in fact, accustomed to say that the Athenians paid him no honor save when a storm arose, and that then they sheltered themselves under him as under a plane-tree, which in fair weather they would rob of its leaves and branches. But the real cause of the defeat of Themistokles in the elections of 479 B. c. was the prostitution of his great influence to corrupt purposes. The Athenians had at last acquired a knowledge of his bribery at Artemisium, and his secret and unjust exactions from the islands during the siege of Andros ; and they wished to teach him, as ten years before they had taught Miltiades, the salutary lesson that not even the savior of his country could with impunity inflict disgrace upon her.

Before advancing from his secure position on the borders of Thessaly, Mardonius strove by all possible means to conciliate the Athenians. With this end in view, he sent to them Alexander, king of Macedonia, promising to rebuild their city and establish them firmly over the rest of Hellas, provided they would form with him an equal and independent alliance.

When the news reached the Spartans, they were in great fear lest the Athenians should agree to the alliance. They knew that the latter were in dire distress on account of the destruction of their city, the laying waste of their country, and the impossibility of cultivating their fields during the current year on account of the total lack of seed. Moreover, the Athenians had good reason to be angry with the Peloponnesians for not sending their forces to the defense of Boeotia during the previous year. The Spartans, therefore, hastily dispatched heralds to dissuade them from entering into an alliance with the invaders, promising to furnish support for their families during the present distress.

The Spartans little understood the magnanimous spirit of the Athenians. The latter delayed answering the proposals of Mardonius until the arrival of the heralds from Sparta, in order that the reply might be delivered in their presence.

Then the following solemn and dignified, yet resolute, answer was given to Alexander :

"Tell Mardonius that, as long as yonder sun shall continue in his present path, the Athenians will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defense, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burned."

Then, turning to the Spartans, they bade them say to their countrymen at home that they were grateful for their offer of sustenance, but that they would endeavor to provide for themselves, and begged them to send the Peloponnesian army as soon as possible into Baotia, that it might protect Attica against the attack of Mardonius.

The Spartans, instead of fulfilling their promise, turned their attention to the celebration of the Hyakinthian festival, while Mardonius advanced as far as Attica with the allies from eastern Hellas, including the Phokians, who had remained neutral during the invasion of Xerxes. The Athenians were not able alone to meet this overwhelming force, and were a second time compelled to abandon their city and fly for refuge to Salamis with their wives and children.

Mardonius sent to them again, repeating his former proposition. The late faithlessness of the Spartans had justly excited the anger of the Athenians, and no one would now have blamed them had they given heed to Mardonius. Yet all the members of the senate, with the single exception of Lykidas, unhesitatingly rejected the proposals. So ominous did the Athenians deem it that one of their archons should suggest the propriety of yielding to Mardonius, that in the excess of their patriotism both senators and people combined to stone Lykidas to death; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had occurred, "went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children."

At the same time they sent to Sparta to remonstrate against the treachery and indifference of that state, and to demand that the army be immediately forwarded, if not into Boeotia, already occupied by the Persians, at least into the Thriasium, the plain of Attica.

The ephors received the message coldly, and replied that they would consider the matter. For ten successive days they delayed their answer, all the while celebrating the Hyakinthia and hurrying up the fortifications of the isthmus. The ambassadors then became impatient, and declared that on the following day they would hold their last meeting, and would then take their departure. The ephors, not desiring to drive the Athenians to desperation, arranged everything with such amazing dispatch as to show how admirably the machinery of their government operated. On the next day the ambassadors, coming to the ephors, said: "Ye Lacedæmonians, remain here, celebrating the Hyakinthia, and desert us, your allies. The Athenians, unjustly treated by you and in want of assistance, will now make the best possible terms with Mardonius, and will act with him in every expedition."

After the ambassadors had ended, the ephors assured them on oath that the army had already started. Five thousand Spartans, each accompanied by seven Helots, had the previous night set out toward the isthmus. Forty thousand men had been ordered to march, and had marched in such silence that the ambassadors, although staying in the same city, had not even a suspicion of the event. In addition, five thousand Pericki, each accompanied by a lightarmed Helot, had also departed toward the isthmus. Other Peloponnesian cities followed this example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

The Argeians hastened to announce to Mardonius the advance of the Spartans. He consequently retreated to Boeotia, a country in every way more favorable to his pur

poses; but, before his departure from Attica, he completed the work of destruction begun in the preceding summer. He led his forces up the banks of the Asopus, and encamped in the form of a square, each side of which had an extent of ten furlongs, defended by wooden walls and towers.

This position was highly advantageous for his cavalry. Near him was the walled city of Thebes; provisions were abundant, and the Baotians ready allies; from the north he feared no enemy, and the Hellenic army, being without cavalry, could not expect success. Many of the Persians, however, were disheartened by the departure of the king, and, placing no reliance on their Greek allies, had no confidence in the favorable issue of the combat. The Phokians were especially mistrusted. Mardonius ordered them to form in a separate detachment on the plain, and surrounded them with a large body of horse. A sudden and simultaneous impression ran through the Phokians that he was about to charge their ranks. But Harmokydes, the Phokian chief, was not dismayed at this turn of affairs. He urged his men to die honorably, and to teach their ignoble opponents that they had plotted as barbarians against Grecian heroes. The attacking horsemen rushed upon the Hellenic ranks with drawn bows, but the Greeks met them with solid phalanx and a firm countenance. All at once the Persians, either terrified at their formidable array, or wishing simply to try the strength of that small body, fell back, and Mardonius, sending a messenger, said: "Take courage, ye Phokians; you have proved yourselves brave men. Show yourselves as ready in the coming war, and you shall be greatly rewarded both by the king and by myself." This circumstance was but one of many that tended to foster a feeling of distrust throughout the Persian army, little calculated to increase its courage and efficiency.

CHAPTER VIII.

EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS.

The Battle of Platœa.

THE Hellenic army arrived late at Eleusis, because the Lacedæmonians were obliged to await the arrival of the Peloponnesian and other confederates. The total force of hoplites was 38,700 men, of whom 8,000 were Athenians. There was no cavalry, and but few bowmen. But if we add those who were called light-armed, some of whom were provided with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor, the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. these light-armed there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5,000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites, together with 1,800 Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.

Of

Pausanias, seeing the Persians drawn up near the Asopus, did not at first dare to descend into the plain, but encamped on the mountain declivity near Erythræ. Mardonius committed the mistake of attacking the Greeks there with his cavalry. The plain was undulating, and ill suited for a cavalry engagement. The Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were hard pressed, but they soon rallied when a force of three hundred Athenians came to their assistance. For some time the struggle was sharp and indecisive, but the Persians finally were driven back with loss. In this engagement, Masistius, the Persian commander, "a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings," was slain while charging at the head of his troops. His death produced deep sorrow among the Persians. His body, after a desperate strug