agreement, or that they could form a basis for any legal demand flowing from not longer fulfilling the terms of the alleged contract. The damages alleged in the pleas are most remote, vague and shadowy in their nature, such as could not have been contemplated by any party to the alleged agreement, as the probable result of its violation. While rules of pleading have become more liberal in modern days, yet in order to found a cause of action on the alleged shortcomings of another, they must at least be so far plainly set up as to show actual damage and the wrongful act of the other party as the proximate and natural cause. The particulars of the alleged resulting damages should be so far set forth that the court may be able to see therefrom that such alleged damages are neither obscure, vague or shadowy, but might and probably would naturally result from the acts complained of. Within such limitations, which have always existed, the three pleas are insufficient.

The next succeeding plea is marked in the record the second separate plea of the defendant William McGuire. The court below treated this plea, together with the third separate plea of the defendant, and his fifth (in truth, the second) additional plea, as together resting upon common ground. We think they may be properly so regarded. It is seen from the whole record that the principals in the bond sued on were expecting to have business transactions with the plaintiffs, by purchasing from them liquors, which they expected to sell to others at profit, but the plaintiffs did not care to sell the goods. to these principals without some security for payment of the goods sold when cash payment was not exacted. The bond in suit was thereupon agreed to be given as security for the payment of the merchandise to be sold by the plaintiffs to the principals, and which the principals were bound to pay for in four months after the date of each respective purchase. This is a clear and separate contract between the plaintiffs and the signers of the bond, and there is nothing in the declaration or bond which shows the existence of any

other agreement than that mentioned therein, or that an alteration in the prices of the goods sold to the principals by the plaintiffs could, or would, have any effect upon the liability of the sureties. The bond being complete in itself on its face, it cannot be seen that any future alteration of the prices for the sale of the merchandise, arrived at between the plaintiffs and the principals in the bond, would be material to or alter the liability of the sureties for the payment of the merchandise sold and delivered at the prices agreed upon, after four months from the date of purchase. There is no allegation in these pleas that any separate agreement was in writing, and the bond itself does not show the existence of any other agreement or the sale of the property upon any other conditions than those mentioned in the bond itself. Under such circumstances evidence by parol going to show any other agreement between the principals of the bond and the plaintiffs would not be admissible. Seitz v. Brewers' &c. Co., 141 U. S. 510; Domestic Sewing Machine Co. v. Webster, 47 Iowa, 357. In holding these pleas insufficient we think the court below was right.

This leaves the fourth (the first additional) and the sixth (the third additional) pleas. The fourth plea alleges that the merchandise referred to in the bond was to be sold at and for certain prices specified in a letter dated August 25, 1903, and sent by plaintiffs to Monaghan and McGuire. What those prices were is not stated in the plea, while the representations alleged in the plea to have been made, that the agreement was applicable to all merchandise to be purchased under the bond, would require parol evidence, as there is no pretense that these representations were made in writing or that the letter referred to them in any way. The same consideration existing in regard to the pleas last mentioned would operate here and render the plea insufficient.

The third additional plea (marked 6 in the record) attempts to set up a cause of action against the plaintiffs because, as alleged, they induced the defendant Monaghan to dissolve

the partnership between him and McGuire and to enter the plaintiff's employ, for the purpose, on plaintiff's part, of increasing the plaintiff's profits and with intent to wrongfully destroy the business of the defendants Monaghan and McGuire. As the court below well says, there is in this plea no allegation as to how long the partnership was to continue, and no action would lie for torminating or inducing the termination of a partnership at will. Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U. S. 328, 333. We do not see how any legal damage to the sureties under such circumstances can be said to be the proximate, natural or probable result of such action on the part of the plaintiffs. After the dissolution of the partnership of course no sales could thereafter be made, and in relation to sales already made with credit according to the terms of the bond, it is impossible to see how it could be said that the ruin of the business of the principals of the bond, and hence the damage to the sureties could be regarded as the probable consequence of the act of the plaintiffs in procuring Monaghan to dissolve the partnership and enter their employ. Whether treated as an offset or recoupment, or simply as an independent cause of action, the plea does not set up facts sufficient to constitute a valid set-off, recoupment or cause of action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was right and is

Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

204 U.S.

CLARK v. GERSTLEY,

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 169. Argued January 17, 18, 1907.-Decided February 25, 1907.

McGuire v. Gerstley, ante, p. 489, followed and held also:

The liability of sureties on the bond in this case given to secure payment for goods sold on a specified credit was not affected by failure of the sellers to notify the sureties of non-payment at the expiration of the credit, or by their giving an extension of credit, there being no definite term of such extension.

26 App. D. C. 205, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Lorenzo A. Bailey for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Eugene A. Jones, with whom Mr. Simon Wolf and Mr. Myer Cohen were on the brief, for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendants in error, plaintiffs below, obtained judgment against the plaintiff in error for $5,000 and interest in April, 1905, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 26 App. D. C. 205, and the plaintiff in error has brought the case here for review.

It is the same action as the foregoing case, just decided, but the plaintiff in error, who was one of the sureties in the bond, separately filed special pleas to the declaration, which were separately demurred to, and the Supreme Court sustained the demurrer. On appeal to the Court of Appeals the demurrer was not disposed of at the same time as the demurrers to the other pleas in the case, but was postponed to a subsequent time, April 7, 1905. On that date the de

murrer was sustained and the judgment previously entered affirmed against this plaintiff in error, who then brought the case here on a separate writ of error.

The special pleas filed by the plaintiff in error were seven in number, the first six being the same as filed by the other plaintiffs in error in the case. The seventh set up the failure of the plaintiffs to give notice to the sureties that the principals in the bond had not paid for the goods at the expiration of the term of credit allowed them, and also that the time had been extended by the plaintiffs in which the principals in the bond might pay for the goods sold to them. No definite term of extension was stated. What has already been said in regard to the other six pleas in the case determines the decision in regard to the same pleas hereinabove set forth. In regard to the seventh plea the plaintiff in error says in his brief in this court that he makes no point concerning the same. Judgment affirmed.

ARTHUR v. TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 176. Argued January 24, 1907.-Decided February 25, 1907.

Cau v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427, followed as to binding effect of agreements in bills of lading exempting carrier from fire loss and claimed to have been forced on the shipper under duress and without consideration. Where a railway company has no other place for delivery of cotton than the stores and platform of a compress company, where all cotton transported by it is compressed at its expense and by its order, its acceptance of, and exchange of its own bills of lading for, receipts of the compress company passes to it the constructive possession and absolute control of the cotton represented thereby, and constitutes a complete delivery to it thereof; nor can the railway company thereafter divest itself of responsibility for due care by leaving the cotton in the hands of the compress company as that company becomes its agent.