other sole corporations before mentioned, who are rather to be considered as heads of an aggregate body, than subsisting merely in their own right: the chattel interest, therefore, in such a case, is really and substantially vested in the hospital, convent, chapter, or other aggregate body; though the head is the visible person in whose name every act is carried on, and in whom every interest is therefore said (in point of form) to vest. But the general rule, with regard to corporations merely sole, is this, that no chattel can go to or be acquired by them in right of succession (f). Yet, to this rule there are two exceptions. One in the Exceptions. case of the king, in whom a chattel may vest by a grant of it formerly made to a preceding king and his successors (g). The other exception is, where, by a particular custom, some particular corporations sole have acquired a power of taking particular chattel interests in succession. And this custom, being against the general tenor of the common law, must be strictly interpreted, and not extended to any other chattel interests than such immemorial usage will strictly warrant. Thus, the chamberlain of London, who is a corporation sole, may, by the custom of London, take bonds and recognizances to himself and his successors, for the benefit of the orphan's fund (h) but it will not follow from thence, that he has a capacity to take a lease for years to himself and his successors for the same purpose; for the custom extends not to that: nor that he may take a bond to himself and his successors, for any other purpose than the benefit of the orphan's fund; for that also is not warranted by the custom. Wherefore, upon the whole, we may close this head with laying down this general rule; that such right of succession to chattels is *universally inherent by the common law in all [* 433 ] aggregate corporations, in the king, and in such single corporations as represent a number of persons; and may, by special custom, belong to certain other sole corporations for some particular purposes: although, generally, in sole corporations no such right can exist. VI. A sixth method of acquiring property in goods and VI. By marriage. chattels is by marriage, whereby those chattels, which be longed formerly to the wife, are by act of law vested in the (f) Co. Litt. 46. (g) Ibid. 90. (h) 4 Rep. 65; Cro. Eliz. 682. Chattels personal vest in the husband absolutely; husband, with the same degree of property, and with the same powers, as the wife, when sole, had over them (3). This depends entirely on the notion of an unity of person between the husband and wife, it being held that they are one person in law (i), so that the very being and existence of (i) See book I. c. 15, pp. 442, 445. (3) The interest which a husband has in the personal estate and real chattels which belonged to his wife before marriage, is founded upon that good faith which ought to be inviolably preserved in so solemn a contract as that of marriage. The burthens to which a husband is liable, are a consideration for his marital rights; upon which rights, therefore, a fraud is committed if the consideration is withheld from him. A conveyance by a woman at any time before her marriage, is prima facie good; but, if a woman, during the course of a treaty of marriage with her, make, without notice to the intended husband, a conveyance of any part of her property, a court of equity, it has been held, will set aside that conveyance, as affected with fraud. (Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves. jun. 28; Draper's case, 2 Freem. 29, 2nd edit.) Some of the dicta, however, in the case just cited from Vesey's Rep. seem to intimate, that a conveyance of her own property in trust for herself, by a woman before marriage, though without her intended husband's privity, may, under circumstances, be sustained in equity; and the same doctrine was held in Slocombe v. Glubb, (2 Br. 551,) as it had previously been in Blithe's case. (2 Freem. 91.) But then, the circumstances must be special; it appears to be a general rule, that after an intimacy with a view to marriage has commenced, a settlement made by the woman, of any part of her property in exclusion of the marital rights of her husband, is fraudulent and void, if concealed from him. The passages of the judgment in Strathmore v. Bowes, from which it might be inferred, that mere concealment would not be sufficient to invalidate such an instrument, where the husband was not positively misled by some express affirmation on the subject ;-these passages, it has been judicially declared, must be understood only as having reference to the particular circumstances of the case in which the dicta were pronounced. (Goddard v. Snow, 1 Russ. 494.) In the later case, however, of St. George v. Wake, (1Mylne & Keen, 620,) the judgment in which case refers to and analyses all the leading previous decisions, it is said that, it has often indeed been laid down as a principle, that a voluntary conveyance by a woman, while her marriage is in contemplation, is avoidable by the husband from whom it was concealed; but, this principle has been very rarely acted upon to the extent of avoiding, by judicial decision, such conveyance, as a fraud upon the husband's rights. Marriage is an absolute gift to the husband of all the goods, personal chattels and estate, which the wife was actually and beneficially possessed of at that time, and of such other goods and personal chattels as come to her, in her own right, during the marriage. (Co. Litt. 300 a, 351 a & b.) But this interest the husband may waive by contract; (Hunt v. Pitt, 2 Freem. 