hended, such a conscription must be deemed a struggle for dominion, not a measure of national security, and as such, demands the most jealous scrutiny even on the part of those states, who are not immediate parties in the contest. The organization of a force incompatible with the safety of other states, would of itself be held a sufficient ground for interference. The United States pretended that we had violated their rights by a misinterpretation of public law in restraining their neutral commerce and subjecting their ships to visitation, and in certain cases to forfeiture. They complained also that their flag was insulted by a claim on our part, to the persons of natural-born British subjects found serving in their marine; and for these supposed injuries they declare war against us. They proceed in that war to the invasion of our dominions, and denouncing conquest and subjugation even after their first invasion is repelled, they form a plan by arming their whole male population to give effect to that threat. Twenty five years ago the publication of such a plan would have been novel in principle, and have astonished mankind. The republicans of France first conceived the daring experiment, and by its tremendous operation almost subdued the world. The republicans of America have followed the example, not for defence, but avowedly for a purpose of conquest. This is a measure which calls the attention of other countries no less than our own, of all those, to whose territories in the Western hemisphere, the aggrandizement of America must prove a dangerous, if not a fatal blow. We have here briefly touched the several points which our ministers must have considered in the formation of that treaty which now waits the ratification of the American government. Of the conditions offered to the enemy we are informed nothing by authority. Having brought to so glorious an issue our contest with republican France, we trust that the energies of this great country are fully equal to secure all its objects in a contest with republican America. It is reasonable indeed, that after twenty years of such severe exertion, we should consider a state of universal peace as a blessing not hastily to be abandoned, and that after the labours of such a contest we should be inclined to recruit our energies in the security of uninterrupted repose. We must however declare our belief that if the Indian nations, our allies, are not restored to those territories of which they have been defrauded or plundered since the independence of the colonies was acknowledged, and if our remaining settlements are not secured by a barrier which cannot be forced whenever the Americans shall chuse again to try their strength in war; we cannot with justice consider the peace as a state of security. Our enemy has proclaimed his object, and evinced the means with which he intends to pursue it. Vigilance must still remain our protection. The acknowledgement of our maritime claims by acquiescence, is indeed an abandonment on the part of the United States of those objects for which they avowedly commenced the war. Their cession of the fisheries which were granted to them by former treaties, and their exclusion from trading with our East Indian dependencies, are points which are most important to our commercial interests, and may fairly be considered as recompensing us for all the expenditure attendant on this just and necessary contest. The treaty as it appears in unofficial statements, if not all that we desire is highly honourable, for on our part it was a defensive war, and the points contended for by the enemy are abandoned. The dangers which we have alluded to are nevertheless real. It might have, however, been inexpedient to agitate these questions at present; but we have no doubt that a day will arrive when the government of the United States, if they should long continue one federal republic, will resume its operations hitherto active alike in peace and in war, to expel the British from North America, and to possess itself of the whole continent. When the treaty of peace shall be published, we may judge of its provision with more propriety than at present; but no act of state is to be considered independently of many circumstances which to the superficial observer may seem unconnected, but are nevertheless intimately blended with it. The negotiations at Ghent must have been conducted on our part with reference to those at Vienna. In concluding the American war without the least sacrifice of honour, and obtaining for our merchants the splendid advantages of monopoly on the continent of Asia, and in the fisheries of Newfoundland, so much has been gained that it might at present be inexpedient to contend for more; and at the present crisis, by effecting a general pacification, more may be gained in our European relations than even the subjugation of the United States, if that were practicable, could counterbalance. But an opinion has prevailed that Mr. Madison will not ratify the treaty. His refusal will be an additional proof that his object is not peace but conquest. A new insult will the offered to our country: but having ascertained what British prowess can accomplish in a warfare of twenty years with the gigantic power of revolutionary France, we do not dread a prolongation of warfare with republican America. ART. ART. V. Reflections on the financial System of Great Britain, and particularly on the Sinking Fund, written in France, in the Summer of 1812. By Walter Boyd, Esq. 46 pp. Hatchard. 1815. THE author of this pamphlet bears a name of celebrity in the annals of our finance. We believe that he was honored by the confidence of Mr. Pitt; and, in our view, it is a high eulogium on the integrity and talent of any one to state, that he enjoyed the confidence of that great Minister. But the vicissitudes of fortune in this commercial country are among the common incidents of every passing day. Early in the last war, Mr. Boyd experienced a fatal reverse of circumstances in a house which, till then, enjoyed the highest credit, and fell from distinguished opulence into great necessity; but he bore with him into retirement the commiseration of many, and the respect of all who knew him. It was the fate of Mr. Boyd to pass into still greater calamity. He was one of those who, during the short peace of 1802, had trusted in the plighted faith of the Consular Government; and, by the unprecedented violence of that government, was detained at the renewal of the war in hopeless imprisonment. He wrote this pamphlet "In the tenth year of his detention in France, under circumstances more calculated