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BY HUDSON & GOODWIN,

AND READY FOR SUBSCRIBERS AND OTHERS,

DESIGNED ESPECIALLY, FOR THE USE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE NEW SETTLEMENTS

Thoughts on the Doctrine of the
Trinity.

ΤΗ
THE persons in the God-

HE doctrine of a Trinity
of

versary, and supports the "God of this world." But notwithstanding the artful and spurious objections against the doctrine of the Trinity, if it be a doctrine of revelation, it is to be avowed as such, and cordially received by the friends of Jesus.

The object of the following remarks is not, directly to prove that the existence of one God in three distinct persons is a truth of revelation; but rather to answer some questions that are proposed by way of objection to the doctrine.

The questions proposed to be considered are the following:

persons in the Godhead, tho' acknowledged by the fathers, and believed by most Protestant divines for ages, is a disputed doctrine, and, in the present day, discarded by some who are set for the defence of the gospel. Many specious objections are raised against it, and much said to stagger the faith and disturb the minds of some who are, yet, honest and sincere friends of Christ, and those truths contained in his gospel. Not only weak minded Christians are wounded by those observations that are raised against this fundamental doctrine of Christianity, but injury is done in another view. Weapons are put into the hands of the enemies of the cross, and the cause of infidelity is strengthened. If professors of religion-if the teachers of Christianity raise objections against the most im-lition, constituting one being portant doctrines of that gospel possessed of perception and vothey are set to defend, it lition? strengthens the cause of the adVOL. V. No. 4.

I. In what doth personality consist-doth it not involve the idea of perception and volition?

II. If personality involve the idea of perception and volition, how is a person distinguished from a being.

III. Is it not a contradiction to say there are three persons possessed of perception and vo

I. In what doth personality
Q

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On the Trinity.

[OCTOBER,

men do not admit of any distinction. Every distinct person is viewed as a distinct being.James, Peter and John are persons, each distinct, as to person

III. Is it not a contradiction to say there are three persons possessed of perception and vo

consist-doth it not involve the idea of perception and volition? It is readily granted that the idea that first presents itself when a person is spoken of is that it is a rational intelligence-ality, from the other. Their a being possessed of percep- being is also as distinct as their tion and volition. To such an personality. They are three one only can personal proper- persons, and three distinct beties and characters be applied. ings. The human mind, indeed, The word person cannot, with is not capable of abstracting, or any propriety, be applied to any making a distinction between but one that has a rational mind person and being, as applied to -one capable of distinguishing men. This is readily conceded, | good from evil, and of choosing although the doctrine of the and refusing. The most impor- Trinity is owned as lying at the tant creatures, of the inanimate foundation of the Christian kind, are not persons, however scheme. useful to mankind. Nor can the word, in strictness of propriety, be applied to any of the irrational animals. The Psalm-lition, constituting one being ist, it is true, compares the sun possessed of perception and voto a "Bridegroom coming out lition? of his chamber, and rejoicing as a strong man to run a race. But this is, evidently, to be taken in a figurative sense; and so are all personal properties when applied either to mere animals, or to inanimate things. Noth- | ing short of a rational mind, capable of wishing and exercising choice, can constitute a person. Without entering into any metaphysical disquisitions, it may be said, in the plain language of common sense, that personality consisteth in a rational mind, capable of choosing and refusing, and that in view of moral good and evil; and, there fore, that perception and volition are, necessarily, involved in it.

II. If personality involve the idea of perception and volition, how is a person distinguished from a being?

The words person and being when applied to finite rational existencies, such as angels or

In attending to this question it seems necessary to answer two others. One is whether the proposition be contrary to reason ? The other is, whether it be, in fact, a contradiction in terms?

1. Is the proposition contrary to reason?

A doctrine or proposition may be contrary to the method of reasoning used by those in opposition to it, and not contrary tə reason itself. A doctrine may, also, be above the comprehension of reason, and yet, in no measure, contrary to it. We are to make a distinction between a doctrine contrary to reason, and one above its comprehension. "We may conclude says one writer, a doctrine is contrary to reason when it contradicts some of the first principles which the mind of man cannot but assent to without any proof. Such are the following:

it thence follow that to say there
are three divine persons con-
stituting one divine being is a
contradiction in terms.
To as-

the whole is greater than a part— it is impossible a thing should be and not be at the same time-trvo are more than one. If a doctrine contradict such plain, self-sert, because our ideas of a disevident propositions it is contrary to reason. But this cannot be said of the doctrine of the Trinity. The most we can say of that is, that it is above the comprehension of a finite mind. Should we say that three per

are one person, or that the one divine being is three divine beings, it would do violence to common sense, and contradic the first principles of reason.— But the proposition is that three persons constitute one divine being, which is not contrary to reason, however mysterious and incomprehensible to a finite understanding.

