legislation, “that a rivality in comL-rce and in the arts of peace, were the sole objects of his ambi

a!" From support, thus qualified, the ministers could receive little pasure and less advantage. It

was evident that it arose from a bebet that they were determined to Jersevere in pacific measures, at al events, and under all circumtoes; and that should war (which was evidently in their contemplaten, however they might endeavour to conceal it from the public, perLas from themselves,) be the resalt of the present menacing posture ef atlairs, that all concurrence in opinion, and assistance from their 154 apparent well-wishers, must In consequence of which the advocates of the present government, rejecting such assistance, had to combat at once the friends of Mr. Fat-the now and the old opposition—a task totally beyond their powers in debate or political science, and the failure in which must expose them, as will always be the case in a popular government, to ultimate defeat and ruin. Under such disastrous auspices did the present administration commence their parliamentary campaign of this year; and such the view of the materials of which that parliament was composed. Warm and eager contention was looked to among the political circles. Nor was the state of the public mind more tranquil. Lulled into the most profund security, by the assurances of the ministers; the inhabitants of the British empire had seen, but prospectively, a continuation of the peace, for a term of sullicient duration. to ensure the reduction of the national debt, a decrease of taxes,

to

66

internal prosperity, and a vast increase of commercial and colonial advantages. In vain did the warning voice" of the first statesmen of the age, announce the coming tempest. In vain did the ambitious turbulence of Bonaparte in every quarter of the globe, bespeak his inveterate hatred to us, and his unlimited ambition. In vain did the British press, that great lever of public opinion, (and which had to its immortal honor first taken the alaim at that despotic violence which threatened in its unchecked progress, the liberties of the world, and of course its own,) exert itself open the eyes of a deluded prople.-The specious and flattering prospects held out by administration, prevailed over the better judgments of a burthened ard commercial nation; and it was not till the speech announced the necessity of military preparation, and the jealous view which it took of continental affairs, that the people could be brought to look their danger in the face.-But this thunderclap soon aroused them--a determination to engage cheerfully in new wars, if such were necessary, quickly prevailed in the minds of all; but with this determination began to be conceived a deep and rooted contempt for the characters of those, who had blindly or wilfully deceived them, and an anxious desire to be delivered in the moment of approaching trial, from those hands which had, in comparatively easy periods, so feebly held the reigns of government; and that they should be committed to such as had experience, ability, and skill to guide them.--Before we close however

ultimate

this statement, it is but justice to remark, that one inestimable good consequence seems to have resulted, even from the very weakness of administration. In proportion to our submission and acquiescence to the views of France; in proportion as we gave way to her ambition, and the accomplishment of her objects; in proportion as we bent under the impositions of an insatiable and insulting enemy; in that proportion the resentment and indignation of a generous and brave people

arose at the proofs of his unmerited hostility. One sentiment, one motive,seemed to pervade,without a single exception, the whole community; and the British nation were, to a man, determined to shew our insulting foe, should a contest be inevitable, that it had not lost its ancient strength or elasticity, but could spring back with tenfold force and energy, to the destruction of the power who had dared oppressively to humble it.

CHAP.

shut us out for ever from the Mediterranean. Wherever we turned our eyes, we must see the progressive aggrandizement of France. He was decidedly of opinion that the sum which was demanded was too large for a peace establishment, and yet too small either for war, or to enable us to interfere, with weight, in the affairs of the continent.

