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ON

PROTESTANT

NONCONFORMITY.

BOOK I.

N

ascertaining

principles, common to

both sides

in a contro

versy.

§ 1. On all subjects which admit of con- Necessity of troversy, there must be taken for granted cer- fundamental tain ascertained or received truths, as the common basis of the reasonings of each party. It would be not only unavailing, but impracticable, to engage in argument with a person with whom we have not some ideas in common. A difference of opinion presupposes an agreement of understanding up to the point at which that difference originates. If the matter in dispute be the colour of an object, there is, probably, no disagreement with respect to its form; or if the nature of a thing he contested, each disputant admits its existence. The necessary preliminary, then, to all controversial discussions, is, to ascertain the proper basis of agreement, to discover the exact point at which the

B

difference of opinion takes its rise. If a man has proceeded so far in demolishing within his own mind the grounds of certainty, as to doubt the existence of a God, still, if he is possessed of sanity, he must admit his own existence; and this being admitted, it is not impossible to deduce from this simple fact, a demonstration of the truth which he denies. There is in moral truth a force of vitality so imperishable, that, like a seed, the most minute particle is capable of multiform development, carrying forward at every stage a nature infinitely reproductive.

The relations between moral truths the most remotely connected in appearance, are not less certain and necessary, than those which are the subject of experimental induction, or of mathematical demonstration. But the first principles of moral science, are less easily ascertained, because the facts to which they relate, do not fall under the cognizance of natural reason. Man is not purely intellectual, nor perfect as a moral being; his faculties, therefore, are not in all cases adequate to trace out the order and connexion in which things really subsist. Truth, however, is not the less certain, because knowledge is uncertain: the reality of light is shewn by the shadows which it casts. There is a degree of truth, which is requisite to give plausi bility to error, for it is very rarely that opinions are found to rest simply on what is false. Some

thing that partakes of the nature of certainty, forms the substratum of our speculations and reasonings on all moral subjects; and to determine what these certain principles are, into which the controversy resolves itself, and to follow them out into their genuine consequences, wheresoever they may lead us, is the only method by which we can come to any satisfactory decision.

of religion

to irreli

gion.

§ 2. In all religious inquiries, the possibility, Definition the existence, and even the excellency of reli- as opposed gion, are taken for granted; but seldom do disputants think of comparing their ideas as to its nature. The term Religion is so familiar, that every body supposes there is a general understanding as to its meaning: it is, however, sufficiently obvious, that it has two distinct acceptations. In its primary meaning, it denotes that sense of a Divine Being, or principle of faith, which is admitted to constitute the philosophical distinction of the human creature,* inasmuch as it elevates him in capacity above the See Howe's level of brutal imperfection. The faculty of Temple, knowing and holding converse with his Divine Originator, is that which imparts infinite value to his being, and forms the purpose of its immortality. "Capable we are of God, both by understanding and will: by understanding, as he is that sovereign Truth which comprehends the rich treasures of all wis

Herbert

De Veritate.

Living

Part I. C. 2.

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