to dissolve ipso facto an injunction granted until the discharge for the purpose of restraining creditors from proceeding against the bankrupt in the state courts. It follows, therefore, that no motion is necessary for a dissolution, the order for the discharge itself terminating the injunction, and the bankrupt must thereafter use his discharge itself as his protection in all cases affected thereby.1 'In re Thomas, 8 Bank. Reg. 7. CHAPTER V. OF INJUNCTIONS IN ECCLESIASTICAL MATTERS. $227. Religious trusts protected in equity. 228. Violation of such trusts may be enjoined. 229. Distinction between a church in its corporate and in its ecclesias tical capacity. 230. Courts of equity will not revise acts of church discipline. 231. Will not correct proceedings of ecclesiastical tribunals. 232. Will not revise interpretation of church canons by ecclesiastical tribunal. 233. Decisions of church judicatory final as to all questions of faith, discipline, or ecclesiastical rule. 234. Usurpation of pastoral office, when enjoined. 235. When injunction will be refused against pastor. 236. Removal of minister by vote of church will not be enjoined. 237. Perversion of trust by trustees. 238. Trustees intruding upon functions of pastor. 239. Trustees acting within their authority will not be enjoined. 240. Trustees may enjoin pretended trustees. 241. Dedication of property to pious uses as effectual as its conveyance. 242. When court of equity will investigate doctrinal questions. 243. Conveyance of property to two religious bodies. 244. Injunction not allowed against a mere trespass. 245. Diversion of church property to school purposes may be enjoined. 246. Rights of pew holders. § 227. The aid of equity is frequently invoked for the protection of religious charities and for the enforcement of trusts created by donations of money or property for religious purposes. The jurisdiction in this class of cases rests upon the foundation of trusts and may be regarded as ancillary to the general jurisdiction of equity over that subject. In all such charities the courts will, if possible, give effect to the intention of the donor, provided such intention is legal, and the objects of the trust being ascertained any perversion thereof or departure therefrom may be prevented by injunction.1 $228. In accordance with these principles it is held that where real estate is conveyed to the trustees of a religious association, to be forever afterward used as a place of religious worship according to the doctrines, forms and discipline of a particular church, if the minister and trustees allow ministers of a different faith, not recognized by the church prescribed as the standard, to use the premises, they are guilty of a departure from the trust created by the original contract, and a court of equity may properly interfere to prevent the 1 Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches, 1 Sandf. Ch. 439. In laying down the principles upon which courts of equity interfere in this class of cases, Sandford, assistant Vice Chancellor, says: "They proceed on the ground of a trust, and their aim is to ascertain its scope and objects and to enforce its proper and faithful administration. The jurisdiction is environed with greater difficulties than that over the ordinary private trusts which come under our review, by reason of the uncertainty which frequently prevails, as to the precise objects and intentions of the donor. The inquiry often arises after a great lapse of time, when no living witness can inform the conscience of the court, and when its search for truth must be made in history, and in the controversial writings of contemporaries of the donor. The course of the administration of the trust, and its alleged perversion, are also frequently shrouded in mystery and involved in the subtleties of polemics and theology. Still the court is bound to exercise its control over these charitable funds, as well as over the less difficult class of private trusts. * * In the leading English authority, The Attorney General . Pearson (3 Merivale, 352, 395,) Lord Eldon decided that when it appears to have been the intention of the founder of a trust for religious worship, that a particular doctrine should be preached, it is not in the power of the trustees, or of the congregation, to alter the designed objects of the institution. The length and breadth of that decision may be the better estimated from the circumstance that the purpose declared in the deed, was simply the worship and service of God.' And those words, without more, are deemed in England to create a trust for the established religion. Yet on its being clearly shown by proof, that the purpose of the trust was to maintain dissenting doctrines, the court decreed that purpose to be carried into execution. And as there were no Unitarians known among the dissenters when the trust was created, (A. D. 1701,) the Unitarians were excluded from the trust. (7 Simons' R. 290 S. C. upon the first decree.)" See also Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio, 492; Baptist Church . Witherell, 3 Paige, 296; Bowden v. McLeod, 1 Edw. Ch. 588; McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa. St. 9; Sutter v. Trustees, 42 Pa. St. 503; Winebrenner v. Colder 43 Pa. St. 244. premises being used otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the terms of the trust. So where property is conveyed to the trustees of a religious body to be used for church purposes, and it has been so used for a long and uninterrupted period, an unauthorized use and occupancy of the premises by persons not members of the religious society, thereby hindering and impeding the regular occupants of the church, will be enjoined, such trespass being continuous and irreparable.2 § 229. A distinction has been drawn between the ecclesiastical and the corporate character of religious associations which is worthy of notice in determining whether a proper case is made out to warrant the interference of a court of equity. Thus, where the trust as declared in the deed conveying property to a religious society is for the interests and purposes of such society, either for church or burial purposes, and it does not specify the ecclesiastical connection of the society nor attempt to perpetuate any particular faith, the trustees take the property for the use of the society in its corporate rather than its ecclesiastical capacity. It follows therefore that a majority of the members of the corporate society may, under such circumstances, change its ecclesiastical relations or connections, as well as the views which shall be taught from the pulpit, without subjecting themselves to the restraining power of a court of equity. And the fact that the society has separated from the church with which it was originally connected and has united itself with another denomination, does not constitute such a departure from the purposes of the original trust as to authorize the interference of equity, the property being still held in the same corporate capacity.4 230. Courts of equity, having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, will neither revise nor question the ordinary acts of Gilbert v. Arnold, 30 Md. 29. Burrel v. Associate Reformed Church, 44 Barb. 282. Id. And see Petty v. Tooker, 21 N. Y. 267; Robertson v. Bullions, 1 Kern. 243. It is to be observed, however, that the decisions in New York rest to a considerable extent upon the religious incorporation laws of that state. church discipline or the administration of church government. Their only power arising from the conflicting claims of the parties to the church property and its use, they will not decide as to the status of membership and will not determine whether members have been properly or improperly excommunicated from a church, but accept the fact of their expulsion as conclusive proof that they are not members, and that having been expelled by a vote of the church, they are no longer entitled to any of the rights or privileges of membership. Thus, where property has been conveyed in trust for the use and benefit of a religious organization, members of the church who have been excommunicated by a vote of the majority, but who still insist on their right to enjoy and use the church property, and who have taken possession and made periodical uses of it without the consent and in defiance of the main body of the members, may be enjoined from interfering with or using the property.1 Shannon. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253. Say the court, Robertson, C. J.: "As the conveyance from Crittenden was to the use of the Baptist Church, as an organized body of professing Christians in Frankfort, every member of that church has a beneficial interest in the property thus conveyed, so long as he or she shall continue to be a member, but no longer. It is only as a constituent element of the aggregated body or church that any person can acquire or hold, as a cestui que trust, any interest in the property thus dedicated to that church. Curd et al. v. Wallace et al., 7 Dana, 195. Such is the effect of this conveyance to congregational uses, and such the civil law of our state; and upon this foundation alone must our decision rest. The judicial eye of the civil authority of this land of religious liberty can not penetrate the veil of the church, nor can the arm of this court either rend or touch that veil for the forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of the excinded members. When they became members they did so on the condition of continuing or not, as themselves and their church might determine. In that respect they voluntarily subjected themselves to the ecclesiastical power, and can not invoke the supervision or control of that jurisdiction by this or any other civil tribunal. Then, not being now members of the church to whose use the ground was conveyed, the appellants seem no longer to be entitled to any beneficial interest in that property, nor to any other right which this court can either enforce or recognize; and consequently the old church, as organized at the date of that conveyance, and still subsisting, must be deemed to be entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the property for all the purposes for which it was first dedicated. And, as |