"It is true that as citizens of the United States, and of that particular district which is subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, it is extraordinary that the courts of the United States, which are open to aliens, and to the citizens of every state in the union, should be closed upon them. But this is a subject for legislative, not for judicial consideration."

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The District of Columbia though not a "State" in the sense in which that word is used in the constitutional clause which gives to the federal courts jurisdiction in suits between citizens of different States, it is declared in DeGeofroy v. Riggs, to be a State within the meaning of a treaty granting certain rights to aliens within the "States of the Union." That the District is a part of the United States internationally viewed was declared in Loughborough v. Blake, and this dictum has never been questioned.

But with reference to the form of government to be given the District, the authority of Congress is as absolute as we have seen it to be with regard to the Territories. "The Congress of the United States being empowered by the Constitution to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatever,' over the seat of the National Government, has the entire control over the District of Columbia for every purpose of government, national or local. It may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a State might exercise within a State." 8

The Constitution provides that Congress shall "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over such district as should, by cession of particular States, become the seat of government. To the author it would seem that the intent of those who framed this provision was that by it Congress should be granted authority exclusive of the State or States by which the district might be ceded. Congress has, however, since the beginning, acted upon the assumption that by this provision it is intended 6 Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cr. 445; 2 L. ed. 332; Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 596; 41 L. ed. 1049.

7 133 U. S. 258; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295; 33 L. ed. 642.

8 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580; 43 L. ed.

that while ordinary municipal powers, such as grants to a city, may be delegated to the local governing body in the District, it may not delegate to such body the general legislative powers possessed by a State of the Union. That, in other words, the legislative authority over the District being vested by the Constitution “exclusively" in Congress, it may not by delegation be exercised by any other body. Thus, if we divide the governing powers in the United States into national, state and local, it has been held nevessary that, as regards the District the first two must be exereised by Congress itself.

It cannot be said that the Supreme Court has passed squarely upon this point, but by various dicta this doctrine has been declared. In Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, the court, after saying that the creation of municipalities exercising local self-government does not violate the rule that legislative powers may not be delegated, go on to say: "But as the repository of the legislative powers of the United States, Congress in creating the District of Columbia a body corporate for municipal purposes' could only authorize it to exercise municipal powers." Strictly speaking, this dictum was obiter as regards the delegation to the local body of local legislative powers such as are exercised by the States, within their several state limits, for the point actually determined in the case was the constitutional inability of Congress to give to the district government authority to legislate with reference to a matter of national concern, namely, interstate commerce. It is believed, however, that the long-continued legislative construction which has been consistently followed, reinforced by this and other judicial dicta,10 makes very improbable the acceptance of a different doctrine.

When legislating for the District, and the same is true as regards the Territories, Congress acts not only as a local legislature in the sense that a State acts as the local legislature for that State, but also as a National Legislature. Whence it follows that the laws thus enacted though of course only applicable to the local

9129 U. S. 141; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; 32 L. ed. 637.

10 Cf. Roach v. Riswick, McArthur & Mackay, 171; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wh, 264; 5 L. ed. 257.

areas, the District or the Territories, especially referred to, are yet national acts in that, so far as is necessary for their enforcement, they have a validity throughout the Union. This doctrine is clearly laid down by Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia," and has not since been questioned. In that case the court say:

"The clause which gives exclusive jurisdiction is, unquestionably, a part of the Constitution, and, as such, binds all the United States. Those who contend that acts of Congress, made in pursuance of this power, do not, like acts made in pursuance of other powers, bind the nation, ought to show some safe and clear rule. which shall support this construction, and prove that an act of Congress, clothed in all the forms which attend other legislative acts, and passed in virtue of a power conferred on, and exercised by Congress, as the legislature of the Union, is not a law of the United States, and does not bind them. The power vested in Congress, as the legislature of the United States, to legislate exclusively within any place ceded by a State, carries with it, as an incident, the right to make that power effectual. If a felon escapes out of the State in which the act has been committed, the government cannot pursue him into another State, and apprehend him there, but must demand him from the executive power of that other State. If Congress were to be considered merely as the local legislature for the fort or other place in which the offense might be committed, then this principle would apply to them as to other local legislatures, and the felon who should escape out of the fort, or other place, in which the felony may have been committed, could not be apprehended by the marshal, but must be demanded from the executive of the State. But we know that the principle does not apply; and the reason is, that Congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, like all its other powers, in its high character, as the legis lature of the Union. The American people thought it a necessary power, and they conferred it for their own benefit. Being so conferred, it carries with it all those incidental powers which are necessary to its complete and effectual execution."

116 Wh. 264; 5 L. ed. 257.

§ 163. Places Purchased.

The same clause of the Constitution which grants to Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the district to be selected for the seat of the National Government, authorizes Congress" to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings."

The federal ownership of such tracts within the States is to be sharply distinguished from political jurisdiction over them. This latter, as the Constitution provides, may be obtained only when the districts have been acquired with the consent of the States in which they are situated.

The language of Clause 17 would seem to indicate that the framers of the Constitution intended that the General Government should or could acquire lands within the States only by purchase and with the consent of the States. In practice, however, this consent has not always been obtained, or been deemed necessary. But, in such cases, the political jurisdiction of the State is not ousted, unless the lands are used for the purposes of government. In Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe12 the court say: "The consent of the States to the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named [in Clause 17] is essential under the Constitution, to the transfer to the General Government with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion. Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to the legislative authority and control of the States equally with the property of private individuals."

Also, the General Government is able to acquire lands within the States by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, a right which it may employ when "necessary and proper" to the exer12 114 U. S. 525; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995; 29 L. ed. 264.

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cise of any of its expressly given powers. When thus obtained, the lands like those acquired by direct purchase and without the consent of the States, remains subject to the general political jurisdiction of the States in which they are located. As property of the United States they are not, however, subject to taxation by the States.14

13 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; 23 L. ed. 449; St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92.

14 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 670; 29 L. ed. 845.