domicile. The debtor State is in no respect his sovereign, neither has it any of the attributes of sovereignty as to the debt it owes, except such as belong to it as a debtor. All the obligations which rest on the holder of the debt as a resident of the State in which he dwells, still remain, and as a member of society he must contribute his just share toward supporting the government whose protection he claims and to whose control he has submitted himself."

§ 98. Marriage and Divorce.

The force and meaning of the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution has been especially worked out in connection with the subject of marriage and divorce and it will, therefore, be proper to state briefly the positions that the Supreme Court has taken upon this point.

Generally speaking, it has been held in the United States that jurisdiction to grant a divorce depends upon the domicile of the complainant. With hardly an exception, all of the States of the Union recognize the possibility of the wife obtaining a domicile separate from that of her husband. Until recently, however, a few States (among them New York) held that where the husband and wife were domiciled in different States, decrees of divorce granted in either State would not have to be given full faith and credit in the other States. The unconstitutionality of this doctrine was, however, declared by the United States Supreme Court in Atherton v. Atherton.20

20 181 U. S. 155; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544; 45 L. ed. 794.

In all European countries, and in Spanish America, the possibility of the wife (who has not obtained a judicial separation) having a nationality, domicile, or residence apart from her husband is not recognized. A few of the Protestant States of Germany, and possibly other States, permit a wife living apart from her husband to secure naturalization and then to get a divorce, but most States refuse to recognize such a divorce as valid. De Bauffremont v. De Bauffremont, Dalloz, 1878, II, I, 1878, 1, 201; 2 Beale's Cases on Conflict of Laws, 99 (France); In re W's Marriage, 25 Clunet, 385; 1 Beale's Cas. 428 (Austria). In England the courts now recognize the possibility of a wife deserted by her husband obtaining a divorce in the State where they last lived together, irrespective of his present domicile. Armytage v. Armytage,

One State of the Union is, of course, not obliged to recognize the validity of a divorce granted by a court of another State unless that State had jurisdiction to grant it, a jurisdiction which, as just said, is held to depend upon the domicile of one or both of the parties. No valid decree of divorce can, therefore, be granted, on constructive service, by the courts of a State in which neither party is domiciled.21

Where the plaintiff has not a bona fide domicile in the State, a court cannot render a decree binding in other States even if the non-resident defendant voluntarily enters a personal appearance.22 Of course, however, there is nothing to prevent courts of one State from recognizing, if they see fit, a decree thus granted in another State. The provision of the federal Constitution is brought into force only when state courts refuse to grant full faith and credit.23

Finally it should be said that in all cases where the defendant has not been summoned within the State, or has not voluntarily appeared, the decree that is rendered has no extraterritorial force except as dissolving the matrimonial status. It cannot control in an extraterritorial manner questions of property rights, custody of children and the payment of alimony.

1898, Pr. 179. In most European States a divorce will be recognized only if obtained in the country to which the parties owe allegiance. In England the divorce will be recognized only when obtained at the domicile of the husband. The English court has recently recognized an American divorce obtained at the wife's domicile, where the husband was domiciled in another American State which recognized the divorce. Armtage v. Attorney-General, 22 T. L. R. 306. The court, however, took occasion to reiterate the general principle that "it is the husband's domicile which decides the tribunal to try the cause. In Scotland and the other countries governed by the Roman-Dutch law there is no requirement whatever of nationality or domicile, but residence of the parties for a certain time within the State is sufficient. Weatherley v. Weatherley, Transvaal, Prov. Rep. 66; 1 Beale's Cas. 420." This note is substantially quoted from the article "Constitutional Protection for Decrees of Divorce," by Joseph H. Beale, Jr., in the Haward Law Review, June, 1906 (XIX, 589).

21 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 551; 45 L. ed. 804. 22 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237; 47 L. ed. 366. 23 Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; 45 L. ed. 810.

