204 U.S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. confesso entered in the suit, not authorized by law, and so was rendered without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Mr. William M. Randolph, with whom Mr. George Randolph and Mr. Wassell Randolph were on the brief, for plaintiffs in error: The titles claimed by the purchasers-defendants in errorto the lands in controversy, which it is conceded belonged to plaintiffs in error, but for their purchases, depend entirely on a strict compliance with the statutes referred to, Act No. 19 of the year 1893, and Act No. 71 of the year 1895, in the assessment, the levy of the taxes, and the conduct of the suit, and cannot be maintained, except by showing affirmatively, not only a substantial compliance with their requirements, but an exact compliance, from the inception of the undertaking to have the levee taxes voted by the landowners, until the conclusion of the sales under the decrees in the suit, authorized to be brought, to enforce the collection of them. Compliance with the requirements of these statutes is essential to the validity of sales for ordinary taxes. The courts treat them as mandatory. Blackwell on Tax Titles, 2d. ed., Ch. 5. p. 106; Black on Tax Titles, 1st ed., Ch. 3, §§ 27, 34; Martin v. Allard, 55 Arkansas, 218; Cooper v. Freeman Lumber Co., 61 Arkansas, 42 et seq.; Logan v. Land Co., 68 Arkansas, 248; Hunt v. Gardner, 74 Arkansas, 583; Bonner v. Directors of St. Francis Levee District, 92 S. W. Rep. 1124; Martin v. Barbour, 34 Fed. Rep. 701; S. C., 140 U. S. 634; Gregory v. Bartlett, 55 Arkansas, 30; Taylor v. The State, 65 Arkansas, 595; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 511, Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 184; Cooley on Taxation, 1st ed., Ch. 12, p. 258; Gaines v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 322, 331; Redfork Levee District v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (Ark.), 96 S. W. Rep. 117. There was no authority in the statutes for combining in one suit the levee taxes for more than one year. When in the same suit the levee taxes for 1894, 1895, 1896 and 1897 Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 204 U.S. were sued for, definite and distinct allegations as to the assessments and levies for each year, and the efforts to collect, and the delinquencies, and the facts authorizing the suits, should have been made. The loose and imperfect statements made in the complaint were not what the law requires. Redfork Levee District v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (Ark.), 96 S. W. Rep. 117. The acts of the General Assembly, under which the suit was brought, required a notice to be given to the owners of the lands, of the suit, and no notice having been given plaintiffs in error, the decree of sale, and the sale of their lands, for want of such notice, were void. Act No. 19 of the year 1893 and Act No. 71 of the year 1895 in question here do not provide for any proceeding strictly in rem. Wilson v. Gaylord, 92 S. W. Rep. 26; S. C., 4 Ark. Law Rep. 341. The provisions of the statutes, Acts of 1893, No. 19, and 1895, No. 71, and all the others on the same subject, as to the method of procedure and notice, and other like matters, are mandatory, and must be shown in this suit to have been observed technically and literally, as well as substantially, as a condition precedent to the attachment of the lien on the lands of plaintiffs in error, and the other lands assessed, and to the power to decree a sale of such lands for the payment of the levee taxes sued for, and to the right to have the lands sold for the taxes, and if the requirements of the statutes have not been so observed, the sales of the lands of plaintiff in error are, for that reason alone, void. Patrick v. Davis, 15 Arkansas, 370; Wiley v. Flournoy, 30 Arkansas, 612; Matter of Cornelius, 14 Arkansas, 682; Abraham v. Wilkins, 17 Arkansas, 319; Rector v. Board of Improvement, 50 Arkansas, 116; Watkins v. Griffith, 59 Arkansas, 344; Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pickering, 640; Sandwich v. Fish, 2 Gray (Mass.), 298; Clark v. Crane, 5 Michigan, 154; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 511; Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 178, 184; Gregory v. Bartlett, 55 Arkansas, 30. 204 U.S. Argument for Defendants in Error. Mr. L. P. Berry, for defendants in error, submitted: A judicial sale of lands for illegal taxes, penalty, interest and costs is not a taking of property without due process of law. Burcham v. Terry, 55 Arkansas, 398; Doyle v. Martin, 55 Arkansas, 37; Kelly v. Laconia Levee District, 74 Arkansas, 202; 85 S. W. Rep. 249; Minneapolis &c. v. Debenture Co., 81 Minnesota, 66. Due process of law does not require that the true owner of land be named in a judicial proceeding for the collection of delinquent taxes where the land is described in a public notice directed to an alleged owner and all others interested therein. Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Tyler v. Judges, 175 Massachusetts, 71. The four weeks' notice, provided by the levee act, by publication to unknown owners and owners of lands who are nonresidents of the county in which suit is brought, is not so unreasonable as to amount to a taking of property without due process of law, nor does it abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor does it discriminate against citizens of other States, nor does it amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws to persons within the jurisdiction of the court. Arndt v. Griggs, 134. U. S. 316; Bellingham Bay v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Tyler v. Judges, 175 Massachusetts, 71; Hager v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; Wurtz v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548; Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 192; Manson v. Duncanson, 166 U. S. 533; Johnson v. Hunter, 127 Fed. Rep. 222; Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry., 130 U. S. 559–563. The levee act is not a private act, but a public act, operating over a limited territory, of which plaintiffs in error were bound to take notice, and proceedings had under this levee act constitute due process of law. Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry., 130 U. S. 559-563; Johnson v. Hunter, 127 Fed. Rep. 222. An erroneous construction by a state court of matters of practice under a state statute, where the statute as construed by the court provided for notice and an opportunity to be heard, is not a deprivation of property without due process of law. West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 263; Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S. 492; In re King, 46 Fed. Rep. 911. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. The assignments of error present the contention that plaintiffs in error have been deprived of their property without due process of law. One of them urges, in addition, the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibit a State from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and from depriving any person within her jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws. Plaintiffs in error invoke those provisions against the statutes of Arkansas, because of the different manner and time of service of summons of the suit authorized by said statutes to enforce the payment of the levee taxes. It is contended that, by requiring personal service of summons upon resident owners or occupants of lands for at least twenty days before the rendition of the decree of sale, and providing for constructive service by publication upon non-resident owners of only four weeks, a discrimination is made between owners of lands, and that non-resident owners are thereby denied the rights secured to them by the Constitution of the United States. We have no doubt of the power of the State to so discriminate, nor do we think extended discussion is necessary. Personal service upon non-residents is not always within the State's power. Its process is limited by its boundaries. Constructive service is at times a necessary resource. The land stands accountable to the demands of the State, and the owners are charged with the laws affecting it and the manner by which those demands may be enforced. Huling v. Kaw Valley Railroad, 130 U.. S. 559. This accountability of the land and the knowledge the owners must be presumed to have had of the laws affecting it is an answer to the contention of the insufficiency of the service. Certainly it was not so insufficient that it can be said that a difference in the time allowed for such service was not the equivalent of that allowed to resident owners. Mixed with the contention is a charge that the notice to non-residents did not comply with the act of 1893, or the general law of the State, but this is decided against plaintiffs in error by the Supreme Court of the State, and we accept its ruling. In passing upon the other contentions of plaintiffs in error we are brought to the consideration of what is due process of law. A precise definition has never been attempted. It does not always mean proceedings in court. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken, 18 How. 272; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37. Its fundamental requirement is an opportunity for a hearing and defense, but no fixed procedure is demanded. The process or proceedings may be adapted to the nature of the case. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; Iowa Central R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, a proposition was laid down which has since been quoted many times. The court said, at pages 104 and 105: "That whenever, by the laws of a State or by state authority, a tax, assessment, servitude or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or of some more limited portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the person or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceedings can not be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other objections." And Mr. Justice Bradley, in a concurring opinion, said, on pages 107 and 108, "that, in judging what is 'due process of |