2. Is the proposition a contradiction in terms? .

tinct finite person are that he is a distinct being, and because we are not able to separate personality from being, when applied to creatures, that therefore every distinct divine person is a distinct divine being, would be false reasoning. And so, because we are not able to abstract separate personality from separate being, when applied to reatures, to assert, that therefore the proposition, "there are three divine persons possessed of perception and volition constituting one divine being possessed of perception and volition," is a contradiction in terms, would be false reasoning; it would be drawing inferences without any premises—it would be to assert, that since we do not fully understand and comprehend a proposition it cannot be true-and this method of reasoning would exclude from human belief many of the truths of revelation: Yca, it would exclude from the minds of many, a belief of some propositions which are capable of demonstration.

To say that the one divine being, possessed of perception and volition, is three divine beings, possessed of perception and volition, would be a contradiction in terms. Or should we say that one divine person is three divine persons it would be self contradiction. But tho' it is conceded that we cannot abstract personality from being, it doth not thence follow that every distinct divine person is a If we consider the subject listinct being; nor that as many fairly, and in the exercise of listinct divine persons as there | Christian candor, the propositre, so many distinct divine be- tion we are examining will not ngs there are. Nor does it fol- appear either a violation of reaow because we cannot conceive son or a contradiction in terms. of distinct personality without, What tho' it contain a mystery; t the same time, conceiving of yet that, it is conceived, is no oblistinct being, when applied to jection against it. Many things reatures, that therefore they which we cannot comprehend, annot be conceived of separate- or fully understand, we are 7, or that they cannot be sep-bound to believe. Who can acrated in the divine mind, and count for the divine existence, 1 the divine being. Nor does from eternity, underived and

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uncaused?

of the Bible, and pronounce it
inconsistent and contradictory,
while we admit others equally
mysterious and incomprehen-
sible? This will be degrading
to our own understanding, as
well as reproachful to the infi-
nite God.
nite God. While we are not to
explain or investigate the doc-
trine of the Trinity, for there is
nothing in the nature of creatures
by which it can be illustrated, we
are to admit it as that our the
credit of divine revelation-es-

Who can, on rational, philosophical principles, see how all things were made of nothing? These are as real mysteries, and as contrary to reason, as the doctrine of the Trinity. Who can account for the resurrection of the body, and the change of those who shall be found alive at judgment? Of the latter, Paul saith, "Behold, I shew you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye."pecially so, since it is neither a Is not this a mystery-as really,

violation of reason, nor a contradiction in terms. If we establish it as a maxim, to admit no doctrine but what we can explain, on principles of reason and human philosophy, we may deny the doctrine of the Trinity. And on this principle we shall deny many other leading truths of scripture. On this principle, indeed, we shall discard and deny many things, which we know exist, in the natural world.Yea, this principle lays the basis of infidelity, and, if pursued, leads a short and easy way to a denial of the whole scheme of Christianity.

so as the doctrine of the Ti-diction in terms.
ty? Can we any more com-
prehend the one than the other?
Is it to be accounted for on
principles of reason and philoso-
phy? And shall we reject this,
shall we reject this,
or any other doctrine, because
above reason; and say it cannot
be true because we are unable
to comprehend it? We cannot
"find out the Almighty unto
perfection." God is greater than
man. He sees thro' and per-
fectly understands those things
which, to the human mind, are
enveloped in thick darkness;
and by his unlimited power he
is able to accomplish all his
purposes. God can as easily
change, in a moment, a natural
to a spiritual body, as he can
will to do it—and he knows per-
fectly well, how all things were
made of nothing, and under-
stands his own eternal existence
underived and uncaused, tho'
in view of these the human
mind is lost and bewildered.-
So, by his infinite understand-isting in one God, the divinity of
ing, God is able to see through
the doctrine of the Trinity, and
know it is true, though to us it
be an incomprehensible mys-
tery.

Shall we deny one doctrine'

It may be suitable before these remarks are closed, to notice some of the dangerous consequences of denying the doctrine of the Trinity; or admitting the force of any objections against it.

1. If we deny the doctrine of the Trinity in unity it is a denial of the divinity of Christ. If there be not three divine persons ex

Christ must be given up-it cannot be supported on any other ground. If we allow that distinct personality constitutes distinct being, when applied to God, then of course, Jesus