$ 24. Courts of equity in the exercise of their general jurisdiction for the prevention of fraud are often called upon to interfere by injunction where fraud constitutes the gravamen of the bill. The manifestations of fraud are so various that it is impossible to embrace all its varieties of form within the limits of a precise definition. Indeed the courts have generally avoided all attempts in this direction, and have reserved to themselves the liberty to deal with it in whatever aspect it may be presented by human ingenuity. The most frequent instances in which injunctions are granted upon the ground of fraud are in cases where relief is sought against proceedings at law, and to the chapters upon that subject the reader is referred for the principles which govern the interference of equity in such cases.11

§ 25. Fraudulent transfers of property, designed to give preference to certain creditors over others, or for the purpose of delaying and hindering creditors, are frequently made the foundation for relief by injunction. And it may be laid down as a general rule that equity will enjoin any transfers of a debtor's property made with intent to defraud and delay his judgment creditors, or to give a portion of such creditors preference over others. And where the main And where the main purpose of the

bill is to set aside a fraudulent transfer of a debtor's goods and effects, made to delay and hinder his creditors, an injunction is regarded as a necessary adjunct, and is granted as auxiliary to the general relief sought.3

§ 26. It is to be observed, however, that the jurisdiction is not exercised in favor of mere contract creditors, or creditors at large, whose claims are not yet reduced to judgment, and in the absence of statutory provisions authorizing the relief, courts of equity will not at the suit of other than a judgment creditor interfere by injunction to restrain a debtor from any disposition of his property, however fraudulent, which he may see fit to make. The principle on which the rule is based is that until

4

1 See Chapters II. and III., post.

Hyde v. Ellery, 18 Md. 496; Witmer's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 455.

3 Hyde v. Ellery, 18 Md. 496.

4 Wiggins v. Armstrong, 2 Johns. Ch. 144; Holdrege v. Gwynne, 3 C. E. Green, 26; Young v. Frier, 1 Stockt. 465; Uhl v. Dillon, 10 Md. 500; Rich

the creditor has established his claim by judgment he has no right to question the acts of his debtor and has no concern with his frauds; and to allow the interference on behalf of mero general creditors before judgment would lead to an unjustifiable and often oppressive interruption of the exercise of the debtor's right to control his property.1

o. Levy, 16 Md. 74; Phelps v. Foster, 18 Ill. 309; Bigelow v. Andress, 31 Ill. 322; Rhodes v. Cousins, 6 Rand. 188. But see, contra, Cottrell v. Moody, 12 B. Mon. 500.

1 Wiggins v. Armstrong, 2 Johns. Ch. 144. Kent, Chancellor, observes: "This is a case of a creditor on simple contract, after an action commenced at law, and before judgment, seeking to control the disposition of the property of his debtor, under judgments and executions, upon the ground of fraud. My first impression was in favor of the plaintiffs; but upon examination of the cases, I am satisfied that a creditor at large, and before judgment and execution, can not be entitled to the interference which has been granted in this case. In Angell v. Draper, (1 Vern. 399,) and Shirley . Watts, (3 Atk. 200,) it was held, that the creditor must have completed his title at law, by judgment and execution, before he can question the disposition of the debtor's property; and in Bennet v. Musgrave, (2 Ves. 51), and in a case before Lord Nottingham, cited in Balch v. Wastall, (1 P. Wms. 445,) the same doctrine was declared, and so it is understood by the elementary writers. (Mitford, 115. Cooper Equ. Pl. 149.) The reason of the rule seems to be, that until the creditor has established his title, he has no right to interfere, and it would lead to an unnecessary, and, perhaps, a fruitless and oppressive interruption of the exercise of the debtor's rights. Unless he has a certain claim upon the property of the debtor, he has no concern with his frauds. On the strength of settled authorities, I shall, accordingly, grant the motion for dissolving the injunction." So it is said in Rhodes . Cousins, 6 Rand. 188, to be "well-settled law that none but a judgment creditor can have the assistance of equity to control, prevent, or interfere with in any way, the disposition which a debtor may choose to make of his property. He may destroy it, give it away, convey it fraudu lently, or sell it and waste the money, and no creditor at large can stop him by injunction. A creditor must have proceeded as far as he can at law. If he means to affect the land, he must have a judgment at law and take his elegit. If the personalty there must be a judgment and execution issued and he must show in his bill that he has done this, or it may be demurred to." An exception has been taken in the case of trespass for malicious injury to property, and a plaintiff, in such case, before judgment recovered has been allowed to enjoin defendants from fraudulently dispos ing of their property to evade the payment of such damages as might be awarded in the action at law, the relief being granted on the ground that the ancillary jurisdiction of the court of equity by injunction was necessary for the protection of plaintiff in his legal remedy. Cottrell v. Moody,

§ 27. In conformity with the principles enunciated in the previous section, an injunction has been refused, pending a trial at law, where it was sought to restrain defendants from disposing of their goods in order that they might be levied upon under the judgment not yet obtained. So where a clerk has embezzled the goods of his employers and converted them into money which he has deposited in bank to his own credit, he will not be enjoined from disposing of the money on the ground that he has no other property and is about to leave the country, it not appearing that the money was the specific money of complainants, or that it had arisen from the sale of their goods. Nor will a garnishee be restrained from disposing of his property in the absence of any allegations that there is danger of loss by reason of his insolvency before a trial can be had in the action at law.3

§ 28. Where fraud is relied upon as the foundation for an injunction, the allegations in the bill must be of specific and definite acts of fraud, and not mere general averments; and in the absence of such specific allegations a court of equity will not interfere, although irreparable injury is alleged.4

§ 29. Nor is the rule requiring specific averments of fraud relaxed, even where a statute authorizes the interference of equity to restrain fraudulent assignments of a debtor's property in derogation of the rights of creditors before judgment, since in such cases the courts require strong prima facie evidence of the facts on which complainant's equity rests." And mere allegations that complainant fears and believes defendant is about to perpetrate a fraud upon him by placing his effects beyond the reach of his creditors, are not sufficient to justify the court in granting relief. But it has been held under a statute authorizing injunctions on behalf of general creditors

12 B. Mon. 500. The exception, however, is in conflict with the current of authority.

Phelps v. Foster, 18 Ill. 309.

