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the attempt, in fact, to do that which being impossible to be done it cannot be necessary it should be done, and if not necessary, all pretence for attempting it as a thing expedient or desirable is taken away; it is the imposition of other tests of union than those which have a relation to the essential unity of the Church: it is these which are the original source of all the mischiefs charged upon diversity of religious opinion. The evil may in short be traced up to this simple circumstance-intolerance armed with power. Differences of opinion are not the cause, they are only the pretence of intolerance; but what gives venom and energy to intolerance, is ambition, and what makes ambition dangerous, is secular power. By this means inroads have been made by worldly policy into the spiritual kingdom of Christ, and the boundary of separation between the Church and the World has been, as a natural consequence, practically involved in utter obscurity. To resist this unhallowed usurpation is a duty resulting from our allegiance to the "One "Lord" of the Church; and it is enforced by every consideration that respects the spiritual integrity and unity of that Church which "He "hath purchased with his own blood."

BOOK II.

ON CHURCH GOVERNMENT.

Nature of

laws in ge

ginating in

ponding re

lations.

T

CHAP. I.

On Laws in General.

§ 1. Ir belongs to the constitution of creneral, as ori- ated beings, to be, in all their operations, subSuperior will ject to fixed laws, which originate in the soverand corres- eign will of the Creator. That limitation of nature which is implied in the notion of a finite being, and which forms a boundary between distinct orders in the scale of being; that which imparts to the necessary actions, whether of inanimate or of living agents, order, uniformity, and continuance; that which guides the voluntary actions of moral agents, in reference to a final end, suitable to their nature; are so many laws originating in the appointment of God, by which term we in general imply either a physical necessity, or an obligation on the agent as a rule of action. It is the prerogative of the Divine Being, to be incapable of obligation in any sense but that which respects the perfection of his own nature, or those promises which are the very expression of his will. "The being of God," is, indeed,

to use the words of Hooker, "a kind of law “unto his working; for the perfection which "God is, giveth perfection to that he doeth." That perfection implies, in conjunction with the power of doing all things, the necessity of doing what is best. But in respect of his nature, the Divine Being is infinitely free.

Laws necessarily presuppose superior authority on the part of their author, and they are uniformly founded on corresponding relations between the legislator and the subjects of their obligations. The laws to which all created being is subject, have their cause in the will of the Supreme Intelligence, the Creator and Governor of all things. The relations subsisting between the works of God and their Divine Author, are those of physical and of moral existence. The material universe, which emanated from the will of the Almighty, is described in the sublime language of Inspiration, as yielding obedience to His commands; as if the blind agent, Nature, were itself conscious of the statutes which it obeyed. Man is, as a creature, equally subject with other creatures, by the necessity of his nature, to the operation of physical obligations; while those higher relations of which as an intelligent free agent and as a social being he is capable, constitute the basis of other laws,-the law of reason, the law of conscience, together with

positive laws superinduced upon these, having reference to the designs of God as the righteous Governor of the accountable beings he has formed. As the will of the Creator is the original reason of physical necessity, so the will of the moral Governor of the Universe, that will which is the expression of his perfections, is the only possible basis of moral obligation. Both have a necessary existence in the nature of things, which is only another phrase for the nature of God: only, moral obligations, being founded, not upon the simple exercise of Divine power, but upon the essential character of the Divine Being, and the necessary conditions of finite existence, are incapable of termination or of change. Positive institutions, however, notwithstanding they are of Divine origin, may, by the interposition of the same authority, undergo repeal; because, although so long as they remain in force, they are equally binding with natural duties, and rest upon the same basis,— the relation of intelligent creatures to the Divine Legislator,-they originate, not in the necessary operations of the Divine will, but in an act of sovereign appointment, prior to which there was no necessity that the creature should be made subject to such particular laws. Our essential obligations, as creatures, remain immutably the same, and these form the fundamental law of moral action. Our

positive duties spring out of these natural obligations, and relate to the variable circumstances of human existence. But in all cases,

the Divine will, expressed in the constitution of nature, or made known by Revelation, is the source of moral obligation, the original cause of what is necessary, the ultimate standard of what is right.

What

Human laws artificial re

rest on the

lations of

man as a so

cial being.

§ 2. The relations subsisting between man and man are the basis of human laws. imparts, however, the force of moral obligation to any human enactments, is the Divine origin of those necessary social relations on which they are founded. Obligations are either natural or voluntary; the former are necessary, and cannot originate, therefore, in the will of man; the latter rest upon those relations which originate in actual or implied compact. Laws of this nature can neither supersede nor add to natural obligation, because the will of man, in which they have their origin, is not the basis of moral duty, since it cannot make any alteration in the essential relations of accountable creatures, or control the moral nature of man. Human laws are founded on the artificial relations of society: they respect man in no other capacity than as a social being, for in this character alone man can be the superior of man. All laws presuppose a superior will,* and a superiority of this kind can attach to a human I. p. 42.

*BLACKSTONE, Vol.

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