latter, Xanthippus at a later period honorably commanded the naval forces of his country in the famous battle at Mykale, drove the Persians from the Thracian Chersonesc, captured Sestos, and laid the foundations of Athenian supremacy on the seas; for which services, as well as for his conscientious adherence to the constitution of the state, he was held in high esteem throughout his whole life.

Themistokles and Aristeides, though perhaps not much. younger in years than the two former, had not been so long on the arena of political action. As statesmen, they were new and striking productions of the constitution of Kleisthenes. Unlike Miltiades, they claimed neither gods nor heroes among their progenitors; unlike Xanthippus, they were not. connected either by blood or by marriage with the noblest families of the city. Being of middle rank and moderate property, both were fair representatives of the new order of affairs that prevailed in the state through the political reforms of Kleisthenes. Both had made their way to distinction by means of their talents and energy, and yet no two statesmen in all history present characters so fundamentally different.

Themistokles was a man of the rarest genius and of exalted ambition. At the battle of Marathon he won his first laurels, and his subsequent career was destined to be eminently glorious, and conducive to the honor and safety of his country. But in the attainment of this end he sometimes resorted to means the most unscrupulous and reprehensible.

Aristeides, with less genius and foresight, was equally brave and patriotic, but more cautious and conservative, exhibiting a decided contrast to the fiery and progressive spirit of Themistokles. His ambition, less intense and less daring than that of his great rival, was always kept conscientiously within the bounds of the constitution. He contented himself with faithfully discharging his duty as a citizen, and honestly fulfilling the requirements of whatever offices were bestowed

upon him by the votes of his fellow citizens. Themistokles, when elected to office, too often sought to make the position a medium of personal aggrandizement, and was rarely known to refuse a bribe if sufficient in amount. Aristeides, on the other hand, never wavered in his integrity, whence he was popularly called "Aristeides the Just." In the course of his career he was many times chosen archon, often occupied the judge's bench, and was finally appointed commander of the naval forces, in which capacity he was invested with almost discretionary power to impose tribute upon the allies. Manifold as were the opportunities thus afforded of enriching himself, no man could ever accuse Aristeides of having committed an injustice or stained his hands with bribes. By the genius of Themistokles not only Athens but all Greece may be said to have been saved at Salamis. No such brilliant exploit can be found in the record of Aristeides, yet the latter always retained a firmer hold on the affections of his fellow citizens than the former was able to do with all his dazzling qualities; so highly did the Athenians esteem justice and integrity in the character of their public men.

Widely divergent in character and political instincts as were these four Athenian leaders at the time of the Persian invasion, they were all alike actuated by a noble and generous determination to preserve their country from the threatening danger.

Great was the consternation at Athens when tidings reached the city that so formidable a host of invaders was disembarking on the plain of Marathon. As frequently happens on such occasions, imaginary dangers conspired to render the reality more appalling. The minds of the people were agitated by rumors of treason; but the prevailing spirit was one of unconquerable bravery and resolution. With their own small army they could scarcely hope to offer effectual resistance to the enormous forces of their foe. Their only assurance of safety seemed to lie in aid from the other states

of Greece. This they could not expect from their nearest neighbors, Ægina and Thebes, both still embittered at the recent defeats they had sustained at the hands of the Athenians. All eyes were therefore anxiously turned toward Sparta, and thither was dispatched in all haste the courier Pheidippides, who, performing the journey of one hundred and fifty miles, on foot, in the incredibly short space of fortyeight hours, made an earnest appeal to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of the sad fate that had lately overtaken Eretria, and imploring them not to suffer Athens, the most ancient among the cities of Hellas, to be likewise enslaved by barbarians. The magistrates expressed their willingness to grant the desired aid, but declined to do so immediately, on the plea that it was now the ninth day of the moon, when, in accordance with a time-honored custom, all the citizens of Sparta were required to be at home, in this month at least, to celebrate the festival of the Karneian Apollo. They promised, however, to send assistance to the Athenians as soon as the festival should be over.

