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"to take up, have estimated the rashness of their "enterprize? Are they competent to deny what a spectator no less malevolent than themselves was "compelled to admit? Has the lapse of eighteen "hundred years enabled them to ascertain a fact of "daily occurrence with more accuracy than a by"stander? Are objects best seen at the greatest "distance?"

Thus it appears, that we have the most marked and direct testimony of the friends of Revealed Religion (those, too, who had been converted from heathenism by the weight of its evidence), and the concessions of its enemies, in favour of those miracles, which were performed in order to prove that the religion came from God; and this testimony, and these concessions, were delivered so near the period in which the miracles were supposed to have been wrought, that they cannot be accounted for in any other way than by admitting that both Christians and unbelievers, in the early ages, were convinced that something which required more than human energy had occurred. Why, then, should this be disputed in these remote ages?

Voltaire and Mr. Hume will answer this question, by telling us in effect, though not in express words, "that since miracles are not wrought now, they never were wrought at all.”

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The substance of Mr. Hume's argument (which I describe, because almost all later Deists have echoed his sentiments) is this, "Experience, which in some "things is variable, in others is uniform, is our only

guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact. "Variable experience gives rise to probability only; "an uniform experience amounts to proof. Our "belief of any fact, from the testimony of eye-wit ❝nesses, is derived from no other principle than our experience of the veracity of human testimony. If "the fact attested be miraculous, there arises a con"test of two opposite experiences, or proof against proof. Now, a miracle is a violation of the laws of

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nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience "has established these laws, the proof against a mira"cle, from the very nature of the fact, is as complete "as any argument from experience can possibly be "imagined; and if so, it is an undeniable conse66 quence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof "whatever derived from human testimony." (p)

Now, to this reasoning, or the most prominent and essential parts of it, several decisive answers have been, or may be, given. A few of these may properly find a place here.

I. Dr. Campbell, in his celebrated" Dissertation "on Miracles," shows the fallacy of Mr. Hume's argument thus: "The evidence arising from human

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testimony is not solely derived from experience: on "the contrary, testimony has a natural influence on "belief, antecedent to experience. The early and "unlimited assent given to testimony by children,

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gradually contracts as they advance in life: it is, 66 therefore, more consonant to truth to say, that our "diffidence in testimony is the result of experience,

(p) Encyclopædia Britannica, art. Abridgment.

"than that our faith in it has this foundation. Besides, "the uniformity of experience in favour of any fact is "not a proof against its being reversed in a particular "instance. The evidence arising from the single testimony of a man of known veracity will go farther to "establish a belief of its being actually reversed. If "his testimony be confirmed by a few others of the 66 same character, we cannot withhold our assent to the "truth of it. Now, though the operations of nature 66 are governed by uniform laws, and though we have "not the testimony of our senses in favour of any "violation of them; still if, in particular instances, we "have the testimony of thousands of our fellow"creatures, and those, too, men of strict integrity, "swayed by no motives of ambition or interest, and governed by the principles of common sense, that

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they were actually witnesses of these violations, the "constitution of our nature obliges us to believe ❝ them." (q)

If we

II. Mr. Hume's reasoning is founded upon too limited a view of the laws and course of nature. consider things duly, we shall find that lifeless matter is utterly incapable of obeying any laws, or of being endued with any powers: and, therefore, what is usually called the course of nature can be nothing else than the arbitrary will and pleasure of God, acting continually upon matter according to certain rules of uniformity, still bearing a relation to contingencies. So that it is as easy for the Supreme Being to alter what men think the course of nature, as to preserve it. (q) Encyclopædia Britannica, art. Abridgment.

Those effects, which are produced in the world regu larly and indesinently, and which are usually termed the works of nature, prove the constant Providence of Deity; those, on the contrary, which, upon any extraordinary occasion, are produced in such a manner as it is manifest could not have been either by human power, or by what is called chance, prove undeniably the immediate interposition of the Deity on that especial occasion. God, it must be recollected, is the governor of the moral as well as of the physical world; and since the moral well-being of the universe is of more consequence than its physical order and regularity, it follows, obviously, that the laws, conformably with which. the material world seems generally to be regulated, are subservient, and may occasionally yield, to the laws by which the moral world is governed. Although, therefore, a miracle is contrary to the usual course of nature (and would indeed lose its beneficial effect, if it were not so), it cannot thence be inferred that it is "a "violation of the laws of nature," allowing the term to include a regard to moral tendencies. The laws by which a wise and holy God governs the world, cannot, unless he is pleased to reveal them, be learned in any other way than from testimony; since, on this supposition, nothing but testimony can bring us acquainted with the whole series of his dispensations, and this kind of knowledge is absolutely necessary previously to our correctly inferring those laws. Testimony, therefore, must be admitted as constituting the principal means of discovering the real laws by which the universe has been regulated; that testimony assures us, that the

apparent course of nature has often been interrupted to produce important moral effects: and we must not at random disregard such testimony, because, in estimating its credibility, we ought to look almost infinitely more at the moral, than at the physical, circumstances connected with any particular event.(r)

III. But the defence of miracles against the objections of infidels need not be thrown wholly upon these general and abstract reasonings, satisfactory and cogent as they are. The miracles recorded in Scrip ture, and especially those performed by Moses, by Jesus Christ, and his Apostles, are accompanied by evidence such as you will find it difficult to adduce in support of any other historic fact, and such as cannot possibly be brought in support of any pretended fact whatever; evidence, such as the pretended miracles of Mahometanism, and those of the Romish church, are totally destitute of.

The truth of a matter of fact may be positively inferred and known, if it be attended by certain criteria, such as no pretended fact can possibly have. These criteria are at least four. It is required, first, that the fact be a sensible fact, such as men's outward senses can judge of secondly, that it be notorious, performed publicly in the presence of witnesses: thirdly, that there be memorials of it, or monuments, actions, and customs, kept up in commemoration of it: fourthly, that such monuments and actions commence with the

(r) This argument is pursued to a considerable extent by the late Professor Vince, in his "Sermons on the Credibility of Miracles, “preached before the University of Cambridge.”