the Egyp tian expedition, which contributed so materially to the peace. He did not mean to blame the conduct of the present ministers; but they began with this advantage, that they could claim all the merit of the success of their expeditions; whereas if they had failed, it was the late administration

ministration which must have borne the blame. He was an advocate for such a state of preparation as would always leave us at liberty to put forward such a degree of strength and energy, as would now, and at all times, be sufficient to check all the hostile designs of the French government.

Lord Hawkesbury observed, that although the address appeared to be unanimously approved of, yet the grounds upon which different gentlemen supported it were very different. He could not agree entirely with what had fallen from either the hon. gentleman (Mr. Fox), or the right honourable gentleman(Mr.Canning) who had just sat down. He himself had said on the conclusion of peace, that it was right to close the accounts of war; but that still they must look forward with a watchful jealousy to prevent any future encroachments on the part of France. The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Canning) who was not present at the discussion of the preliminary and definitive treaties, had certainly misconceived the grounds on which they had been defended by his majesty's ministers. His supposition that ministers had relinquished the system, upon which they concluded that treaty, was founded upon a misconception. The principle that was avowed and acted upon at the late treaty, was what would govern his majesty's ministers now, and for the future. It was this, that as far as respected merely the interests of this country, the peace was made on honourable terms; inasmuch as the integrity of the British dominions was preserved: but as to the continent, it was allowed to be unsatisfactory; which was regretted in terms still stronger than had been

used to-night. The principle of concluding this peace then was this, that it was better to take the chance of peace than the chance of war, for objects merely continental, unless we had the support of the continental powers. This was the principle upon which his majesty's ministers had acted, on which they now act, and on which they would always be ready to act in future, and to justify themselves. The right hon. gentleman had misunderstood him, when he supposed that he had ever wished that this country should abstract itself from the politics of the rest of Europe. It was impossible that a country connected as this was by commerce, with the interests of all other nations, should ever feel indifferent to what befel these other nations: we could not seperate the politics of this country, from the politics of Europe. Among nations, as well as individuals, those who are great and powerful, have interests to attend to, beyond the mere preservation of their existence. The protection of those who are weaker, is not only a duty, but it is among the most important of their interests. The extent however to which this principle was to be carried, depended on the existing circumstances, and was regulated in a great measure, by expediency. This had been always attended to in the consideration of the line of conduct, which this country should pursue. When Poland was blotted out of the map of the world as an independant nation; it was expediency alone, which prevented our interference. There was no British sovereign, who ever felt a stronger desire to limit the power of France upon the continent, than William

the

the third, and yet he did not think it adviseable for this country to engage in a war singly against France, merely for continental objects. Although we should be always prepared to act according to circumstances, yet we could not pretend to controul existing circumstances. He must declare it to be his most decided opinion, that if (under the present circumstances of the country and of Europe) peace could be maintained with honour to ourselves, it would be better than a renewal of the contest. His right hon. friend had also misunderstood him, when he supposed that he had held forth desponding language, at the conclusion of the peace. He was sure that if war became necessary, the spirit of the people of this country would be always found equal to the contest. As to Switzerland, he must say most positively, that the resistance of that country was by no means instigated by the British government; and that no encouragement had been held out to them by this country. Some honourable gentlemen, in their compliments to Mr. Pitt, appeared to consider that the present administration wanted the firmness necessary to their situation. No man was more disposed to bestow praise on the conduct of that gentleman than himself; but events had happened in the latter part of his administration, which shewed that it was not in the power of the greatest talents to command success. The right honourable gentleman had described the state of the country, as most prosperous when he retired from office. He seemed to have forgotten, that there was at that time a com

bination of almost the whole of Europe against us. He had forgotten the dismay and anxiety which pervaded the public mind before the battle of Copenhagen, and the success of the Egyptian expedition. Some gentlemen seemed to think our navy had been dismantled, and our military force imprudently disbanded; but, in truth, there never was before, a peace in which our naval establishment had been so strong, and that of France so weak. The right hon. gentleman had said that he did not so much regard the conditions of the peace, as the animus in which it was made. As to the animus of France, if we were to wait till it was completely friendly to this country, we must be at war for ever. The policy of ministers was now, and ever had been, to resist any unjust demands from any foreign power; and if a stand must be made, to make it in the first instance. It was their wish to preserve peace as long as they could, consistently with the policy and the general circumstances of Europe. The altered situation of Europe must certainly be a subject of regret to every lover of this country; but it must be acknowledged, that we had it not alway in our power to redress whatever we might feel to be our grievance. He concluded, by trusting that the conduct of his majesty's ministers would always be found consistent with the principles they professed, and would give general satisfaction to the country.

Mr Windham particularly directed his argument against the observations of Mr. Fox, who had formerly praised the French revolution, and who now considered France, merely on the footing of a commercial rival.

When