When every messenger who arrived from the continent, brought the account of some nation conquered, or state subverted by the ambition of France; he was astonished, that the hon. gentleman could still consider France, as only a commercial rival. Since the peace, Piedmont had been annexed to France, and Switzerland enslaved. He considered this country approaching to its dissolution, and going the way of all flesh. The Continent of Europe formerly contained near twenty inpendent nations, now it has but four or five; and if France, within so short a space of time, has been enabled to subdue so many nations, it seemed a simple question of arithmetick, what time she would require to subdue the rest. It must be also recollected, that her means have been encreased in the same proportion, as the means of defence in other nations has been diminished. The balance of power on the continent, is completely gone, and France can bring against us, the full force of her superior population. When he considered what she had already done, and the situation in which we stand, he could not help exclaiming with Macbeth,

"Can such things be, And overcome us like a summer's cloud, Without our special wonder? You make

me strange,

Even to the disposition that I owe,
When now I think you can behold such

sights,

And keep the natʼral ruby of your cheek,

When mine is blanch'd with tear!"

The first effect of the peace, was a great saving of expence, as if our wealth would encrease faster than the power of France; but this prosof gain began to fail us, for we pect were obliged to keep such high

He

peace establishments, as nearly equalled the expence of those of the war. In point of gain however, the statesman would not always weigh money against the sword, and commerce against continental politics; but France could, when she attains this imperial power to which she aspires, cut up at pleasure, all the sources of our commerce, and of our gains. If France is suffered to continue her career, if she is permitted to extend this system of aggrandizement and encroachment unopposed, if we are to look on with apathy and cowardly indifference, what can we expect, but that when she has accomplished her designs upon the continent, that she will immediately fall upon us? therefore thought, that we should now retain those things which were still in our possession, as arms for our own defence and protection: he thought the time was come, when no administration could save the country, without the most cordial co-operation from the country itself. Arguments could be found for every description of people; for the generous, the patriotic, the high-minded, and the liberal: he would appeal to the jacobins too, not as lovers of social order, or of monarchy, but as men of spirit, as lovers of what they call liberty, and men of hot and proud blood: he would ask them, would they be content that this country should be crushed beneath the yoke of France? To the inert, inactive, and selfish, he would put the question, what security was there that in the present course of things, they would be allowed much longer either to enjoy their fortunes, or their ease? If the country should be once subdued by France,

every thing that is dear to every man in it, would be for ever lost. We were now in a state, that we could not stand still, and therefore with us, as well as the enemy, the motto should be "aut Cæsar, aut nullus." He did not wish wantonly to spread alarm, but if an enlightened rational fear was first felt, it might be soon followed up by a proper manly spirit: it is necessary the country should be made sensible of its danger, before it could be saved He hoped the present ministers were not the Augustuli under whom the British empire was to fall: he spoke from a deep sense of the calamities of our situation, from seeing that the power of France was growing round us, that this country was labouring under a complication of disorders both chronic and acute, and that unless great sacrifices and exertions were made, it must inevitably be ruined. He concluded by declaring, that the dying words of Lord Chatham, "that he would pawn the shirt off his back before he would consent to submission," expressed completely his feelings upon the present occasion. Mr. Fox, in explanation, said, he had been completely misrepresented by the right hon. gentleman; he never said that France was not most formidable; he regretted it as much as any man, but he always imputed it to the measures of that right hon. gentleman and his colleagues, that France had grown so powerful. He thought that they were gravely responsible to the country for the aggrandizement of

France.

Mr. Windham, in a few words, declared it was not his intention to misrepresent the hon. gentleman, and he must submit it to the house, Vol. XLV.

whether he had misrepresented him or not?

The chancellor of the exchequer (Mr. Addington) could not hear it stated, that we were running rapidly the race of ruin, and hurrying to destruction, without making some observations on those expressions. He could not allow himself to suppose, that sentiments so disheartening and so unworthy of the situation of the country, were held by many men. He would not rise to apologize for the peace his majesty's ministers had made; on the contrary, he could not think, without the most heartfelt satisfaction, on the share he himself had in bringing about that peace. As to the influence of France upon the continent, it was nothing new; except in Holland and Portugal, thein.uence of France up on the continent was always greater than ours. There was no period of our history in which the government of this country ever thought it adviseable to go to war with France singly, for continental objects. He was surprized to hear the government accused of reducing all our cstablishments. The fact was, that the army is now double what it was in the year 1784, the year after the peace. There had been no reduction, except in the cavalry and in the disembodyin, the militia, a measure which necessarily took place, at the conclusion of every war. Our naval establishment in 1786, was 115 ships of war, now it is 207; in 1792, we had 18,000 seamen em ployed, now we have 46,000. In the discussion upon the peace, it was insisted that our commerce and manufactures must sufler considerably; whereas, on the contrary, our foreign export trade had increased

C

from

from twenty-three millions, the highest which it had ever reached in any preceding year, to twenty-seven millions and a half, to which it arrived this year. He thought the right hon. gentleman would find it difficult to prove to the house that a state of war was the best for our internal security. He believed, in his conscience, that the disposition of the nation was the same as that of his majesty's ministers; that they anxiously wished for peace, but were not afraid of war. There could be no wish in any body to lay the country at the feet of France; but he saw a wish in some people to inflame the two countries to hostility, without any definite object. He felt that war, without any definite object, was the greatest of all evils; but still he should prefer it, at any time, to the sacrifice of our honor; he should be ready, on any future occasion, to enter minutely into the principles of the government, both at the conclusion of the peace, and to the present moment.

