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A Difcourfe of the CONTESTS and DISSENSIONS between the NOBLES and the COMMONS in ATHENS and Rome; with the confequences they had upon beth thofe ftates *.

Si tibi vera videtur,

Dede manus; et, fi falfa eft, accingere contra. Lucr.

Written in the year 1701.

CHAP. I.

"Tis agreed, that in all government there is an abfolute unlimited power, which naturally and originally feems to be placed in the whole body, wherever the executive part of it lies. This holds

in

*This difcourfe is a kind of remonftrance in behalf of King William and his friends, against the proceedings of the house of Commons; and was published during the recefs of parliament in the fummer of 1701, with a view to engage them in milder measures when they should meet again.

As this time Lewis XIV, was making large ftrides towards univerfal monarchy: plots were carrying on at St. Germain's; the Dutch had acknowledged the Duke of Anjou as King of Spain, and King William was made extremely unafy by the violence with which many of his minifters and chief favourites were pursued by the Commons; the King, to appeafe their refentment, had made fiveral changes in his miniftry, and removed fome of his most faithful fervants from places of the highest truft and dignity: this expedient, however, had proved ineffectual, and the Commons perfifted in their pofition; they began by impeaching William Bentink, Earl of

Portland,

in the body natural: for wherever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal fpirits in general, the body moves and acs by a confent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed fundamentally in the body of a people, is what the best legiflators of all ages have endeavoured,, in their several fchemes or inftitutions of government, to depofit in fuch hands as would preferve the people from zapine and oppreffion within, as well as violence from without. Most of them feem to agree in this, that it was a truft too great to be committed to any one man or affembly, and therefore they left the right still in the whole body; but the administration or executive part in the hands of the one, the few, or the many, into which three powers all independent bodies of men feem naturally to di vide; for by all I have read of thofe innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it seems to me, that a free people met toge ther, whether by compact, or family-government, as foon as they fall into any acts of civil fociety, do of themselves divide into three powers. The first is that of fome one eminent fpirit, who, having fignalized his valour and fortune in defence of his

Fortland, Groom of the Stole; and proceeded to the impeachment of John Somers, Baron Somers of Evesham, First Lord Keeper, af terwards Lord Chancellor ; Edward Ruffel, Earl of Orford, Lord Treasurer of the Navy, and one of the Lords Commiffioners of the Admiralty; and Charles Montague, Earl of Halifax, one of the Commiffioners of the Treafury, and afterwards. Chancellor of the Exchequer. Its general purport is to damp the warmth of the Commons, by fhewing, that the meafures they pursued had a direct tendency to bring on the tyranny which they profeffed to oppofe; and the particular cafes of the impeached Lords are parallelled in Athenian characters,

This whole treatife is full of hiftorical knowledge, and excellent reflections. It is not mixed with any improper fallies of wit, or any light airs of humour; and, in point of ftyle and learning, is equal, if not fuperior, to any of Swift's political works. Orrery.

country

country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to prefide, after a fort, in their civil affemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reafon, which in all difficul-ties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, do rather incite us to fly for counfel or af fiftance to a fingle perfon, than a multitude. The fecond natural divifion of power is of fuch men, who have acquired large poffeffions, and confequently dependencies, or defcend from ancestors. who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. These easily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon meafures for fecuring their properties, which are beft upheld by preparing against invafions from abroad, and maintaining. peace at home; this commences a great council or fenate of nobles for the weighty affairs of the nation. The last divifion is of the mafs or body of the people, whofe part of power is great and indif putable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it. Now, the three forms of government, fo generally known in the fchools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or fometimes two, (as in Sparta), who were called Kings; or in a fenate, who were called the Nobles; or in the people collective or reprefentative, who may be called the Commons. Each of thefe had frequently the execu tive power in Greece, and fometimes in Rome; but the power in the laft refort was always meant by legiflators to be held in balance among all three, And it will be an eternal rule in politics among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every ftate within itself, as well as among feveral ftates with each other..

The true meaning of a balance of power, either

without

without or within a ftate, is best conceived by confidering what the nature of a balance is. It fuppofes three things: Firft, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now, confider feveral ftates in a neighbourhood; in order to preferve peace between thefe ftates, it is neceffary they fhould be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reft into equal fcales, and upon occafion remove from one into the other, or elfe fall with their own weight into the lightest; fo in a state within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmost exactnefs into the feveral fcales. Now, it is not neceffary, that the power fhould be equally divided between thefe three; for the balance may be held by the weakeft, who, by his addrefs and conduct, removing from either fcale, and adding of his own, may keep the fcales duly poized. Such was that of the two kings of Sparta, the confular power in Rome, that of the kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as reprefented by Xenophon ; and that of the feveral limited states in the Gothic inftitution.

When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weakness of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either fcale, the power will never continue long in equal divifion between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the trueft account of what is understood in the most ancient and approved Greek authors by the word tyranny, which is not meant for the feizing of the uncontrolled or abfolute power into the hands of a fingle perfon, (as many fuperficial men have grofsly mistaken), but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one fcale; for tyranny and ufurpa

tion in a state are by no means confined to any number, as might eafily appear from examples enough; and because the point is material, I fhall cite a few to prove it.

The Romans having fent to Athens, and the Greek cities of Italy, for the copies of the best laws, chofe ten legiflators to put them into form, and, during the exercife of their office, fufpended the confular power, leaving the administration of affairs in their hands. Thefe very men, though chofen for fuch a work, as the digefting a body of laws for the government of a free ftate, did immediately ufurp arbitrary power; ran into all the forms of it, had their guards and fpies after the practice of the tyrants of thofe ages, affected kingly ftate, deftroyed the nobles, and oppreffed the people; one of them proceeding fo far, as to endeavour to force a lady of great virtue: the very crime which gave occafion to the expulfion of the regal power but fixty years before, as this attempt did to that of the Decemviri.

The Ephori in Sparta were at first only certain perfons deputed by the kings to judge in civil matters, while they were employed in the wars. Thefe men, at feveral times, ufurped the abfolute authority, and were as cruel tyrants, as any in their age.

Soon after the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Athenians chofe four hundred men for adininistration of affairs, who became a body of tyrants, and were called, in the language of those ages, an oligarchy, or tyranny of the few; under which hateful denomination they were foon after depofed in great rage by the people.

When Athens + was fubdued by Lyfander, he appointed thirty men for the administration of that

*Dionyf. Hal. lib. 10,

1 Thucyd. lib. 8.

Xenophon de rebus Græc. lib. 2.