supposed privacy, but caught up and duly reported by the spies. Were it not for these austerities, the half of Rome would go over to the Jesuits. I am myself acquainted with six young men who returned to their parents before the end of the first year, were married, and are now engaged in useful employments. This strictness, let it be observed, is relaxed by no favour to individuals. Every one is admitted who chooses to apply, and in process of time may be received by profession, after having passed through the novitiate. It is alleged that the order sends no one back; it is sufficient, however, that by intolerable austerities they so terrify the novice in whom they find no promise of usefulness, as to constrain him, of his own accord, to depart. The life even of the professed Jesuit is by no means so full of charms as the uninitiated are apt to imagine. It is true that the privations and torment of the novitiate are brought to an end; yet he has no control over a single moment of his life. The canonical hours must be observed with scrupulous exactness, even in their colleges. No one dares to go abroad, except in the company of an elder member; and then, only to take a walk, or to purchase a book, or to execute some spiritual commission for the order. It is forbidden to the professed Jesuit to visit any one in his house, and especially to take a meal there; nay, he dares not even to converse with an acquaintance. Hence it is that no Jesuit is ever seen to linger, or enter into conversation, in the streets, or in any dwelling; a freedom which even the Carthusians sometimes enjoy. Observe, likewise, that while the order is necessarily excluded from all secular honours, it seeks none which are ecclesiastical. No one of its members can receive an office in the hierarchy. The society numbers among its sons no pope, cardinal, or dignitary of the church. It is the lot of every individual to live in a state of constant subordination, without the freedom of a moment; to yield a blind obedience to the general, and at his pleasure to journey even a thousand miles from home. Remember that the Jesuit receives nothing in return for these privations, except the bare supports of life; and you will be ready to ask what is it then that these men seek?' 'A mere conceit,' is the reply; the conceit of spiritual domination. Let the order become rich beyond measure, and powerful, even above crowned heads; what is gained by the individual member? Nothing. At his death he cannot dispose of the paltry shoes which he has worn in his life time. Other ascetic orders who have renounced worldly honours, as, for example, the Carthusians, have at least some regard to the life beyond the grave. While they deny themselves earthly gratifications, they are sustained by the hope of endless happiness. Not so the Jesuit. He does all for this world, and yet can never enjoy even this world, with any degree of peace."-Röhr's Prediger-Bibliothek. Vol. IX. p. 1151. Such is the success of the efforts for the repristination, as

it is denominated, of this dangerous society; and if, in a city where their doctrines have been condemned, their order suppressed, and their estates sequestrated; where, but a few years ago, a Jesuit would have been scarcely tolerated, they are now able thus to lord it over the consciences of men, what may they not accomplish in a country such as ours, where prejudice is unawakened, and where no barrier can be erected to prevent their inroads? To such suggestions it is usually replied, that the spirit of the age, the diffusion of knowledge, the freedom of our institutions, and the inquisitive temper of our people, afford a sufficient pledge that Popery, and above all Jesuitism, can never obtain any extensive prevalence; and that the temper and policy of the papacy have been greatly meliorated by the increase of light. But why are we so ready to be seduced into the belief that the church of Rome has undergone a change since the days of Loyola? Has the infallible Pontiff manifested any diminution of enmity towards the schismatics and heretics who defraud him of his vaunted honours? Has the unchanging creed of the self-styled Catholic church been improved since the council of Trent? or has it ceased to proscribe the Word of God? And is there any alteration which may not be very plainly traced to a subtile and temporary yielding to unconquerable opposition in public sentiment? Are not the Jesuits, as a body, strewing through our states the principles of Romanism, and with the authority of the Pope himself? Let the reader weigh such sentences as the following, from the Bull Solicitudo omnium, Aug. 7th, 1814. "We declare besides, and grant power, that they may freely and lawfully apply to the education of youth in the principles of the Catholic faith, to form them to good morals, and to direct colleges and seminaries." "We take under our tutelage, under our immediate obedience, and that of the Holy See, all the colleges, houses, provinces, and members of the order, and all who shall join it." (p. 20.) The spirit which once fulminated bulls against reformers, can now do no more than condemn the distributors of the Bible; but the spirit is the same. The politic zeal which, in 1622, established the Congregation De propaganda fide, and in 1627 attached to it the college of the same name, and which ordered into Germany an army of anti-protestant missionaries, betrays itself in the appropriations made for the Valley of the Mississippi, the seminaries which are springY

ing up in silence throughout our land, and the presses which send forth, in our enlightened times, the doctrines and legends of the middle ages. It is not for lack of malice that the vision of good John Bunyan is accomplished in this country. "Though he be yet alive, he is, by reason of age, and also the many shrewd brushes that he met with in his younger days, grown so crazy and stiff in his joints, that he now can do little more than sit in his cave's mouth, grinning at pilgrims as they go by, and biting his nails because he cannot come at them." (Pilgrim's Progress, Part I.)

