dictory to the revealed accounts of the primitive origin of mankind, and their prefervation two thousand years afterwards; both which were effected by the means of fingle families. These formed the first natural fociety among themselves; which, every day extending its limits, laid the first, though imperfect, rudiments of civil or political fociety: And when it grew too large to fubfift with convenience in that paftoral ftate, wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it neceffarily fubdivided itfelf by various migrations into more. Afterwards, as agriculture increased, which employs and can maintain a much greater number of hands, migrations became less frequent: And various tribes, which had formerly feparated, reunited again; fometimes by compulfion and conqueft, fometimes by accident, and fometimes perhaps by compact. But, though fociety had not its formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants and their fears; yet it is the fenfe of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together, that demonftrates the neceffity of this union, and that therefore is the folid and natural foundation, as well as the cement, of civil fociety. And this is what we mean by the original contract of fociety; which, though perhaps in no inftance it has ever been formally expreffed at the first institution of a state, yet in nature and reason must always be understood and implied, in the very act of affociating together: Namely, that the whole fhould protect all its parts, and that every part fhould pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and that fin return for this protection) each individual fhould fubmit to the laws of the community; without which fubmiffion of all it was impoffible that protection could be certainly extended to any.

For, when civil fociety is once formed, government at the fame time refults of course, as neceffary to preferve and to keep that fociety in order. Unless some fuperior be conftituted, whofe commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their feveral rights, and redress their fev

eral

eral wrongs. But, as all the members which compofe this fociety were naturally equal, it may be asked, in whofe hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general answer is easy; but the application of it to particular cafes has occafioned one half of those mischiefs which are apt to proceed from mifguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree, that government should be reposed in such perfons, in whom thofe qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which is among the attributes of him who is emphatically styled "The Supreme Be"ing." The three grand requifites, I mean, of wifdom, of goodness, and of power: Wisdom, to discern the real intereft of the community; goodness, to endeavour always to purfue that real intereft ; and ftrength, or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural foundations of fovereignty, and thefe are the requifites that ought to be found in every well conftituted frame of govern

ment.

How the several forms of government we now fee in the world at firft actually began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occafioned infinite difputes. It is not my business or intention to enter into any of them. However they began, or by what right foever they fubfift, there is, and must be, in all of them, a fupreme, irresistible, abfolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura fummi imperii, or the rights of fovereignty, refide. And this authority is placed in thofe hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of fuch refpective states, either exprefsly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the qualities requifite for fupremacy, wisdom, goodness, and power, are the most likely to be found.

The political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the first, when the fovereign power is lodged in an aggregate affembly, confifting of all the free members of a community, which is called a democracy; the fecond, when it is lodged in a council, compofed of felect members, and then it is ftyled an aristocracy; the laft, when it is entrusted in the hands of a fingle person, and then it takes the name

of

of a monarchy. All other species of government, they fay, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, these three.

By the fovereign power, as was before observed, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that power refides, all others must conform to, and be directed by it, whatever appearance the outward form and adminif tration of the government may put on. For it is at any time in the option of the legislature to alter that form and administration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the laws into whatever hands it pleafes; by conftituting one, or a few, or many executive magiftrates: And all the other powers of the state muft obey the legislative power in the difcharge of their feveral functions, or else the constitution is at an end.

In a democracy, where the right of making laws refides in the people at large, publick virtue, or goodness of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of the other qualities of government. Popular affemblies are frequently foolish in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and juft, and have always a degree of pa triotism or publick spirit. In aristocracies there is more wisdom to be found than in the other frames of government; being compofed, or intended to be compofed, of the most experienced citizens: But there is lefs honesty than in a republick, and lefs ftrength than in a monarchy. A monatchy is indeed the most powerful of any; for by the entire conjunction of the legislative and executive powers, all the finews of government are knit together, and united in the hand of the prince: But then there is imminent danger of his employing that strength to improvident or oppreffive purposes.

Thus thefe three fpecies of government have, all of them, their feveral perfections and imperfections. Democracies are ufually the beft calculated to direct the end of a law; ariftocracies to invent the means by which that end fhall be obtained; and monarchies to carry thofe means into execution. And the ancients, as was obferved,

VOL. I.

C

INTROD. obferved, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government but these three: For though Cic. ero fdeclares himself of opinion, "effe optime conflitu"tam rempublicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis, regali, "optimo, et populari, fit modice confufa ;" yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a visionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lafting or fecure g

But, happily for us of this ifland, the British conftitution has long remained, and I trust will long continue, a ftanding exception to the truth of this obfervation. For, as with us, the executive power of the laws is lodged in a fingle perfon, they have all the advantages of ftrength and difpatch that are to be found in the moft abfolute monarchy: And as the legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to three diftinct powers, entirely independent of each other; first, the king; fecondly, the lords fpiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratical affembly of perfons felected for their piety, their birth, their wifdom, their valour, or their property; and, thirdly, the house of commons, freely chosen by the people from among themselves; which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by different fprings, and attentive to different interests, compofes the British parliament, and has the fupreme difpofal of every thing, there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be with flood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power, fufficient to repel any innovation which it fhall think inexpedient or danger

ous.

Here then is lodged the fovereignty of the British constitution; and lodged as beneficially as is poffible for fociety. For in no other shape could we be fo certain of finding the three great qualities of government fo

f In his fragments de rep. 1. 2.

well

g "Cunetas nationes et urbes populus, aut primores, aut finguli re gunt: delecta ex bis et conftituta reipublicae forma laudari facilius quain evenire, vel, fievenit, haud diuturna effe poteft." Ann. 1.4.

well and fo happily united. If the fupreme power were lodged in any one of the three branches feparately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of either abfolute monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy; and fo want two of the three principal ingredients of good polity, either virtue, wisdom, or power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches; for instance, in the king and house of lords, our laws might be providently made, and well executed, but they might not have always the good of the people in view: If lodged in the king and commons, we fhould want that circumfpection and mediatory caution which the wisdom of the peers is to afford: If the fupreme rights of legislature, were lodged in the two houses only, and the king had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolish the kingly office, and thereby weaken (if not totally deftroy) the ftrength of the executive power. But the conftitutional government of this ifland is so admirably tempered and compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but deftroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legislature and the reft. For if ever it should happen that the independence of any one of the three fhould be loft, or that it fhould become fubfervient to the views of either of the other two, there would foon be an end of our conftitution. The legislature would be changed from that, which (upon the fuppofition of an original contract, either actual or implied) is prefumed to have been originally fet up by the general confent and fundamental act of the fociety: And fuch a change, however effected, is, according to Mr. Locke ↳ (who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire diffolution of the bands of government; and the people are thereby reduced to a flate of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative

power.

Having thus curforily confidered the three ufual fpecies of government, and our own fingular conftitution, felected and compounded from them all, I proceed to

h On Government, part ii. §. 212.

observe,