2 McKenzie v. Cowing, 4 Cranch C. C. 479. Bigelow v. Andress, 31 Ill. 322.

Powell v. Parker, 38 Geo. 644.

Lanpheimer v. Rosenbaum, 25 Md. 219.

'Hubbard v. Hubbard, 14 Md. 356.

before judgment, to prevent a fraudulent disposition of the debtor's property, that allegations that the debtor has, by a fraudulent bill of sale, placed his property beyond the reach of legal process are as effective as averments of insolvency, and it appearing that no other property of the debtor can be found, save that covered by the bill of sale, the injunction should be awarded. 1

§ 30. It is always a sufficient objection to the granting of an injunction that the party aggrieved has a full and adequate remedy at law, and it is a well-established rule that courts of equity will not lend their aid for the protection of rights or the prevention of wrongs where the ordinary legal tribunals are capable of affording sufficient redress." And where it

does not appear that the remedy at law is inadequate, or that the party aggrieved is entitled to more speedy relief than can be obtained by the ordinary process of courts of law, an injunction will be refused. Thus, where complainant's equity is based upon a claim for unliquidated damages for a substantive injury for which ample remedy exists at law, and there is no impediment to bringing the action in a legal forum, an injunetion will not be granted. And when it is apparent on the face of the bill that a court of chancery has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause, and that the party aggreived had an adequate remedy at law, the bill is obnoxious to a demurrer. 5

$31. Where a positive statutory remedy exists for the redress of particular grievances, a court of equity will not interfere by injunction and assume jurisdiction of the questions involved, nor will it enjoin proceedings under such statutory remedy, since such interference would place the

' Conolly v. Riley, 25 Md. 402.

* Coe v. Columbus etc., 10 Ohio St. 372; Coughron v. Swift, 18 Ill. 414; Winkler v. Winkler, 40 Ill. 179; Poage v. Bell, 3 Rand. 586; Webster v. Couch, 6 Rand. 519; Akrill v. Selden, 1 Barb. 316; Sherman v. Clark, 4 Nev. 138; Mullen v. Jennings, 1 Stockt. 192; Wooden v. Wooden, 2 Green Ch. 429.

* Mullen v. Jennings, 1 Stockt. 192; Hart v. Marshall, 4 Minn. 294. • Webster v. Couch, 6 Rand. 519.

'Winkler v. Winkler, 40 Ill. 179.

judicial above the legislative power of the government.1 Legal rights should be left to the decision of a legal forum, and in the absence of special circumstances warranting the interposition of the extraordinary aid of courts of equity, such courts will not interfere to protect a purely legal right, properly triable at law. And the assertion of a right whose

' Brown's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 155. In this case a landlord had begun proceedings before a justice of the peace, in pursuance of a statutory remedy, to recover possession of premises demised; before judgment the proceedings were enjoined in the Common Pleas. Thompson, C. J., says: "The Landlord and Tenant Act, of 1863, provides an ample remedy whereby to recover possession of leased premises when it is alleged that the term has expired. It is not a one-sided remedy, for it allows the defendant ample scope to allege and prove any legal defense he may have against the plaintiff's demand, with the right of review by appeal or certiorari. It is a complete system for that species of controversy. I do not know that it is a wise system; that may be doubted, but it is complete in itself. Proceedings under this system were legally and regularly begun by the defendants, as appears by the records before us; but before a final result was arrived at, the Court of Common Pleas interposed by injunction and stopped them. The reason assigned for this was, supposed hardship upon the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs in the proceeding repossessed themselves of what they had leased to the defendants. This was manifest interference without authority of law. The court had no jurisdiction in equity of the proceedings. They were not contrary to law; and if they had been, an injunction was not a correctional process. That was to be done by the process provided in the act, viz.: by appeal or certiorari. These were the legal matters provided in the act, and a court of equity could not supplement them. Courts may restrain acts contrary to law, but not where they are according to positive law. That would be to put the courts above the legislature. Where a positive statutory remedy exists and may be pursued, equity can not interfere on the ground of irreparable mischief. The law injures no one' is a maxim which inculcates obedience to law. Where positive law in point of fact injures, it is the legislature which must furnish the corrective; courts can not. Irreparable damages can not be alleged against statutory remedies legally pursued, and that was the case of the plaintiffs before the magistrate. These principles are plain, and need neither authority nor elaboration to substantiate. We think the court below had no jurisdiction in equity to restrain these defendants from proceeding under the Landlord and Tenant Act referred to, to try their right to repossess themselves of the leased premises in question. The decree in the case is therefore reversed, and the bill is dismissed at the cost of the appellees."

'Wooden v. Wooden, 2 Green Ch. 429.