as to those corporations which have paid the entrance tax and receive
permits to do business; nor can such a tax be justified under the power
to alter, amend and repeal reserved by the state constitution. So
held as to Colorado Statutes of 1897 and 1902. American Smelting Co.
v. Colorado, 103.
3. Contracts, impairment of obligation—Validity of ordinance of city of
Cleveland affecting franchise of street railroad company.
The action of the city council of Cleveland, and the acceptance by the
Cleveland Electric Railway Company of the various ordinances adopted
by the council did not amount to a contract between the city and the
company extending the time of the franchise involved in this action;
and a later ordinance affecting that franchise after its expiration as
originally granted is not void under the impairment clause of the
Federal Constitution. Cleveland Electric Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 116.
4. Due process of law defined.
Due process of law has never been precisely defined; while its fundamental
requirement is opportunity for hearing and defense, the procedure may
be adapted to the case, and proceedings in court are not always essen-
tial. Ballard v. Hunter, 241.
5. Due process of law; deprivation of property without opportunity to be heard.
Even though a statute providing for forfeiture and sale of buildings erected
on National lands of the Choctaw Nation may be valid, the title to the
buildings is not forfeited by the mere act of building, but the forfeiture
must be enforced by valid action; and to deny to those erecting the
buildings an opportunity to be heard would deprive them of their
property without due process of law. Walker v. McLoud, 302.
6. Due process of law; deprivation of property-Validity of law of Nebraska
fixing penalty and mode of execution for embezzlement of public money.
The statute of Nebraska, providing that one embezzling public money shall
be imprisoned and pay a fine equal to double the amount embezzled,
which shall operate as a judgment for the use of the persons whose
money was embezzled, is not unconstitutional as depriving the person
convicted of embezzlement of his property without due process of law
because it provides for such judgment irrespective of whether restitu-
tion has been made or not. In such a case the fine is a part of the
punishment and it is immaterial whether it is called a penalty or a civil
judgment, and the only question on which defendant can be heard is
as to the fact and amount of the embezzlement, and if he has an op-
portunity to be heard as to that he is not denied due process of law.
Coffey v. Harlan County, 659.
7. Due process of law; deprivation of property-Validity of Idaho sheep
grazing law.
Sections 1210, 1211, Revised Statutes of Idaho, prohibiting the herding
and grazing of sheep on, or within two miles of, land or possessory
VOL. CCIV-44
claims of persons other than the owner of the sheep, having been con-
strued by the highest court of that State as not affecting the right of
the owner of sheep to graze them on his own lands but only on the
public domain, is not unconstitutional as depriving the owner of sheep
of his property without due process of law because he cannot pasture
them on public domain, or as an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimina-
tion against the owners of sheep, as distinguished from other cattle,
and is a proper and reasonable exercise of the police power of the
State. Bacon v. Walker, 311.
8. Due process of law; deprivation of property—Validity of state statute re-
quiring admission to places of amusement on terms of equality.
A State may in the exercise of its police power regulate the admission of
persons to places of amusement, and, upon terms of equal and exact
justice, provide that persons holding tickets thereto shall be admitted
if not under the influence of liquor, boisterous, or of lewd character,
and such a statute does not deprive the owners of such places of their
property without due process of law; so held as to California statute.
Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 359.
9. Due process of law; deprivation of property-Right of municipality to grant
to a new company property of railroad company whose franchise has
expired.
In the absence of any provision to that effect in the original franchise, the
city granting a franchise to a street railway company cannot on the
expiration of the franchise take possession of the rails, poles and operat-
ing appliances; they are property belonging to the original owner,
and
an ordinance granting that property to another company on payment
to the owner of a sum to be adjudicated as its value is void as depriving
the owner of its property without due process of law. Cleveland Elec-
tric Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 116.
10. Due process of law-Validity of personal judgment against corporation
rendered without notice or appearance.
If a personal judgment be rendered in one State against a corporation of
another State, bringing such corporation into court, that is, without
any legal notice to the latter of the suit, and without its having ap-
peared therein in person or by attorney or agent, it is void for want
of due process of law. Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 8.
11. Due process and equal protection of laws-Validity of St. Francis Basin
Levee Act of 1893.
The St. Francis Basin Levee Act of Arkansas of 1893 does not deprive
non-resident owners of property assessed and sold pursuant to the
statute of their property without due process of law or deny such owners
the equal protection of the laws. Ballard v. Hunter, 241.
12. Eminent domain; requiring alteration of bridge to secure navigation;
liability of Government for cost thereof.
Requiring alterations to secure navigation against unreasonable obstruc-
tions is not taking private property for public use within the meaning
of the Constitution; the cost of such alterations are incidental to the
exercise of an undoubted function of the United States, exerting
through Congress its power to regulate commerce between the States.
