"Into an extended argument on this subject my limits will not permit me to go: it must be sufficient to glance at the proof which may be adduced. Two distinct classes of phenomena, viz. extension, divisibility, gravity, form, colour, attraction, repulsion, &c., and perception, memory, reasoning, joy, grief, &c., become known to us, in radically different ways; the one, through the medium of the external senses-the other, by consciousness. Are these phenomena the qualities of the same substance? Is it reasonable to suppose that properties so opposite to each other, the knowledge of which is obtained in so different a manner, inhere in the same permanent subject? If the qualities are thus essentially different, must not the essence be essentially different? The argument is, however, yet but partially developed. Some of these qualities are incompatible with each other, so that like length and shortness, when the comparison is with the same objects, they cannot possibly be the qualities of the same substance. Sensation and thought belong to one of the classes of properties which have been specified; divisibility is included in the other. If sensation and thought were properties of matter, they must be divisible, because matter is divisible, every separate particle of the thinking and feeling whole, must possess a separate portion of sensation and thought; as every separate particle possesses the power of attraction. But sensation and thought are not divisible, consciousness being judge; the permanent subject, therefore, of these qualities, whatever be its positive nature, is certainly not material."

We think with Mr Payne, that a treatise of this nature should commence with a demonstration of the immateriality of the thinking principle; a circumstance which both Stewart and Brown have omitted. No objection can be offered to the reasoning above employed, without denying to matter those qualities which the Newtonian philosophers deem essential. We know not why those who do this, may not as properly be termed immaterialists as materialists; a remark which Dr Priestley, if we recollect aright, has made in reference to himself.

We have here to object to the phraseology used in reference to the phenomena or operations of the mind. It is as follows. "With reference to these phenomena, let it be observed, that they are not to be regarded as constituting something distinct from the mind, but as being the mind itself in different states." "Our notions, thoughts, and ideas, then, are nothing more than the mind itself in different states." "The same thing may be said of the varied affections of the mind; they are the mind itself," &c. We suppose these phrases are intended to express what all late

philosophers have taught, that the mental phenomena are simply acts of the mind, not something distinct, like the ideas of Plato, or the species of the schoolmen; for we are told that these successive "states" "do not constitute the mind," which would differ little from the doctrine of Hume, but that the mind is the "permanent exhibitor" of these phenomena. If we have stated above what was intended to be expressed, why this parade of new terms? If we have not, then the language is unintelligible.

From the frequency with which these terms are repeated, we have sometimes been inclined to think, that Dr Brown and his followers supposed they had made a nearer approach to the essence of mind, or rather that they had acquired more definite conceptions of the mode of its existence and operation than preceding philosophers. It was a fine remark of Locke, "I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things."

The

The nature of the powers of the mind is next treated of, and here the language employed is equally exceptionable. The powers of mind we are told "are not to be considered as separate portions or members of the mind," which no one ever taught or believed, "but as capabilities imparted to it by its Creator, of existing in various states of thought and feeling which constitute the whole phenomena of the mind," they "denote the constitution it has received. from its Creator by which it is capable of existing in all those states, which form the consciousness of life." term faculty is entirely discarded by Dr Brown. Mr Payne has employed it in one or two instances. We can see no reason for rejecting a term sanctioned by usage, and in perfect accordance with our consciousness. We feel that the mind has the power of exerting itself in various ways, or in reference to various objects. For instance, we can perceive external objects, or we can pursue a process of reasoning. Where then is the impropriety in saying that the mind has the faculty of perception, &c.? Why resort to the circumlocutory mode of expression, that the mind is capable of existing in a state which constitutes perception or reasoning? Is this necessary to prevent the notion that the faculties are something distinct from the mind, as the members of the human frame are from the body? We are not aware that any other distinction between the mind and its

faculties has been held, than that which obtains between a substance and its powers.

Dr Brown was led to the adoption of this phraseology by his views on the subject of cause and effect, which lie at the foundation of his system. As this subject has been treated at large in a former number of our work, we shall not dwell on it now. On this point, Mr Payne differs from Dr Brown, though he has scarcely offered a reason for so doing. On a subject of such importance, he should have, at least, more definitely expressed his opinions. In reference to the succession of thought, he says, that mere invariableness of antecedence and consequence does not constitute the relation of cause and effect, but "there is an aptitude in certain feelings or states of the mind to precede and to follow one another." From this we should suppose that he adopts the common theory, but in another part of his work he speaks of "the prevailing misconception of the meaning of such terms as causation," &c.

And again "it is impossible for the old philosophy to explain how one affection of the mind produces another af fection. But if we entertain those notions of causation, &c. which have been advocated in the preceding part of this work," &c. We should like to be informed what these "notions of causation" are, and wherein they differ from "the old philosophy." We only know that he rejects the theory of Brown. To be consistent, he should reject the phraseology occasioned by his peculiar views.