79;) and may empower his wife to make a testamentary disposition of her personal estate during her coverture. (See ante, p. 375, note, and post, p. 498.) modo only. the woman is suspended during the coverture, or entirely merged or incorporated in that of the husband. And hence it follows, that whatever personal property belonged to the wife, before marriage, is by marriage absolutely vested in the husband. In a real estate, he only gains a title to the chattels real, sub rents and profits during coverture: for that, depending upon feodal principles, remains entire to the wife after the death of her husband, or to her heirs, if she dies before him; unless, by the birth of a child, he becomes tenant for life by the curtesy (4). But, in chattel interests, the sole and absolute property vests in the husband, to be disposed of at his pleasure, if he chooses to take possession of them: for, unless he reduces them to possession, by exercising some act of ownership upon them, no property vests in him, but they shall remain to the wife, or to her representatives, after the coverture is determined (5). (4) See ante, p. 126, et seq. the third section of chapter 8, with the notes thereto. (5) Whether it is competent to a married woman, by examination in court, to part with her contingent, or reversionary chattel interest, is a question which has been much agitated. There are cases where the wife's consent has been taken de bene esse; (Woollands v. Crowcher, 12 Ves. 178; Richards v. Chambers, 10 Ves. 581 ;) but this practice does not appear to be generally approved. (Sperling v. Rochfort, 8 Ves. 178, and see infra.) It is true, that, in Saddington v. Kinsman, (1 Br. 48,) the leaning of Lord Thurlow's opinion was, that a wife's reversionary chattel interests might be assigned by her husband, if he had made a settlement upon her: (see also, Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wms. 199,) and if the law were settled that a husband could, for a valuable consideration paid to himself, assign his wife's reversionary chattel interests(subject only to her equity to have a provision thereout, in cases where the funds cannot be come at without the assistance of a court of equity; Franco v. Franco, 4 Ves. 520; Like v. Beres- Distinction in this between There is, therefore, a very considerable difference in the chattels personal acquisition of this species of property by the husband, ac life of that fund, and both the wife and the tenant for life outlived the husband, the wife was entitled, by right of survivorship, to claim the fund against such particular assignee for valuable consideration. The assignee, it was determined, merely purchased the chance of the husband's outliving the wife; if the reversionary chose en action had fallen into possession during the coverture, the assignment might have been available; but the husband's right was no more than a right to obtain possession of the subject, when the period should arrive at which the wife would be entitled to the possession of it: by his death before that time, leaving his wife surviving, the husband's right was gone, and with it the derivative right of the assignee was also gone; and the claim of the surviving wife, it was held, must take effect. For, though a future chose en action be assignable in equity, the assignment cannot alter the nature of the thing; the subject must remain what it was before, a chose en action not reduced into possession. A court of equity will not refuse to give effect to such an assignment, so far as the assignor had any right or interest to assign; (Ripley v. Woods, 2 Sim. 167;) but, the interest of a husband in his wife's reversionary choses en action, (and a fortiori the interest of the husband's assignee, Pierce v. Thorneley, 2 Sim. 179,) must depend upon the chance of his living till the property is actually reduced into possession. (Stamper v. Barker, 5 Mad. 157; White v. St. Barbe, 1 Ves. & Bea. 405.) And, it seems, a wife ought not to be permitted, in such a case, to divest herself of the chance in her favour; and that a court of equity should not, by taking the wife's consent to pass a remainder or reversion in personal property to her husband or his assignee, lend itself as an instrument to enable the husband to acquire a right in the wife's chattels, which he could by no means acquire at law; (Wade v. Saunders, 1 Turn. & Russ. 307;) by parting with such a remainder or reversion, the wife would not only part with a future possible equity, but with her chance of coming into possession of the whole property by surviving her husband. (Pickard v. Roberts, 3 Mad. 386.) Of course, if such reversionary interests are