The chancellor of the exchequer trusted that the house would not believe, that it was from any disrespect, that he did not think it necessary to preface the resolutions with any observation. The right hon. gentleman and his friends, had a very short time ago felt, that there were sufficient reasons for a larger establishment, and they then called for it; but now, when an increased establishment is proposed, he was asked what was the reason for this excess? If he and his friends believed the descriptions they had hemselves given of the state of Europe, he should suppose no farther reasons could be necessary, to them at least, for an increased establishment. It seemed now to be agreed by every body, that a strong defensive force was necessary for this country, in the present situation of Europe. As to the increase of the Dutch navy, when it was considered how it had been reduced last war, it was no wonder that exertions were made to restore it: but if there was no supineness on our part, those exertions could not be to us injurious. In the beginning of the last war the fleets of the enemy were as follow:France had 105 sail of the line, Spain 79, and Holland 27; but at the conclusion of the war, this force was so reduced, that France

had but 39, Spain 63, and Holland 16. The British navy now exceeds the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, by sixty sail of the line, and proportionally in frigates and sloops of war. Under those circumstances, he did not think this country need feel any serious alarm from the naval exertions of the powers which France could influence to join her. His majesty's ministers had no other wish than to be enabled to put forth, upon any emergency, a force sufficient to repel all danger from this country.

Sir Sidney Smith expressed considerable regret, at the great reductions which were suddenly made, both in the king's dock-yards, and in the navy in general. A prodigious number of men had been thus reduced to the utmost poverty and distress; and it might be apprehended that they would be obliged to seek employment from foreign states. Whatever reluctance they might feel to this, they might, by dire necessity, be compelled to it. On this ground he wished the number of seamen to be employed were considerably greater than it is; for he knew, from his own experience, that what was called an ordinary seaman, could hardly find employment at present, either in the king's or in the merchants' service. had himself been present at some of the changes which had taken place in France; they resembled more the changes of scenery at a theatre, than any thing else. than any thing else. Every thing was done for stage effect, and whether it was the death of Cæsar; the fall of Byzantium; or the march of Alexander, it seemed to Frenchmen almost equally indifferent. If the invasion of Britain was to be produced,

He

produced, it might have stage effect enough to draw 400,000 volunteers to join in the procession. Under those circumstances, he wished that this country should always be in a situation to call together speedily a strong naval force, to frustrate any attempts on the part of the enemy.

Mr. Sturges supported the resoIntion, from his idea of the necessity of a large establishment; but expressed surprize that ministers had assigned no reason for this increase, and earnestly hoped that it would be yet possible to continue in peace.

Captain Markham defended the conduct of the admiralty board, in contradiction of the instances adduced by sir Sidney Smith.

Lord Hawkesbury said, it was not usual for ministers to preface resolutions of this nature with many observations; but, in the present instance, he thought it more peculiarly necessary, as it was generally understood at the time of discussing the address, that our establishments were to be considerably increased. Ministers had then distinctly avowed their intentions of proposing such an increase. It was uncommon for ministers to give such an explanation; it was very uncommon to demand it from them. As to a permanent establisment, that was certainly a fit subject for parliamentary discussion; but the establishment which ministers might think necessary for the year, depended upon their opinion of the situation of affairs, that, they were not at liberty to disclose. It was therefore absolutely necessary to place such confidence in whoever were the ministers, as to give them credit, when they declared their

opinions generally, that such a force is immediately necessary for the defence of the state. He believed, that without speaking from any exclusive information his majesty's ministers might have, there were sufficient circumstances known by every man in that house and in the country, to induce a very general opinion, that our military establishments ought to be increased. He wished, however, that the country would endeavour to continue the peace, in the true spirit of peace; a spirit which was perfectly consistent with the national honor; but free from that degree of irritation, which, if pursued, could answer no one good end, but must inevitably lead to hostilities. It had been usual for that house, without much observation, to vote such peace establishment for the year, as ministers should declare to be necessary. It was not, however, merely on this ground of confidence, that ministers relied for the support of the house; there were abundant circumstances known to the whole world, to make an increased establishment a thing of evident and absolute necessity.

Mr. Canning professed to be satisfied with the explanation of his noble friend (lord Hawkesbury), and if such an explanation had been given before the resolutions were brought forward, he thought it would have prevented all discussion. He allowed that it was always necessary to be prepared, not only against the hostility, but against the perfidy of France. We should be prepared against the attack of our foreign possessions, and the possible event of invasion, not only on the first declaration of war, but