PART FIFTH.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

CHAPTER I.

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

Deliberations at Sparta.

THE events last related occurred during the spring and summer of 432 B. C. The causes of dispute were multiplied, and the passions of the contending parties were more and more inflamed. The Megarians did not cease to object to the decree, and the Corinthians had now become to the highest degree angry and warlike. They maintained that the Athenians had violated the thirty years' truce by having fought against them, and, on mere suspicion that the Potidæans intended to revolt, had assailed the rights and privileges of that city. Besides, some other allies of the Peloponnesians made complaint of unjust treatment; many subjects of the Athenians, especially the Æginetans, were secretly complaining to Sparta of the persecution which they were suffering; and, most of all, the fear prevailed that the Athenians had in view the enslavement of all Hellas.

Thus the Lacedæmonians-although as indolent as ever, although always hesitating to undertake a great conflict,

although more readily promising than granting assistanceforced at last by the pressure of public opinion, deemed it of the most urgent necessity to do something on this occasion. In such serious emergencies, it was necessary that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether any cause of war existed. If there were no cause, the affair was not even submitted to a vote of the allies. If war were decided upon, and the majority concurred in the opinion of Sparta, the confederacy was obliged to execute the order; but if the majority decided otherwise, Sparta none the less carried out her decision, together with those of the allies who agreed with her. Every city, large or small, had an equal right of suffrage, but it is easily seen that Sparta exerted a controlling influence. The Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as held that the Athenians had either violated the truce or otherwise wronged the Peloponnesians, submitted their complaints to the assembly of the citizens of Sparta. Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could have been decided only by the entire body of the citizens who, by reason of their age, regular attendance at the syssitia, and strict observance of the laws, had the right of voting. After the accusation had been formally presented, all strangers were excluded, and the assembly debated in secret.

The great historian of the Peloponnesian war furnishes an unusually full account of what occurred during this assembly, in which the fate of Hellas was to be decided. He does not indeed record all the speeches delivered; but first, the argument of the Corinthians, necessarily the most important of all; next, that of some Athenian envoys, who, happening to be at the same time in Sparta on other business, obtained permission from the magistrates to answer the accusers; thirdly, the speech of King Archidamus "on the policy proper to be adopted by Sparta"; and, finally, the pithy but most characteristic address of the ephor Sthenelaï

das, through the influence of which war was decreed. These speeches were composed by Thucydides himself, yet they faithfully depict the sentiments of the political parties which they represent. For this reason, not one of them is an answer to the preceding, but each represents the situation of affairs from the standpoint of the speaker.

After the war had been decided upon, the Lacedæmonians asked the god at Delphi whether it would be beneficial for them to proceed to war. He answered that if they should fight with all their might they would be victorious, and that he would help them whether he should be invoked or not. The vote for war was taken about the beginning of 431 B. C.

Responsibility for the War.

Thus was the Peloponnesian war initiated-the most bloody and cruel of all the wars that ever stained the earth. It divided the Hellenic nation for many a year into two opposing camps; it shook Hellas from its very foundations; it aroused the noblest and wildest of passions; and, with the material and moral exhaustion of the strength of the nation, it prepared the decline of ancient Hellenism. But who called forth the war? This is a question which, although already suggested, still forces upon us the necessity of again returning to it. It is a question which has been widely disputed, and some of the greatest modern historians express an opinion contrary to our view. Grote, for instance, maintains that the Athenians, by their decree against the Megarians and their alliance with the Korkyræans, did not violate the ordinances of the thirty years' truce. holds that Athens was in the right; that the Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest. We believe that the essential point to be considered is not to what degree the Athenians violated the ordinances of the truce, but whether by their acts they did not unwarrantably injure the Megarians, enter into a state of

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war with the Corinthians, overturn the peaceful relations with the Peloponnesian allies, and above all justify the prevalent opinion that, not content with the advantages which the thirty years' truce offered, they intended to render all Hellas subservient. To demonstrate this, we will not bring forth the testimony of the comic poets, nor avail ourselves of the opinion offered by the historian Ephorus,* because the opinions of these persons can have no weight before the judgment of the great authority on the Peloponnesian war. Now Thucydides declares the Athenians the instigators of the war. At first he inadvertently hints at it, then mentions it in stronger terms, and finally declares it not only as his own opinion, but as that of all Hellas. "The truest reason," he says, "though least brought forward in words, I consider to have been that the Athenians, by becoming great and causing alarm to the Lacedæmonians, compelled them to proceed to hostilities." 5." t

Again he says: "The Lacedæmonians decided by vote that the treaty had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they were convinced by the arguments of the allies, as because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that most of Hellas was already in their hands."

Again: "In about fifty years [between the retreat of

* Ο δὲ Περικλῆς, εἰδὼς τὸν δῆμον ἐν μὲν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἔργοις θαυμάζοντα τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας διὰ τὰς καταπειγούσας χρείας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην τοὺς αὐτοὺς συκοφαντοῦντα διὰ τὴν σχολὴν καὶ φθόνον, ἔκρινε συμφέρειν αὑτῷ, τὴν πόλιν ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς μέγαν πόλεμον, ὅπως χρείαν ἔχουσα τῆς Περικλέους ἀρετῆς καὶ στρατηγίας μὴ προσδέχηται τὰς κατ ̓ αὐτοῦ διαβολάς.

† Thucydides: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ τοὺς ̓Αθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι, μεγάλους γιγνομένους, καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀναγκάσαι εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν.

† Εψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι, καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, οὐ τοσούτων τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Αθηναίους, μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα.

Xerxes and the beginning of this war] the Athenians established their power on a firmer footing and advanced to a great height of prosperity. During this period the Lacedæmonians remained quiet, and made but little effort to hinder their progress. Even before this they were not sudden in proceeding to hostilities, unless they were compelled; and, to a certain extent, they were hindered by intestine wars [the revolt of the Helots] ; so that the power of the Athenians was clearly rising to a dangerous height, and they were encroaching on their confederacy. Then they considered it no longer endurable, and were of opinion that they ought with the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, if they could, by beginning this war.'

Thucydides distinctly asserts that the Athenians gave cause for provocation by attacking the allies of the Lacedæmonians; and he remarks: "The good wishes of men were strongly in favor of the Lacedæmonians, especially as they gave out that they were the liberators of Hellas. And every individual, as well as state, put forth his strength to help them in whatever he could, both by word and deed. angry were the people generally with the Athenians-some from a wish to be released from their dominion, others from a fear of being brought under it." †

So

Many other passages could be cited to prove that Thucydides, who was an eye-witness of the events, believed the

Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι, οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχὺ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ προτοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκάζοιντο, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι· πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν ̓Αθηναίων σαφῶς ᾔρετο, καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο. Τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ ̓ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχὺς, ἤν δύνωνται, ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον.

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† Ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παραπολὺ ἐπῄει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν. Εῤῥωτό τε πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις, εἴτι δύναιτο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ξυνεπιλαμβάνειν αὐτοῖς. . . Οὕτως ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς ̓Αθηναίους, οἱ μὲν, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ, μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβούμενοι.

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