The lukewarm behavior of the Spartans has been justified by some historians on the ground that it was in accordance with their religious principles; but this same custom, which the Spartans alleged as an excuse for their delay, was violated on other occasions when it happened to be to their interest so to do. Had Athens fallen into the hands of the invaders, nothing could have saved Sparta herself and the entire land of Greece from the yoke of Persia. We are not to infer that the Spartans offered this custom as a pretext in order altogether to avoid sending the desired assistance; for they did indeed send an army in all haste to Attica four days later. Probably at first they did not thoroughly appreciate the magnitude of the danger, their own city not being immediately threatened; but it must be acknowledged that they displayed a total lack of the Panhellenic sentiment that had prompted the Athenians to send succor to Miletus and Eretria.

The unsatisfactory answer brought back to Athens by Pheidippides on the fifth day from his departure greatly troubled the minds of the citizens, who could not help suspecting that their jealous rival city intended to leave them to their fate. Yet it caused no change in the plans of resistance. Nine thousand hoplites had already been dispatched to the plain of Marathon to oppose the advance of the invaders by land, while the remainder of the forces were kept in the city in order to be prepared for an attack by sea; for it might be the intention of the Persian commanders, after landing a large force at Marathon, to proceed with the fleet to the very harbor of Athens.

These nine thousand citizens-nine hundred being from each of the ten Attic communities-were accompanied by their slaves, who served as attendants, and many of whom no doubt took part in the ensuing battle as light-armed troops. This little force was under the command of ten generals, one from each community, each of whom was to hold in turn the post of commander-in-chief for the space of one day, and then to hand over this authority to the next in order. Arriving on the field, they pitched their camp in a favorable place about a mile distant from the spot where the Persians had disembarked, and in such a position that the latter could not advance toward Athens without first giving battle. The ten generals then held a council of war, in which Miltiades advocated the policy of boldly attacking the enemy instead of remaining on the defensive, alleging that the courage, high spirit, and admirable self-confidence of the little army rendered an offensive policy perfectly justifiable, and that too long a delay might furnish an opportunity to the secret partisans of Hippias, of whom there were not a few still left in Athens, to effect an understanding with the enemy and to betray the city. Four of the other generals agreed with Miltiades, but the remaining five deemed it unwise to risk the fortune and existence of

Athens on the chance of a single battle, especially since there was good ground for expecting the speedy arrival of reënforcements from Sparta. The commanders being thus equally divided in opinion, the decision of the matter rested. with the polemarch, or the third in rank of the nine annual archons, who by virtue of his office was entitled to a vote in the council of the regularly elected generals. Fortunately for the Hellenic cause, the polemarch was Kallimachus, a man of daring and prompt action. Convinced by the arguments of Miltiades, Kallimachus gave the casting vote in favor of an aggressive movement. This decision reached, Aristeides, who was also one of the ten generals, and had a right to the supreme command on the day of his turn, voluntarily came forward and resigned that right in favor of Miltiades, whom he acknowledged to be a more able and experienced general than himself. His example was immediately followed by the rest, and Miltiades became sole commander of the whole force. Nevertheless he did not seek an encounter with the enemy until the day on which he would have held command according to the previous arrangement, which happened to be the tenth day after their departure from Athens. The delay was probably owing to his desire to fall upon the Persians at an unguarded moment, or perhaps unavoidable on account of preliminary manœuvres.

In the mean time, although the promised aid from Sparta had not arrived, an event occurred that raised the spirits of the Athenians to a high pitch of enthusiasm, and convinced them that they were not entirely abandoned. They were joined by one thousand hoplites from the little city of Platæa, which twenty years previously had been freed by the Athenians from the Baotians. This little band formed the entire military force of the Plateans, who made use of this opportunity of showing their gratitude toward Athens for past services. When we consider that Athens was the main object of the vengeance of Darius, and that Platea was not