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should never be so construed as to permit its legislature to pass a law excluding citizens of other States from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities granted them by the federal Constitution.7

Beginning with the admission of Nevada in 1864, the promises exacted of Territories seeking admission as States assumed a more political character. Of Nevada it was required that her Constitution should harmonize with the Declaration of Independence and that the right to vote should not be denied persons on account of their color. Of Nebraska, admitted in 1867, it was demanded that there should be no denial of the franchise or any other right on account of race or color, Indians excepted. Of the States that had attempted secession, still more radical were the requirements precedent to the granting to them of permission again to enjoy the other rights which they had for the time being forfeited. Of all of them it was required that there should be, by their laws, no denial of the right to vote except for crime; and of three, that negroes should not be disqualified from holding office, or be discriminated against in the matter of school privileges. Finally, Utah, when admitted as a State in 1894, was required by Congress by the Enabling Act to make "by ordinance irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of the United States, provisions for perfect religious toleration and for the maintenance of public schools free from sectarian control; and that polygamous or plural marriages are forever abolished."

It would seem that as regards the enforceability of these contracts, a distinction is to be made between those that attempt to place the State under political restrictions not imposed upon all the States of the Union by the federal Constitution, and those which seek the future regulation of private, proprietary interests.

7 A superfluous requirement, for with or without such a promise, a State is, and was then, constitutionally unable to deprive any one of the rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution.

8 By the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, some of these limitations have been made applicable to all the States and thus an equality, as to them, created.

The first class of these agreements the Supreme Court has repeatedly held are not enforceable against the State after it has been admitted into the Union.

In Pollard v. Hagen' the court held that a stipulation of an act of Congress passed for the admission of the State of Alabama into the Union that "all navigable waters within the said State shall forever remain public highways, free to the citizens of said State, and of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor, imposed by said State" did not give to the United States any greater control of the navigable waters of that State than was possessed by the Federal Government over the waters of any other State.10

In Escanaba v. Lake Michigan Transportation Co.11 the court declared, relative to certain limitations placed upon the governing powers of Illinois while in a territorial condition: "Whatever the limitations upon her powers as a government while in a territorial condition, whether from the Ordinance of 1787 or the legislation of Congress, it ceased to have any operative force, except as voluntarily adopted by her after she became a State of the Union. On her admission, she at once became entitled to and possessed of all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which belonged to the original States. She was admitted and could be admitted only on the same footing with them."

And in Boln v. Nebraska12 it was declared: "This court has held in many cases that, whatever be the limitations upon the power of a territorial government, they cease to have any operative force, except as voluntarily adopted after such Territory has become a State of the Union. Upon the admission of a State it becomes entitled to and possesses all the rights of dominion and

93 How. 212; 11 L. ed. 565.

10 Cf. Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82; 13 L. ed. 337; Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57; 21 L. ed. 798; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113; 31 L. ed. 149; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548; 38 L. ed. 331.

11 107 U. S. 678; 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; 27 L. ed. 442.

12 176 U. S. 83; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287; 44 L. ed. 382.

sovereignty which belongs to the original States, and, in the language of the act of 1867 admitting the State of Nebraska, it stands upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever."

In the foregoing cases reference was had, as appears from the quotations, to States created out of Territories. There would seem to be, however, no reason why the same doctrine should not be applied to the political limitations exacted of a number of the Southern States at the time of their readmission to full constitutional privileges after the period of the Civil War and Reconstruction.

§ 115. Contracts Regarding Proprietary Interests.

Turning now to a consideration of the continued validity and enforceability of compacts between the States and General Government with reference to proprietary interests, one finds the comparatively recent case of Stearns v. Minnesota13 most illuminating. That case involved the construction and application of an agreement made by the State with the United States at the time of its admission to the Union, with reference to public lands, within its boundaries, owned by the United States. The court in its opinion say: "That these provisions of the Enabling Act and the Constitution, in form at least, made a compact between the United States and the State, is evident. In an inquiry as to the validity of such a compact this distinction must at the outset be noticed. There may be agreements or compacts attempted to be entered into between two States, or between the State and the Nation, in reference to political rights and obligations, and there may be those solely in reference to property belonging to one or to the other. That different considerations may underlie the question as to the validity of these two kinds of compacts or agreements is obvious. It has often been said that a State admitted into the Union enters therein in full equality with all the others, and such equality may forbid any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights and 13 179 U. S. 223; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73; 45 L. ed. 162.

obligations; whereas, on the other hand, a mere agreement in reference to property involves no question of equality of status, but only of the power of a State to deal with the Nation or with any other State in reference to such property. The case before us is one involving simply an agreement as to property between a State and the Nation. That a State and the Nation are competent to enter into an agreement of such a nature with one another has been affirmed in past decisions of this court, and that they have been frequently made in the admission of new States, as well as subsequently thereto, is a matter of history. We are of opinion that there was a valid contract made with these companies in respect to the taxation of these lands— a contract which it was beyond the power of the State to impair; that this subsequent legislation does impair that contract and cannot, therefore, be sustained."

§ 116. Suits Between States.

This subject will be treated in connection with the Judicial Power of the United States.14

14 See chapter LIII.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PERSONS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES: STATUS OF ALIENS.

§ 117. Territorial Sovereignty.

By international law and by the public law of all civilized States the legal jurisdiction of a State is generally recognized to extend over all persons for the time being within the districts. under its de facto control. The only exceptions, if exceptions they be, are those coming within the principle of extraterritoriality. A State has jurisdiction over, not only its native-born and naturalized subjects, but all the subjects of other States permanently or, at any given time, temporarily resident, within its borders.

Nowhere, perhaps, has this general constitutional principle been better stated than by Marshall in the great case of The Exchange, decided in 1812. In the opinion rendered in this case, the Chief Justice, after pointing out that the jurisdiction of a State within its own territory is necessarily exclusive as well as absolute, goes to show that the exceptions to this principle, generally recognized in practice, are themselves founded upon the will of the State recognizing them. Thus the so-called doctrine of extraterritoriality, though often spoken of as a fiction, namely that the diplomatic representatives and their establishments, and public ships of war, are upon, or are parts of, the territory of the States to which they belong, is not a necessary fiction. Such immunity from local jurisdiction as exists is due to the consent of the local State. That is to say, it is by an exercise of the jurisdiction of that State that these persons are exempted from the operation, though entitled to the protection, of the local law.

§ 118. De Facto Control.

The authority of States over districts and their inhabitants temporarily subject to its de facto control, will be considered in 17 Cr. 116; 3 L. ed. 287.

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