the United States, differ from judgments recovered in a foreign country in no other respect than in not being re-examinable on their merits, nor impeachable for a fraud in obtaining them, if rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties. In the words of Justice Story, 'the Constitution did not mean to confer any new power upon the States, but simply to regulate the effect of their acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within their territory. It does not make the judgments of other States domestic judgments to all intents and purposes, but only gave a general validity, faith, and credit to them as evidence. No execution can issue upon such judg ments without a new suit in the tribunals of other States. And they enjoy not the right of priority or lien which they have in the State where they are pronounced, but that only which the lex fori gives to them by its own laws in their character of foreign judgments.""

As being simply evidence, judgments of the courts of one State, when sued upon in another State, are subject, as regards procedure and remedies, to the law of the latter State. For example, the statute of limitations of the State where suit is brought is applied even though it provides a shorter term of years than that existing in the State in which the judgment was originally obtained.8

It has been held in numerous cases that each State of the Union may enforce in its own courts which have jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matters, civil rights of action depending solely upon the statutes of another State, provided there be no local policy of the forum inconsistent therewith. Thus in Dennick v. Central R. R. Co.9 with reference to a suit for damages brought in New York under an act of New Jersey, the court say: "It is scarcely contended that the act belongs to the class of criminal laws which can only be enforced by the courts of the State where the offense was committed, for it is, though a statutory remedy,

8 McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; 10 L. ed. 177; Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22; 15 L. ed. 811.

9103 U. S. 11; 26 L. ed. 439.

a civil action to recover damages for a civil injury. It is, indeed, a right dependent solely on the statute of the State, but when the act is done for which the law says the person shall be liable and the action, by which the remedy is to be enforced, is a personal and not a real action, and is of that character which the law recognizes as transitory and not local, we cannot see why the defendant may not be held liable in any court to whose jurisdiction he can be subjected by personal process or by voluntary appearance, as was the case here. It is difficult to understand how the nature of the remedy or the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce it is in any manner dependent on the question whether it is a statutory right or a common law right. Wherever, by either the common law or the statute law of a State, a right of action has become fixed, and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any court which has jurisdiction of such matters and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties."

In Slater v. Mexican National R. R. Co.," applying the same doctrine, the court say: "When such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree is subject to the lex fori with regard to either its quality or its consequences. On the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is operative outside of its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio which, like other obligations, follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.”

In this case the court go on to declare, however, that if the only source of obligation be the law of the place of the act, that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation, but its extent. It seems to us unjust," the court say, "to allow the plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law

10 See also Stewart v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; 42 L. ed. 537.

11 194 U. S. 120; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; 48 L. ed. 900.

for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law would impose."

This doctrine is again affirmed and applied in Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers.12

§ 96. Judgments in Rem and in Personam.

The validity of judgments, or decrees in States other than those in which they are obtained depends upon the court which rendered them having obtained jurisdiction. In order to obtain jurisdiction in actions in rem, the res must be located in the State. In all actions service of notice of the commencement of the suit must be had upon the defendants. In actions in rem this service need not be actual, but may be constructive, that is, by publication In actions in personam, however, actual service is required. Mere constructive service will not warrant a personal judgment or decree which may be sued upon in another jurisdiction. doctrine is carefully laid down in Pennoyer v. Neff. 13 In its opinion in this case the court say: "It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-residents situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the non-residents have no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can addicate.

This

Where a party is within a territory, he may justly be subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process against him. Where he is not within such territory, and is not personally subject to its laws, if on account of his supposed or actual property being within the territory, process by the local laws may, by attachment, go to compel his appearance, and for his default to appear, judgment may be pronounced against him; such a judgment must, upon general principles, be deemed to bind him only to the extent of such

12 213 U. S. 366; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; 53 L. ed. 695.

13 95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed. 565.

property, and cannot have the effect of a conclusive judgment in personam, for the plain reason that, except so far as the property is concerned, it is a judgment coram non judice."

The inability of the courts of one State to effect by their judgments or decisions property having its legal situs in another State is illustrated in the recent case of Fall v. Eastin,14 in which it was held that a deed to a piece of land located in Nebraska made by a commissioner in the State of Washington under the order of a court of that State need not, under the full faith and credit clause, be recognized in the former State. The court point out that had the plaintiff in error obeyed the order of the Washington court and made, as directed, a deed of conveyance, that conveyance would have received recognition in the Nebraska courts. But he having refused to do this, and the deed having been made by a commissioner, the conveyance was to be considered as a part of the proceedings in the court which ordered it, which court was without power to affect the title of real property not within the State. As to this the court quote from Watkins v. Holman,1 where it is said: "A court of chancery, acting in personam may well declare the conveyance of land in any other State, and may enforce its decree by process against the defendant. But neither the decree itself nor any conveyance under it, except by the person in whom title is vested, can operate beyond the jurisdiction of the court."

§ 97. Nul Tiel Record.

15

From the foregoing it clearly appears that in all cases in which suit is brought in one State upon a judgment rendered in another State, the court in which the suit is brought may examine whether the tribunal in which the judgment sued upon was rendered had jurisdiction to render a personal judgment. In Fauntleroy v. Lum1 the interesting question was raised whether a court in which suit is brought upon a judgment obtained in another State may examine into the original facts upon which that judgment

14 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3.

15 16 Pet. 25; 10 L. ed. 873.

16 210 U. S. 230; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641; 52 L. ed. 1039.

was based, and refuse to give full faith and credit to the judgment if it be found that these facts were such as would not have created a legal claim under the law of the State in which enforcement of the judgment thereupon is being sought. In this case the plaintiff, a citizen of Mississippi, obtained in Missouri a judgment against another citizen of Mississippi upon whom personal service had been obtained while he was temporarily in Missouri, in a suit brought upon a contract in cotton futures entered into in Mississippi in which State such futures were prohibited by law. The case finally reaching the federal Supreme Court, that tribunal held that, the Missouri court having had jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the defendant, the full faith and credit clause obligated the courts of Mississippi to give to the judgment full force and credit. The court admitted that in the opinion in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co." language was used which might imply a right in a court to examine as to the original basis of the foreign judgment sued upon, but these words were declared obiter, and the doctrine of that case limited to the precise point decided.

In a dissenting opinion in Fauntleroy v. Lum, concurred in by four justices, it was argued that in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co. the court had held that the full faith and credit clause did not preclude an examination into the basis of the foreign judgment, and rightfully so, inasmuch as at the time of the adoption of the Constitution the rules of comity universally prevailing did not require a sovereignty to give effect to a judgment of another sovereignty when to do so would be to enforce a contract illegal and prohibited by the local law, when both the contract and all the acts done in pursuance thereof had taken place in the State where enforcement of the judgment was sought.

In this dissent reliance is also placed on Anglo-American. Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co.18 in which it was held that a judgment rendered in Illinois against one corporation in favor of another, both corporations being foreign to New York, was not

17 127 U. S. 265; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370; 32 L. ed. 239. 18 191 U. S. 373; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; 48 L. ed. 225.