so given or settled to the separate use of the wife, that she has the legal power of disposing thereof, her examination would be idly superfluous; she may pass the property without any such form. (Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 192.) It seems, from the authorities already stated, to be, at present, clearly held, that a deed by which a husband assigns his wife's contingent or reversionary chattel interests, is not such a reduction thereof into possession by him, as to give even a qualified title to his assignee, if the wife prove to be the survivor. (Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 50; Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Mad. 20.) And though, (in Gage v. Acton, 1 Salk. 327,) Chief Justice Holt said, that when the wife has any right or duty, which by possibility may happen to accrue during the marriage, the husband may, by release, discharge it; this dictum cannot now be relied on, without qualifying it by a condition, that the possibility shall actually come into possession during the coverture. Keeping this restriction in mind, there is no doubt that a wife's possibilities are assignable by her husband, for a valuable consideration; though the assignee may be compelled to make some provision for the wife, when the subject of assignment is of such a nature, that when cording to the subject-matter; viz. whether it be a chattel in possession, real, or a chattel personal: and, of chattels personal, whe- tion only. the contingency has happened, it cannot be reached without the aid of equity: (Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Jac. & Walk. 477; Beresford v. Hobson, 1 Mad. 373; Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Mad. 457) and it seems, that courts of equity do not merely act in analogy to the legal doctrine, but were the first to hold that such assignment by the husband ought to be supported. (Grey v. Kentish, 1 Atk. 280; Hawkyns v. Obyn, 2 Atk. 551; Bates v. Dandy, 2 Atk. 208; Duke of Chandos v. Talbot, 2 P. Wms. 608, and cases there cited; Spragg v. Binks, 5 Ves. 588.) It appears settled, however, that, where the wife's interest was such, that the husband could not, even for valuable consideration, have released it at law, equity will not assist him. Thus, if the reversion could not possibly fall into possession during the husband's life; for instance, if it were a reversion upon his own death, there the husband's release or assignment, would be invalid at law; and clearly the wife's consent would not be taken, in order to give it effect in equity. (Dalbiac v. Dalbiac, 16 Ves. 122.) So, if a woman, before marriage, stipulate that her property shall revert to her own absolute disposal in the event of her surviving her husband, or if a bequest be made to her, accompanied with that direction; and no power of disposition over the fund, during the marriage, be reserved by her, in one case, or given to her in the other; there, it would obviously be to defeat the plain object of the settlement, or will, if the wife, whilst under the possible influence of her husband, were permitted, either by examination in court, or by any other act during the coverture, to dispose of her right of survivorship. (Richards v. Chambers, 10 Ves. 586; Lee v. Muggeridge, 1 Ves. & Bea. 123.) An assignment, by a husband, to a particular assignee, of a chose en action, or equitable interest given to his wife, in terms not making it her separate estate, for her life only, (such assignment being made for valuable consideration, and at a time when the husband was maintaining his wife,) will, it seems, not only be supported, but the purchaser will not be bound to make any provision for the wife. (Elliot v. Cordell, 5 Mad. 156; Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. 18; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 100; Stauton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 182.) Equity, however, will not allow the general assignee under a commission of bankruptcy against a husband, to obtain possession of such property, without making some provision for the wife; since, when the title of such last-described assignee vests, the incapacity of the husband to maintain his wife has already raised this equity in her favour: (Elliot v. Cordell, ubi supra :) and where the right to the whole equitable interest, or chose en action, was in the wife, absolutely, and not for life only, there the preponderance of modern authority (after considerable fluctuation of judicial opinion) seems fully to establish, that the wife's right to a provision cannot be resisted by the particular assignee of her husband, more than by his general assignee. (Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Jac. & Walk. 477; Like v. Beresford, 3 Ves. 512; Macauley v. Phillips, 4 Ves. 19; Beresford v. Hobson, 1 Mad. 373; Earl of Salisbury v. Newton, 1 Eden, 371; Oswell v. Probert, 2 Ves. jun. 682.) When a husband makes a settlement in consideration of the wife's whole fortune, whatever fortune she then has, notwithstanding it may consist entirely of choses en action, is looked on as purchased by the hus and those in ac |