Until the decision in 1906 of the case of Haddock v. Haddock,2 it had been supposed that a decree of divorce granted the husband or wife by a court of the State in which he or she was domiciled, if the notice of the beginning of the suit required by the local law had been served actually or constructively upon the other party, was in all cases valid in other States. This, it had been thought, had been determined in Atherton v. Atherton.25

In Atherton v. Atherton a divorce had been granted, on the ground of desertion, to a husband in Kentucky whose wife had left him and taken up residence in New York. She had not appeared in the suit, but notice had been served upon her by mail. The highest court of New York refused to give effect to this decree upon the ground that the wife had been forced to leave her husband because of cruel treatment, had thereby been entitled to obtain a domicile apart from him, and had not appeared or been personally served with process. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed this holding of the New York court, saying that, inasmuch as the Kentucky court had jurisdiction of the complainant, and constructive service had been had upon the defendant, its decree had to be recognized as conclusively establishing not only the fact of the divorce, but that the wife had abandoned her husband. The opinion declared: "We are of opinion that the undisputed facts show that such efforts were required by the statutes of Kentucky, and were actually made to give the wife actual notice of the suit in Kentucky as to make the decree of the court there, granting a divorce upon the grounds that she had abandoned her husband, as binding on her as if she had been served with notice in Kentucky, or had voluntarily appeared in the suit. Binding her to the full extent, it established beyond contradiction, that she had abandoned her husband, and precludes her from asserting that she left him on account of his cruel treatment. To hold otherwise would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the husband to obtain a divorce for the cause alleged, if it actually existed. The wife not being within the

24 201 U. S. 562; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525; 50 L. ed. 867. 25 181 U. S. 155; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544; 45 L. ed. 794.

State of Kentucky, if constructive notice, with all the precautions prescribed by the statutes of that State, were insufficient to bind her by a decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony, the husband could only get a divorce by suing in the State in which she was found; and by the very fact of suing her there, he would admit that she had acquired a separate domicile (which he denied), and would disprove his own ground of action, that she had abandoned him in Kentucky."

The court in its opinion was, however, careful to confine the doctrine laid down to the particular case before it. "This case," it declared, "does not involve the validity of a divorce granted on constructive service, by the court of a State in which only one of the parties ever had a domicile, nor the question to what extent the good faith of the domicile may be afterward inquired into. In this case, the divorce in Kentucky was by the court of the State which had always been the undoubted domicile of the husband, and which was the only matrimonial domicile of the husband and wife. The single question to be decided is the validity of that divorce, granted after such notice had been given as was required by the statutes of Kentucky." The court did, however, affirm the general doctrine that "the purpose and effect of a decrce of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relations of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind the other. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law."

The facts of the case of Haddock v. Haddock26 very much resembled those of Atherton v. Atherton. The only important difference, if indeed it was an important difference, was that here the decree which was sought to be used as conclusive in another State, had been granted the husband by the courts of a State which was not the matrimonial domicile, but was the then domicile of the husband. The wife, residing in the State of the original matrimonial domicile, had received only constructive notice. The 26 201 U. S. 562; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525; 50 L. ed. 867.

courts of the State of the wife's domicile refused to recognize the validity of this decree, on the ground that the separation had occurred through the fault of the husband, and their action was upheld by the federal Supreme Court, that court thus, in effect, deciding that the husband, though divorced in the State (Connecticut) where he had obtained his decree, was not divorced in another State (New York) where his wife or former wife — resided. In effect, then, limiting the case to the particular facts involved, the doctrine was laid down that where the complainant has abandoned the wife, and obtained a domicile in a State, other than that of the original matrimonial domicile, and only constructive service has been had upon the defendant, no decree of divorce can be granted to which full force and credit must be given in the courts of other States.

In order to distinguish this case from previous adjudications, and especially from that of Atherton v. Atherton, the court, in its majority opinion, reviewed the whole subject and laid down the following doctrines as having been definitely established: "First. The requirement of the Constitution is not that some, but that full, faith and credit shall be given by States to the judicial decrees of other States. That is to say, where a decree rendered in one State is embraced by the full faith and credit clause, that constitutional provision commands that the other States shall give to the decree the force and effect to which it was entitled in the State where rendered. (Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679; 49 L. ed. 1066.) Second. Where a personal judgment has been rendered in the courts of a State against a nonresident merely upon constructive service, and, therefore, without acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, such judgment may not be enforced in another State in virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Indeed, a personal judgment so rendered is, by operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, void as against the non-resident, even in the State where rendered; and, therefore, such non-resident, in virtue of rights granted by the Constitution of the United States, may successfully resist, even in the State where rendered, the enforce