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 364.
13. Eminent domain; exercise of right without compensation-Unlawful
delegation of power-Validity of § 18 of River and Harbor Act of 1899.
The provisions in § 18 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121,
1153, providing for the removal or alteration of bridges which are unrea-
sonable obstructions to navigation, after the Secretary of War has, pur-
suant to the procedure prescribed in the act, ascertained that they are
such obstructions, are not unconstitutional either as a delegation of
legislative or judicial power to an executive officer or as taking of
property for public use without compensation. Ib.
14. Equal protection of laws; when denied.
While a state legislature may not arbitrarily select certain individuals
for the operation of its statutes, the selection in order to be obnoxious
to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
clearly and actually arbitrary and unreasonable and not merely possi-
bly so.
Bachtel v. Wilson, 36.
15. Equal protection of laws-Classification in regulating use of public lands.
A classification in grazing countries of sheep, as distinguished from other
cattle, is not unreasonable and arbitrary in a regulation regarding the
use of public lands within the meaning of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bacon v. Walker, 311.
16. Fourteenth Amendment; application to state laws.
The laws of a State come under the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment only when they infringe fundamental rights. Ballard v. Hunter,
241.
17. Fourteenth Amendment—Application to stamp taxes of rule that general
expressions not allowed to upset long established methods.
The rule that the general expressions of the Fourteenth Amendment must
not be allowed to upset familiar and long established methods is ap-
plicable to stamp taxes which are necessarily confined to certain classes
of transactions, which in some points of view are similar to classes that
escape. Hatch v. Reardon, 152.
18. Full faith and credit; judicial proceedings wanting in due process of law
not entitled to.
The constitutional requirement that full faith and credit be given in each
State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every
other State is necessarily to be interpreted in connection with other
provisions of the Constitution, and therefore no State can obtain in the
tribunals of other jurisdictions full faith and credit for its judicial pro-
ceedings if they are wanting in the due process of law enjoined by the
fundamental law. Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 8.
See JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.
Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court. See JURISDICTION, A 1.
19. Privileges and immunities of citizens; impairment by State-Deprivation
of liberty without due process of law-Status of corporations.
A corporation is not deemed a citizen within the clause of the Constitution
of the United States protecting the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States from being abridged or impaired by the law of a
State; and the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
against deprivation without due process of law is that of natural, not
artificial, persons. Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 359.
States; discrimination between resident and non-residents as to service
of process. See STATES, 3.
Who may set up unconstitutionality of state statute. See TAXES AND
TAXATION, 4.
1. Bonds to secure sales; accrual of right of action on; sufficiency of declaration.
A bond to secure sales made on a credit for a specified period means that
the purchasers shall not be called on for payment until after the expira-
tion of that period, and if the declaration shows that such period has
actually elapsed since the sales sued for were made, it is sufficient
although it may not allege that the sales were made on the specified
terms. McGuire v. Gerstley, 489.
2. Bonds to secure sales; liability of parties not affected by alterations of prices
of articles sold.
Where a bond given to secure payment for goods sold to the principals
on a specified credit is complete on its face it is a clear and separate
contract between the sellers and the signers of the bond, and the lia-
bility of the sureties is not, in the absence of any separate agreement
in writing, affected by any future alterations of the prices of merchandise
sold provided the specified credit is allowed; and parol evidence to
show the existence of any other agreement as to prices between the
principals of the bond is not admissible. Ib.
3. Bonds to secure sales; effect of want of notice of non-payment or extension
of credit on liability of sureties.
The liability of sureties on the bond in this case given to secure payment
for goods sold on a specified credit was not affected by failure of the
sellers to notify the sureties of non-payment at the expiration of the
credit, or by their giving an extension of credit, there being no definite
term of such extension. Ib.
4. Bonds to secure sales; pleading in action on.
Pleas in defense to a suit on such a bond alleging damages for failure to sell
on the terms and for prices agreed must be distinct and set forth the
details. In order to found a cause of action on the shortcomings of
another they must be so plainly set up as to show that they were the
proximate and natural cause of actual damages sustained. Ib.
See CARRIERS, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3;
MINES AND MINING, 1.
CONTRIBUTION.
See ADMIRALTY, 1.
MINES AND MINING, 1, 2, 3; PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 4.
Foreign; implied assent to law of State in which it is doing business relative
to service of process.
Where an insurance company or corporation of one State goes into another
State to transact business in defiance of its statute as to service of
process, it will, in an action against it in such State, be held to have
assented to the terms prescribed by the local statute for service of
process in respect to business done in that State, but its assent in that
regard will not be implied as to business not transacted in that State.
Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 8.
See CONDEMNATION, 1;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 10, 19;
JURISDICTION, C 2; E 1;
NATIONAL BANKS,
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