It is by no means true, as we are sometimes disposed to flatter ourselves, that, as Americans, we are placed above the perils and disasters of other people. Great as are our national favours, human nature has not so changed under the genial skies of liberty, as to make that harmless to us, which has carried desolation into the fairest and the most enlightened regions of the other continent; nor is our population so mature in knowledge and piety, as to be shielded against the "cunning craftiness" of wily controvertists. On the contrary, we can hardly open our eyes upon the remote districts of this Union, without observing that the rankest growth of wild fanaticism and varied error is springing up, and that there is scarcely a heresy noted in the books of the polemic, which has not its lineal descendant in America. In the imposing ceremonial, the entertaining rites, the pomp of outward worship, the indulgences to transgress, the frequency of confession, and the easy absolutions of Romanism, there is every thing to attract the eye, seduce the heart, and subdue the conscience of the natural man. And the minister of the gospel who gocs forth unprepared to cope with the insidious and polished Jesuit, and is called upon to attack this system of error, which has not sprung up in a moment, but attained the firm and symmetrical growth of centuries, may regret, when it is too late, that he has considered the elaborate volumes of his predecessors useless lumber upon his shelves, and instead of toilsome study of the controversy, has yielded to supineness, incredulity, and contempt of the danger.

REVIEW.

Elements of Mental and Moral Science: designed to exhibit the original susceptibilities of the mind, and the rule by which the rectitude of any of its states or feelings should be judged. By George Payne, A.M. J. Leavitt. New York. 1829. Pp. 451. 8vo.

We have ever entertained a high opinion of the importance of mental philosophy, and regard with pleasure the increasing attention which it is receiving. Notwithstanding the slow progress it has hitherto made, and the difficulties it has still to encounter, we believe that it will continue to advance, and at length attain a pre-eminent rank among the sciences. All efforts, therefore, to direct to it the public attention and to promote its advancement, are viewed by us with warm approbation. Hence we were highly pleased to meet with the work which stands at the head of this article, and which we propose to introduce to the notice of our readers. Its occasion and design are thus indicated by the author in his preface.

"The subsequent pages owe their origin to the professional engagements of the writer. Expected to impart instruction to the students committed to his care, in the philosophy of the human mind, as well as on subjects strictly theological, he devoted all the time he could command to the task of drawing up a course of lectures on the Elements of Mental and Moral Science, which should be made to combine, as far as he found it practicable, comprehension with brevity, and might be used as a text book in his future prelections.

"His object in the preparation of his lectures was not originality, but usefulness. His sole desire was to guide the minds of his pupils to what he regarded as the right decision upon the multifarious topics of inquiry which his plan embraced; and whether he attained that end by presenting to them the statements of others, or what might be more properly denominated his own, was to him a matter of no importance whatever.

"In the prosecution of this object, the quotations made from the works both of living and departed genius were of course numerous. In short, it appeared to him that to present to his young friends a statement of the sentiments of our most approved writers in relation to the important subjects to which he directed their attention,

combined with an effort to guide them to the truth amidst this conflict of opinions, would prove one of the best modes he could adopt for securing a competent acquaintance with those subjects; nor when he afterward proceeded to prepare his manuscript for the press, did he see reason to adopt a different course of proceeding.

"The preceding statement will account for the free use which he has made, in the following pages, of the writings of those illustrious men to whom the friends of mental science are under such deep obligations. He ventures to state, however, that the present work is not a mere compilation. He has endeavoured at least to think for himself; and though he has mainly adopted the views and the system of the late Dr T. Brown, the attentive reader will perceive that he differs from that writer on several important points— whether justly or not, must of course be left for the public to decide; the difference will at any rate show that he does not slavishly follow any leader, or consent to hold his mind in bondage to any man.

After reading the above remarks, the reader will not be disappointed to learn, that the volume consists of a perspicuous and condensed exposition of the philosophy of Brown, together with quotations from Locke, Reid, Stewart and others, illustrative of their views on the subjects discussed. Mr Payne has indeed differed from his master on several important points, which we shall notice in their proper places.

The object of mental science is very properly stated to be the mental phenomena, as both in matter and mind the qualities, not the essence, form the subject of inquiry. But though it is

"Unphilosophical to speculate concerning the positive essence of the mind, it is not unphilosophical to attempt to show that that essence is not material. The importance, not to say necessity, of doing this, is greater, we conceive, than Mr Stewart, or even Dr Brown, seems disposed to allow. The former indeed says, that 'the conclusions to which we are led, by a careful examination of the phenomena which mind exhibits, have no necessary connexion with our opinions concerning its nature.' This statement is surely not correct. Are we not in the constant habit of contending that the complexity, which we cannot but ascribe to the mental phenomena, cannot be similar to that which is produced by the union of two or more substances, so as to form one physical whole, because the mind is a simple indivisible essence? Do we not assume the indivisibility of the mind, in many of our speculations? And have we any right to do this, without previously proving the immateriality of mind, i. e. that its essence, though unknown, is different from that of matter?