An assertion is made with regard to the operations of the mind, which we should not notice if it were not employed in subsequent reasonings. We are told, that the mind can exist but in one state at a time; that is, if the expression have any meaning, the mind can perform but one operation at a time. On such subjects, our appeal must of course be to our consciousness. Can we not perceive external objects at the same time that we are listening to a strain of music, or engaged in a process of reasoning? If such is the fact, the above is a mere assumption.

"The manner in which our knowledge of the mental phenomena is obtained," or consciousness, is the subject of discussion next in order. All philosophers before the time of Brown have considered it a distinct power, having the operations of the mind for its object. Dr Reid says, "it is a power by which we have a knowledge of the operations of

our own minds." Stewart's view is the same. But is a distinct power necessary to make us acquainted with the existence of feelings whose very existence consists in being felt?

"Dr Brown maintains, that consciousness is not a distinct power of the mind-that the word consciousness is a general term expressive of the whole variety of our feelings; so that the phrase, the whole consciousness of life, denotes all the feelings we experience during life; he states that to be conscious of a sensation, and to have that sensation, is the same thing. Referring to Dr Reid's statements, he says, 'To me, I must confess that this attempt to double, as it were, our various feelings, by making them not to constitute our consciousness, but to be the objects of it, as of a distinct intellectual power, is not a faithful statement of the phenomena of the mind, but is founded partly on a confusion of thought, and still more on a confusion of language. Sensation is not the object of consciousness, different from itself, but a particular sensation is the consciousness of the moment; as a particular hope, or fear, or grief, or resentment, or simple remembrance, may be the actual consciousness of the next moment.' 'In the mind,' he tells us, that there is nothing but a certain series of feelings, or of transient successive states;-that the consciousness we have of them is nothing more than the thoughts and sensations themselves, which could not be thoughts and sensations if they were not felt ;'-' that the evidence of consciousness is nothing more than the evidence implied in the mere existence of our sensations, thoughts, desires,— which it is utterly impossible for us to believe to be, and not to be; or, in other words, impossible for us to feel, and not to feel, at the same moment."

With these statements Mr Payne expresses his agreement. He thinks the doctrine of those who regard consciousness as a distinct power liable to two objections. The first is, that it supposes the mind to exist in two different states at the same time. But this objection is founded on the assumption we have noticed above.

"Secondly, Dr Reid's doctrine, that consciousness is a distinct power of the mind, by which we gain the knowledge of its present thoughts, sensations, &c. necessarily supposes that, without this faculty of consciousness, an impenetrable veil would hang over all the mental phenomena,-that we might, and indeed must, remain in a state of utter and hopeless ignorance of our infinitely diversified thoughts and feelings; in other words, that we should think without thinking, and feel without feeling; a statement which involves in it direct contradiction; for a sensation which is not felt, is not a sensation at all."

Another objection may be urged to this doctrine, which in our opinion fairly overthrows it. If the operations of our minds are made known to us by a distinct power, by an act of consciousness, something must make us acquainted with this act, or we have operations of which we are ignorant, feelings which are unfelt. Each act of consciousness, then, requires another to make it known to us, and so on ad infinitum, which is absurd.

The subject of identity is next discussed, and is disposed of in a few pages. Our author briefly states the opinions of Stewart and Brown, and his assent to those of the latter. Stewart thinks that we cannot properly be said to be conscious of our existence, but only of our present thoughts and feelings; that this notion arises by an original law of the mind, on the first exercise of sensation. Brown contends that it could not arise from one exercise of sensation, there must be a succession, and in the remembrance of these is involved the belief of our identity, which he considers to be the same notion, "expressed in different words," as the knowledge of our minds as a substance. Payne makes a distinction between the notion of self and of identity. "The former," says he, "would seem to me to be the conception of mind, as the permanent subject of our thoughts, feelings, &c.; the latter the conception of mind as unchanging." We confess that we cannot see the difference between the mind's being the "permanent subject" of our thoughts and feeling, and its being unchanging. The subject of personal identity has been encumbered with many difficulties, as is always the case when men attempt to reason concerning intuitive truths. The belief of our identity is intuitive, and to inquire on what it is founded is absurd. Hence the great labour which Brown bestows on this subject is worse than useless. There is an accumulation of words and a semblance of reasoning, that tend to darken, and to create difficulties where really there are none. He, indeed, finally refers our belief of it to intuition, but from his explanation of the circumstances in which he conceives it to arise, we should be led to suppose that he founded it on memory. He also uses the term mental, instead of personal identity, the propriety of which change we do not perceive.

The "analysis and arrangement of the mental phenomena" is the next subject of attention.