shipments in question had been posted as required by section 6 of the act to regulate commerce, noted in margin.'

The assumption, it is insisted, is authorized because, it is asserted, the conclusion that the schedule of rates became legally operative was not justified by the finding that such schedule had been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and copies thereof furnished to the freight officers of the railroad company at Cisco and other points. The contention is without merit. The filing of the schedule with the commission and the furnishing by the railroad company of copies to its freight offices incontrovertibly evidenced that the tariff of rates contained in the schedule had been established and put in force as mentioned in the first sentence of the section, and the railroad company could not have been heard to assert to the contrary. The requirement that schedules should be "posted in two public and conspicuous places in every depot," etc., was not made a condition precedent to the establishment and putting in force of the tariff of rates, but was a provision based upon the existence of an established rate, and plainly had for its object the affording of special facilities to the public for ascertaining the rates actually in force. To hold that the clause had the far-reaching effect

1 First paragraph of section 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. L. 855):

"That every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall print and keep open to public inspection schedules showing the rates and fares and charges for the transportation of passengers and property which any such common carrier has established and which are in force at the time upon its route. The schedules printed as aforesaid by any such common carrier shall plainly state the places upon its railroad between which property and passengers will be carried, and shall contain the classification of freight in force, and shall also state separately the terminal charges and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates and fares and charges. Such schedules shall be plainly printed in large type, and copies for the use of the public shall be posted in two public and conspicuous places in every depot, station, or office of such carrier where passengers or freight, respectively, are received for transportation, in such form that they shall be accessible to the public and can be conveniently inspected."

claimed would be to say that it was the intention of Congress that the negligent posting by an employé of but one instead of two copies of the schedule, or the neglect to post either, would operate to cancel the previously established schedule, a conclusion impossible of acceptance. While section 6 forbade an increase or reduction of rates, etc., "which have been established and published as aforesaid," otherwise than as provided in the section, we think the publication referred to was that which caused the rates to become operative; and this deduction is fortified by the terms of section 10 of the act making it a criminal offense for a common carrier or its agent or a shipper or his employé improperly "to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates then established and in force on the line of transportation of such common carrier."

Whether by the failure to post an established schedule a carrier became subject to penalties provided in the act to regulate commerce, or whether if damage had been occasioned to a shipper by such omission, a right to recover on that ground alone would have obtained, we are not called upon in this case to decide.

The judgment below is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

AMERICAN RAILROAD COMPANY OF PORTO RICO v. CASTRO.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF PORTO RICO.

No. 151. Argued January 14, 1907.-Decided February 25, 1907.

The mere assertion of a Federal right and its denial do not justify this court in assuming jurisdiction where it indubitably appears that the Federal right is frivolous and without color of merit, and this rule applies to cases brought to this court under the act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. 85, from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. Under § 34 of the act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. 85, regular terms of the United States District Court are to be held at Ponce and San Juan at the time fixed by the act and the same character of terms at Mayaguez at times specially designated by the court. The terms held at Mayaguez are not special terms at which jury cases cannot be tried as distinguished from regular terms, and § 670, Rev. Stat., does not apply to such terms of that court.

JULIO P. CASTRO, defendant in error, was plaintiff in the court below, and the defendant in error, the American Railroad Company, a New York corporation doing business in Porto Rico, was defendant. The action was commenced by the filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the court at Mayaguez, Porto Rico. Damages in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars were prayed, because of the alleged negligent killing of the daughter of the plaintiff by a train of the company, whilst she, with other persons, were attempting to pass, in a vehicle, over the railroad of the defendant, at a point where it intersected a public highway leading from the town of San German to the town of Mayaguez.

A demurrer to the complaint was filed, and also the following plea to the jurisdiction of the court:

"Defendant, in the above-entitled action, comes now, by its attorney, F. H. Dexter, and objects to the jurisdiction

of this court to try this cause under the terms and provisions of section 670 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, for the reason that all terms of this court held in the city of Mayaguez, under and by the terms and provisions of the act of March 12, 1900, creating a civil government in Porto Rico, and particularly the present term at which the above cause is set for trial, is a special term of this court, and, therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to try the issues in this cause by a jury.

"Wherefore, defendant prays for an order either dismissing this cause or transferring the same for trial at a regular term of this court to be held at either San Juan or Ponce."

After the entry of an order overruling the demurrer and the plea to jurisdiction, an answer was filed and the case was tried by a jury. A verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of sixteen hundred dollars. The objection to jurisdiction was renewed in a motion to arrest the judgment, and after the overruling thereof a bill of exceptions was settled by the trial judge, containing exceptions taken during the trial to the admission and rejection of evidence and to instructions given and refused. The case was then brought to this court.

Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, with whom Mr. Francis H. Dexter and Mr. John Spalding Flannery were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Frederic L. Cornwell, for defendant in error, submitted.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

By the act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. L. 85, chap. 191), the general rule governing the right of this court to review by writs of error or appeal final decisions of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico was made as to amount

to conform to that obtaining as to the Territories of the United States, viz., five thousand dollars. As this case does not involve the requisite jurisdictional amount, it follows that the right of review does not exist unless the case is within the provision of the statute conferring jurisdiction to review in this court "in all cases where an act of Congress

is brought in question and the right claimed therein is denied."

It has been settled that where, in the course of litigation pending in the court just referred to, a party asserts a right under an act of Congress, the act "is brought in question," and when the right so claimed is denied the case can be brought here. Serralles v. Esbri, 200 U. S. 103; Rodriguez v. United States, 198 U. S. 156; Crowley v. United States, 194 U. S. 461.

It is undoubted that the plea to the jurisdiction filed and insisted upon below asserted on the record a right under an act of Congress, which right was denied. But in harmony with the rule which governs where a right under the Constitution, etc., of the United States is asserted in a case which is brought to this court from a state court and in accord with the same rule which also governs cases originally brought in a court of the United States (New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, and cases cited; Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U, S. 561), we are of opinion that the mere assertion of a Federal right and its denial do not justify our assuming jurisdiction where it indubitably appears that the Federal right asserted is frivolous, that is, without color of merit. We think the case at bar is of this character.

As appears in the Revised Statutes it has been the uniform practice of Congress to fix both the time and place for holding sessions of the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, which, for convenience of expression, have been styled the regular terms of court. Rev. Stat. secs. 572, 658. Upon the district judge has also been conferred the power of designating the time and place of holding special terms of the Dis