Quotations to this effect may be multiplied at pleasure, by any person who is conversant with the productions of the classic poets. I shall only select two more; the first from Seneca the tragedian: "Post mortem nihil est, ipsaque mors nihil"Quæris quo jaceas post obitum loco,

"Quo non nata jacent."

And lastly from Virgil, Æn. x. :

"Olli-dura quies oculos, et ferreus urget,

"Somnus, in æternum clauduntur lumina noctem."

We have now seen that the sentiments of the legislators and poets, in regard to religion and morals, differed in nothing essentially from those of the i móλλ01; much as they prided themselves upon their superiority to that multitudinous class. Let us next take a rapid glance at those opinions of the PHILOSOPHERS which are connected with our present inquiry, and ascertain whether St. Paul, who was well acquainted with the philosophical notions of his and all preceding times, was not justified in saying to the Colossians," Be"ware, lest any man make a prey of you through an 66 empty and deceitful philosophy."

Now, that this branch of our inquiry may not be loaded with any superfluous matter, I do not hesitate to admit that some of the ancient philosophers had very sublime conceptions respecting the nature and a few of the attributes of God, some of them spake nobly of virtue in general, and some indulged in exalted speculations relative to the immortality of the soul. I have no wish to "charge the picture of their "aberrations and defects with deeper shades than

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justly belong to it." Yet, I must say, there was a strange confusion and diversity of sentiments among them respecting the Deity; and that a complete system of morality was not to be found in the writings of any one philosopher, nor of all of them collectively. Some of them excluded a divine mind and intelligence from the formation of the universe: few, if any of them, acknowledged God in a proper sense to be the Creator of the world: most of them encouraged polytheism. Some taught that God is the soul of the world: some, that the world is God: some, that the world is eternal both in matter and form: some, that the stars are to be worshipped: the greatest and best of them spoke of a plurality of gods, whom they recommended to the adoration of the people. They justified the worship of images: they apologised even for the Egyptian animal worship: they added metaphysical deities to the popular ones: they referred the people for instruction to the priests and the oracles; and gave it as a general rule, that all men should conform to the religion of their country, that is, to polytheism. The best of them, amidst all their arguments, often spoke doubtfully of a future state, and none of them applied the doctrine of a future state to its proper ends and uses: they affirmed, that a short and temporary happiness is as good as an eternal one; and few of them believed future punishment. In regard to morals, they were generally wrong in that part which relates to purity and continence, and the government of the sensual passions. Many of them, as Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Æschines, Cebes, &c. were charge

UNT

able with unnatural lusts and vices, which they reckoned among things of an indifferent nature. (1) They generally allowed of fornication, as having nothing in it sinful, or contrary to reason. Many of them pleaded for suicide, as lawful and proper in some cases; and most of them thought lying lawful when it was profitable. Thus, Plato says, "he may lie who "knows how to do it, ev dovTI xalpw, in a fitting or "needful season." In his fifth Republic he lays it down as a maxim, that it is "necessary for rulers to "make use of frequent lying and deceit, for the

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benefit of their subjects, σύχνῳ τῷ ψέυδει καὶ ἀπάτη "xeño da." In his third and fourth books De Republica, he advises governors to make use of lies both towards enemies and citizens, when it is convenient. In his second book De Republica, he allows lying in words on some occasions; but not lying in the soul, so as to believe a falsehood. And in this he was followed by the Stoics, who held that a wise man might make use of a lie many ways, ἂνευ συγκαταθέσεως, without giving assent to it; as in war, in prospect of some advantage, and for many other conveniences and managements of life, κατ' άλλας οικονομίας τῷ βίω πόλλας. Consistently with this, Maximus Tyrius says, "there is nothing “venerable, ¿dèv σeμvòv, in truth, if it be not profitable "to him that hears it." He adds, that "a lie is often profitable or advantageous to men, and truth hurt"ful." Thus it appears how apt they were to mistake in

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(1) Incestus omnigenus, adulterium, et etiam aprevoμižia, veterum nonnullis, sapientiæ nomine claris, inter adiapopa, habebantur. Canon. Chronic. Secul. ix. p. 172.

judging of what is truly venerable, decorous, and laudable, which yet they made one of the principal characteristics of the тó naλov, or honestum. Plato mentions it as an old saying, and one which he approves, that that which is profitable is xaλov, honourable, and that which is hurtful is base. Since, therefore, both he and others of the philosophers held that a lie is, in many cases, profitable, they must hold that a lie is often xanov, honestum. Some of the philosophers, again, as Laertius tells us of Theodorus, declared without disguise, that "a wise man might, upon a fit occasion, commit theft, adultery, and sacrilege; for that none of those things 66 are base in their own nature, if that opinion concern"ing them be taken away, which was agreed upon for "the sake of restraining fools.”(m) Besides all this, they were, as Diodorus Siculus testifies, continually innovating in the most considerable doctrines, and, by perpetually contradicting one another, made their disciples dubious; so that their minds were kept in such continual suspense during their whole lives, that they could not firmly believe any thing.

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From this induction of particulars you may perceive that, with regard to men of learning and strong intellect among the heathens, reason, so far as it related to God and religion, and human happiness, was asleep : if some happy hints at any time awoke it, and set it moving in a right direction, yet without the guidance of revelation, it was ever ready to wander and go astray. As this, however, is a very interesting topic, you will, perhaps, expect that I should specify some of (m) Diog. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 99.

the erroneous notions taught by the most celebrated philosophers. I will, therefore, select a few instances your information.

for

SOCRATES, you will, I doubt not, recollect (n) was the first among the Greeks who made morals the proper and only subject of his philosophy, and brought it into common life. Yet he represents the worshipping not of one God, but of the gods, as the first and most universal law of nature; he was in the habit of consulting the oracle to know the will of the gods; and every one knows that his dying injunction was, "CRITO, we owe a cock to Esculapius: discharge "this debt for me, and pray do not neglect it." He sometimes, it is true, gives a noble account of future happiness; but seems to confine it principally, as several of the modern deists do, to those who had made a great progress in philosophy. "The soul," says he, "which gives itself up to the study of wisdom and "philosophy, and lives abstracted from the body, goes "at death to that which is like itself-divine, immortal, "wise-to which, when it arrives, it shall be happy, "freed from error, ignorance, fears, disorderly loves, " and other human evils; and lives, as is said of the “initiated, the rest of its life with the gods." This philosopher, however, debased his doctrine of a future state with that of the transmigration of souls, and gives a mean idea of the happiness reserved for the common sort of good and virtuous men after death: "They go," he says, "into the bodies of animals of "a mild and social kind, such as bees, ants, &c. But

(n) Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 4.