connecting carrier in handling the shipments of corn involved in this case, or that it was under no obligations respecting the same." It is true the court also said that plaintiff in error contended "that it had the right to discriminate between freight arriving in Birmingham over its lines and freight arriving over other lines, and could give preference between those that it chose to serve in this business," but this contention, it was also said, was "as a corollary" to the proposition that plaintiff in error was not a common carrier, but simply a private carrier. The court determined against this proposition, and in consequence adjudged plaintiff in error liable. In other words, the judgment of the court was in exact response to the pleading. Nor was there any change on appeal to the Supreme Court. The railroad company's second assignment of error was (and it is the only one with which we can concern ourselves) that it was not "liable for any portion of the alleged damage to these various shipments, because under the facts of this case it was not a connecting carrier and was not bound to handle these shipments. There is in the printed record a certificate of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State, given when the writ of error was applied for, to the effect that the Supreme Court of the State was of opinion "that the statutes and laws of Tennessee were not in conflict with the act of Congress regulating interstate commerce, and that the act of Congress did not control the shipments in controversy." Counsel concedes the rule to be that the certificate of the presiding judge of a state court is insufficient to give us jurisdiction, but insists that it can make more certain and specific what is too general and indefinite in the record. There is no doubt of the rule, but there is nothing in this record to justify its application. There is nothing in the record to specialize. It is less open to conjecture than the certificate. As no Federal question was raised, the motion to dismiss must be granted. VOL. CCIV-36 It is so ordered. Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. KEATLEY. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS. 204 U.S. No. 482. Submitted January 29, 1907.-Decided February 25, 1907. Where several persons are indicted under one indictment an order of the court granting separate trials makes separate independent causes and entitles the clerk to separate docket fees under par. 10 of § 828, Rev. Stat. Clerk's fee for recording abstract of judgment allowed on folio basis under par. 8 of § 828, Rev. Stat., in addition to the docket allowed by pars. 10, 11, 12 of that section. 41 C. Cl. 384, affirmed. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Van Orsdel and Mr. Philip M. Ashford, Special Assistant Attorney, for appellant. Mr. Frank B. Crosthwaite, for appellee. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. The claimant in the court below, appellee here, was clerk of the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of West Virginia from July 1 to July 6, 1902, and clerk of that court and the District Court from July 16, 1902, to September 17, 1904. He regularly rendered accounts for such services, which contained, among other things, charges for "separate docket fees in separate trials under one indictment." The charges were disallowed and this suit was brought therefor in the Court of Claims. Judgment was rendered for claimant for the sum of $125.45, certain items being disallowed. A counterclaim was filed by the United States for the recovery of $57.90, charged for "docketing judgments," alleged to have been erroneously and unlawfully paid to claimant by the accounting officers of the United States. The counterclaim was disallowed and the United States assigns as error the action of the court in rendering judgment for the claimant as aforesaid and overruling the counterclaim. In passing on the charge for the service the Court of Claims said: "The defendants' contention as to item 6 is troublesome. It appears that joint indictments were returned against several defendants; that on motion of defendants' counsel separate trials were granted to some of the defendants, whereupon the clerk made separate docket entries in accordance with said motion, docketing said causes as though separate indictments had been returned against the parties granted separate trials. "Paragraph 10 of section 828 of the Revised Statutes pro vides: "For making dockets and indexes, issuing venire, taxing costs and all other services on the trial or argument of a cause where issue is joined and testimony given, three dollars.' "By paragraph 11 a fee of $2 is allowed where no testimony is given, and by paragraph 12 a fee of $1 is allowed where the cause is dismissed or discontinued or judgment or decree rendered without issue.” The contention of the appellant turns upon the word "cause." The argument is that the word "cause" is limited by the word "indictment," and if it be returned against a number of persons and they be granted separate trials there is only one "cause." It is conceded that the court may grant separate trials, and it is not disputed that the court did so in the case for which the services sued for were charged and that each was separately designated on the records. We think the order granting separate trials made separate causes, and therefore each was independent of the other. State v. Rogers, 6 Baxter (Tenn.), 563; Noland v. State, 19 Ohio St. 131; Bryan v. Spivey, 106 N. Car. 95. The services rendered were a proper charge under the statute. 2. The counterclaim was for the recovery of $57.90, charges made for "docketing judgments," and the lists filed showed amounts from $0.15 to $8.70. The Court of Claims' comment was: "The defendants' counterclaim, predicated upon the alleged illegal allowance for the docketing of judgments, will have to be dismissed. The services here charged for were admittedly performed, by order of the court, and under the Jones case (supra) allowable." The case referred to is United States v. Jones, 134 U. S. 483. In the absence of anything in the record to the contrary, we must assume that the application of that case was made on account of the facts presented to the Court of Claims in this. Counsel for the United States say that the findings of the Court of Claims "on the subject of the counterclaim are not as full and complete as they might be." A belief is expressed, however, that it appears, from the face of the counterclaim, that they are folio fees. At all events, it is insisted, that they are not the charges specified in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of section 828 of the Revised Statutes. This the appellee concedes in effect, and urges that the charge was made under and is justified by paragraph 8 of that section, which reads as follows: "For entering any rule, order, continuance, judgment, decree, or recognizance, or drawing any bond or making any record, certificate, return, or report, for each folio fifteen cents." The words we have italicized are the words upon which appellee relies combined with the following order of the court: "The clerk of this court is directed to keep a judgment docket wherein shall be recorded abstracts of all judgments rendered in cases wherein the United States is a party. Said judgment docket shall contain: "The number of the case. "The names of the parties. "The amount of the judgment. "The amount of costs. "The date of the judgment. 204 U.S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. "When docketed. "The amount paid. "The disposition of the funds and any additional matter which the clerk may deem pertinent." The record required by that rule, appellee contends, is different from the various dockets which are kept in all United States courts in which brief entries of fact are made, and which, it is said, are covered by the docket fee. The contention is consonant with the decision of the Court of Claims, and we do not think it is refuted by the suggestions made by appellant. Judgment affirmed. OSBORNE v. CLARK. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE. No. 159. Argued January 16, 1907. Decided February 25, 1907. The fact that a state statute which was assailed in the state court as invalid under the constitution of the State might have been assailed on similar grounds as also invalid under the Constitution of the United States does not give this court jurisdiction to review under § 709, Rev. Stat., on writ of error where the objections to the decision under the Constitution of the United States were suggested for the first time on taking the writ of error. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. James J. Lynch and Mr. Floyd Estill, with whom Mr. Jesse M. Littleton, Mr. Isaac W. Crabtree and Mr. Felix D. Lynch were on the brief, for plaintiffs in error: The charter granted by the State of Tennessee to the Trustees of Carrick Academy created a contract, and the rights of |