Mr. Thomas Grenville said, that after the turn which the debate had taken, his tacit support of the address might be construed into an assent of propositions, which he could by no means allow. His sentiments, on the present address, coincided exactly with those of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham). The details which the chancellor of the Exchequer had given of the revenue of the country, were no answers to the arguments that had been adduced. He could not allow that the makers and approvers of the peace were equally pledged to maintain it. The approvers of it had only acted on the assurances that they had received, of the beneficial

consequences which were to result from it. Those assurances, however, had now completely failed; and therefore those who had merely approved of it, were no longer bound to support it. The fact was, that the peace had never been thoroughly discussed, as to the tone and temper in which it was made. The tone of it had been taken on the mere word of ministers, and it was now found that they had either been completely deceived themselves, or had deceived others. The treaty, in truth, was no sooner signed, than the disposition of the French government was found to be very different from what ministers had affected to believe it. And that disposition was every day evinced more plainly. No sooner had the treaty been signed, in May last, than we heard of Piedmont being annexed to France; in August we heard of the plan agreed upon by France and Russia, for the destruction of the German empire. And yet, by the treaty of Westphalia, this country guaranteed the German empire; but now we were to be told, in the language of The Moniteur, "that we had the treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens." In September, the unhappy fate of Switzerland arrested our attention; and in October the duchy of Parma is irrevocably united to France. These are the first indications of the friendly disposition of the first consul. The very words of the address shew, that the sentiments of administration are changed. It was on that account, and because a high military establishment was recommended, that he gave his hearty concurrence to the address.

Lord Castlereagh defended the conduct

conluct of his majesty's ministers, but freely confessed that the state of Europe was much more unsatisfactory now than it was at the time of the signing of the peace at Amiens. Great advantages, however, hád been derived from that peace. "Had we continued the war on the reasoning of the right hon. gentleman and his friends, we should have lost our energy, and the country would not have been with us.” Another advantage had been de rived from the peace: the country sees that its resources are firmly fixed, and do not depend upon the circumstance of peace or war. His noble friend (lord Hawkesbury) had been misunderstood by those who supposed him to have stated that all continental alliance was at an ead: he certainly had never meant to express the dispiriting idea, that no circumstances or time could revive the vigour and energy of the continent. The determination of his majesty's ministers was to place the peace establishment, on the most efficient and permanent footing; and should war become necessary, he felt no doubt but the spirit and resources of the nation would enable us to repel every danger with which we might be threatened.

Mr. Whitbread said, he should vote for the address, although he could not deny but that he was alarmed at what had fallen from his

Those who

majesty's ministers. disapproved the peace, acted consistently in now wishing for war; but those who had made the peace, while France was in possession of Piedmont and Switzerland, and who had not then made the slightest stipulation, in regard either to Switzerland or Sardinia, would act inconsistently if they were to break the treaty on such grounds. However he admired the abilities and lively imagination of a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Windham), he could not agree with him in his reasoning, when he supposed France would increase much faster in power during peace than in time of war. The fact was otherwise: at the first effort at negociation, France was content to cede Belgium; at the second she refused to give it up; at the third her pretensions were still higher; the fourth attempt was, when Bonaparte sent overtures of peace, which, in an evil hour, were rejected; and during the war France had enormously increased in power. She had not made an equal progress in peace. He hoped peace was not likely to be soon broken, and he lamented that language tending to inspire such a belief should have been so inconsiderately used.

After some explanations between the chancellor of the exchequer and Mr. Whitbread, the address was carried unanimously.

ON

N the 24th of November, the report of the address having been brought up by Mr. Trench, and the question being put on the second reading,

Mr. Wilberforce rose to deliver his sentiments. The address seemed to him to hold out that language which was proper for the house to maintain. He thought the country had been hitherto rather too forward in entering into war and continental connexions, in which it had often engaged itself to an extent that it certainly had not foreseen, and which had wasted much of our blood and treasure, without producing any adequate advantage: but he never did say that continental connections were at all times, and under all circumstances, to be avoided. It was certainly desirable to prevent France extending her power by land as well as by sea; but then, in attending to this principle, we must consider expediency, as well as the speculations of statesmen. How had the speculations of the wisest been turned into foolishness? The profoundest politicians had overlooked what men of the plainest and meanest capacities had forescen. He could not but

remember the splendid and eloquent speech of his noble friend, (Lord Hawkesbury) which, though replete with knowledge, and displaying the profoundest political combinations, only shewed the weakness of political speculation, and how one disastrous event could overturn the foundation of the best reasonings. The quantity of treasure vainly expended in the last war, would better have been employed in the improvement, than in the destruction of mankind. At the conclusion of the treaty of Utrecht, a single accident changed the whole complexion of political affairs, and produced a peace for thirty years. If he had said to his constituents "that the people of this country were too honest for continental connexions," what he meant by the expression was, that we were always faithful to our engagements, whereas we were as generally forsaken by our allies. The principle of the continental powers seemed to be, to pay no attention to political engagements, longer than it suited their convenience. Every court in Europe had at different times belonged to the late confederacy against France, and yet they had all found means to

get