to drive him to despair, than to lead him to look for consolation in any endeavour to be useful to his country. "Stifling however the sense of his personal sufferings, and eleyating, as well as circumstances permitted, his mind to the importance of the subject, he employed his time, during several months, in establishing a chain of reasoning, from assumed data (for such only he possessed) tending to shew the utility, and even the necessity of some change in the management of the Sinking Fund, in prder to derive from thence part of the permanent taxes, which an indefinite prolongation of the war would render necessary." Whatever comes from Mr. Boyd is worthy of attention. Expericuced in the doctrines of Finance, he forms no hasty judgement. His opinions are entitled to attention even where they fail of convincing. The plans here laid before us are founded on a view of thẹ National Debt and of the Sinking Fund, not according to the annual amount of the one and the gross amount of the other, but according to the relation which the produce of the one may bear to the charge for ultimately redeeming and in the mean time defraying the interests of the other. Thus, in the year 1786, when our finances were reduced to order by Mr. Pitt, the Sinking Fund Fund of the annual million then established bore the proportion of nearly i to 9 to the then existing interest of the National Debt, which was nearly eight millions, with the charge for redemption added. By the uninterrupted operation of that fund upon that debt, it would redeem the whole in 45 years. Mr. Boyd assumes that the interest of the debt, at the time that he wrote, is 24 millions, and the Sinking Fund, in its natural progress, and by the additions made on account of the subsequent loans, increased to 12 millions, making the amount of the annual charge 36 millions. The proportion therefore between the augmented Sinking Fund and the annual charge, for payment of the interest, and for its ultimate redemption, is as 1 to 3. By extending the calculation it will appear, that while the Sinking Fund is left in uninterrupted operation, and the usual provision of 1 per cent. made for the redemption of every new loan added to the debt, the proportion of the Sinking Fund to the total charge for interest and redemption will continually increase, notwithstanding the increase of the debt by frequent loans, till at last its amount must be the same, and the debt be extinguished. "It is made a question whether a perseverance in this system, which burthens the country with the whole charge of the publick funded debt, and all the additions to it," till a great or complete progress be made in its redemption, "be preferable to such a present modification of the Sinking Fund as may have the effect of gradually relieving us of taxes, as they have been and may be gradually imposed." Mr. Boyd proposes three schemes of modification. By the first scheme the Sinking Fund is to proceed in its present course of operation for five years. At the end of that period it is to be reduced to bear the same proportion to the then an. nual charge which it now bears to the present annual charge. The surplus produce is to be still applied in the purchase of stock-and the interest of that stock is to be appropriated by Parliament to such purposes as may be deemed expedient. At the end of the next and of every succeeding period of five years the proportion which now subsists between the Sinking Fund and the annual charge is to be again restored, and the surplus produce in like manner to be applied. By the second scheme the Sinking Fund is to be reduced, at the end of every period of five years, to its present proportion, and its surplus produce be applied, not in the purchase of stock, the interest of which might be appropriated to the reduction of taxes, but to the immediate aid of the publick for the current expences of each of each year. Without Without entering into the details used by Mr. Boyd to render these schemes luminous to those who delight in prolix calculation, we shall only observe that the simple effect of either of them is to arrest the grand progression of the Sinking Fund at the end of fiveyears from the present period, and to limit its maximum of operation to that increase which would be attained in the continuance of the established system during that five years. The third scheme proposed by Mr. Boyd is engrafted on the first, so as that whatever sums should be withdrawn from the Sinking Fund, by the operation of that scheme, are to be annually issued by Government (either raised by new loans or by new taxes) to replace the same amount in that fund. For the details we must refer to the publication itself. Now though our respect for Mr. Boyd's calculation is consi. derable, yet we cannot extract from those, which he has now published, any novel result. We were taught at school that the operation of compound interest, continued uninterruptedly, would produce prodigious accumulation. As children, we raised many a splendid fabrick of imagination on that glittering foundation. But parsimonious expenditure and multiplication of resources are the only sure means of avoiding the pressure of subsisting debts, or of adding to the mass of acquired wealth, either in private or in publick economy. Schemes of calculation, whether simple or abstruse, have no magical power. The British Government has incurred a heavy load of debt, because its expenditure has continually exceeded the amount of its re The reduction of it, as far as expedient, can only be effectuated by rendering its expenditure less than its revenue, and reserving the excess of revenue for the discharge of a portion of its debts. The statement of that principle exhausts the science of the Sinking Fund. The main utility of that institution is to provide a growing revenue appropriated to the liberation of the State from past obligations. Whatever scheme may arrest the growth of that appropriated revenue, however ingeniously devised, is in fact illusive, and a partial abandonment of its principle. The reduction of the National Debt very far below its present amount is desirable, because the taxes now raised for the payment of its interest are of so great an amount that they weaken the political energies of the country. We trust that the peace, now happily established in Europe, will be of long continuance; but a day must come when we, or our childreu, shall again contend against powerful enemies, if not for our constitution and independance, yet for honour and the security of our rights. "Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera que vehat Argo We |