ferance.

(1) Of course our author will be understood to put this case of letting, only as a particular instance of one mode in which an estate for years may be created. (See post, p. 143.) There are obviously various ways in which such an estate may arise. Thus, where a person devises lands to his executors, for payment of his debts, or until his debts are paid, the executors take an estate, not of freehold, but for so many years as are necessary to raise the sum required. (Carter v. Barnardiston, 1 P. Wms. 509; Hitchens v. Hitchens, 2 Vern. 404; S. C. 2 Freem. 242; Doe v. Simpson, 5 East,

171; Doe v. Nicholls, 1 Barn. & Cress. 342; 2 Dowl. & Ryl. 488.) Though, in such case, if a gross sum ought to be paid at a fixed time, and the annual rents and profits will not enable them to make the payment within that time, the Court of Chancery will direct a sale or mortgage of the estate, as circumstances may render one course or the other most proper. (Berry v. Askham, 2 Vern. 26; Sheldon v. Dormer, 2 Vern. 311; Green v. Belchier, 1 Atk. 506; Allan v. Backhouse, 1 Ves. & Bea. 75; Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Meriv. 233.)

putation respectively prevails: (see post, p. 276 :) the term therefore is taken in that sense which is conformable to the subject matter to which it is applied. Still, in matters of contract, the question will ever be, what was the intention of the contracting parties at the time when they made use of the word. And in the case just cited, though it related solely to a temporal matter, it was held that the word "months" meant calendar, not lunar months. The usage of computing months as calendar months, in all questions touching ecclesiastical matters, was recognised in Crooke v. M'Tavish, (1 Bing. 310,) and in Cockell v. Gray, (3 Brod. & Bing. 186,) the rule, that the meaning of the word "month" must depend on the intention of the contracting parties who use it, was held to be clear; and the court adduced many instances in commercial matters, where a calendar month is always intended, as in bills of exchange, payable so many months after date, or in insurances effected for so many months. And it is too general an assertion to say, that, in the construction of statutes, the word "month" must always be understood to mean a lunar month, unless it appears clear that a calendar month was intended: it rather seems to be the practice to make a different exposition of the word, whenever by so doing the penalties or forfeitures declared by a statute will be avoided. (Davy v. Salter, 3 Salk. 346; The King v. Cussens, 1 Sid. 186; Biddulph v. St. John, 2 Sch. & Lef. 529; Dowling v. Foxall, 1 Ball & Beat. 195; Burton v. Woodward, 4 Mod. 96.)

Mr. Christian further observes, that "it is somewhat remarkable that the difference between six calendar months and half a year does not seem to have been considered by legal writers. Lord Coke says, half a year consists of 182

days. (1 Inst. 135.) But six calendar months will be one or two days less or more than half a year, accordingly as February is reckoned, or not, one of the six. Lord Coke, in his report of Catesby's case, clearly considers the tempus semestre to be six calendar months; (6 Co. 61;) yet Sir George Croké, in his report of that case, states it as confidently to consist of 182 days; and in neither report is the difference taken notice of. Cro. Jac. 167." But, in the report of the same case in Yelverton, (p. 100,) it is distinctly stated, for the odd day in the division of the year into halves, the law does not regard it," which is in conformity with the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas, (as reported in Dyer, 345 a,) who held, that " 91 days make a quarter of a year, and to the 6 hours over the law pays no regard." And, upon the occasion cited, an old book of the Exchequer was shown, containing the following note: "every quarter of a year containing in it ninety and one days, which make 13 weeks; and half a year containing 182 days; but the year 365 days and 52 weeks." It should be observed, that Catesby's case, which Mr. Christian alludes to, was a case of quare impedit, brought to contest a bishop's right to collate to a living; and we have seen, that in such, and in all other ecclesiastical questions, the computation is to be made by calendar months. Mr. Christian further mentions, that, "from the cases in 3 Wils. 25, and 1 T. R. 159, it appears that a notice to a tenant from year to year to quit the premises, must be half a year, and not six calendar months, though the computation by the latter would be more simple and convenient; and that was understood to be the proper notice by the Court of Common Pleas, in 2 Bl. Rep. 1224." But in Doe v. Spence, (6 East, 123,) Lord

Ellenborough said, that the rule of law, which originally was, that a tenant was entitled to reasonable notice to quit his occupancy, received a precise construction so long ago as in the reign of Henry VIII., in a case in the Year Books, deciding that it should be half a year's notice (and see post, p. 147). The usage of a particular district, however, where the contract between landlord and tenant is entirely silent on the subject, may make a shorter notice sufficient. (Webb v. Plummer, 2 Barn. & Ald. 750; Brown v. Burtinshaw, 7 Dowl. & Ryl. 610; Senior v. Armytage, Holt's N. P. C. 199).

(3) In Ex parte Dufresne, (1 Ves. & Bea. 54,) it was held, as it had previously been in Wydown's case, (14 Ves. 88,) that a commission of bankrupt may be sustained, if it appear that the act of bankruptcy was committed on a previous part of the same day on which the commission was sealed. It is certain, however, that our law rejects fractions of a day more generally than the civil law does. In our ordinary courts the day is, for most legal purposes, considered as a sort of indivisible point, so that no act done in the compass of it is more referrible to one than to another portion thereof: (Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 257; Reynolds v. Nelson, 5 Mad. 61; Fox v. Morewood, 2 Sim. & Stu. 326 :) but there are cases in which it may be absolutely necessary to determine the rights of the parties by their actual priority on one and the same day. (Ex parte D'Obree, 1 Ves. 83.) It was held in Dowling v. Foxall, (1 Ball &

Beat. 196,) as well as in Ex parte Fallon, (5 T. R. 287,) that whenever a right would be devested, or a forfeiture incurred, by including the day when an act was done, the computation will be made exclusive of it; and, on the other hand, in construing that section of the statute of 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, which enacts that all conveyances by a bankrupt shall be invalid, unless made more than two months before the issuing of the commission, it has been determined, that where, under that statute, time is to be computed from an act done, the day on which the act is done should be included in the computation: and, upon this principle, a mortgage executed on the 18th of February by one, against whom a commission issued on the 18th of April following, was declared to be valid, and within the protection of the statute. (Ex parte Farquhar, 1 Mont. & M'Arth. 8. And see ante, the note to Vol. I. p. 463.)

(4) The application of the rule laid down in the text has never been disputed as concerning ordinary contracts; but it has been made a question, whether there be or not a difference between bills of exchange and other contracts, in this respect: (Leftly v. Mills, 4 T. R. 173; Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bos. & Pull. 602.) It seems, however, now to be established, that such a difference does exist; and that, although debts upon ordinary contracts, (as, for instance, rents,) are not due till the last instant of the day; (Duppa v. Mayo, 1 Saund. 287; Maund's case, 7 Rep. 113; Wood & Chiver's case, 4 Leon. 180;) still,