ing turns on the sense in which the word will is taken. If taken in its broader sense, this would be admitted; if in the restricted sense, we should deny it altogether. Those who make the assertion, doubtless take it in the latter; for they say that all that precedes the decision of the soul, its fixing on some object of desire as its chief portion, is neither sinful nor holy; that holiness consists in the selection of God and sin in the choice of the world, and that there is nothing sinful or holy but these primary or ultimate choices, and the subordinate acts resulting from them. But it is clear that the term voluntary applies not only to such acts of choice, but to all exercises of the affections or desires preliminary thereto. No one would say that the disposition to love ourselves, or our children, depends on choice; and yet these dispositions are properly and truly voluntary. We cannot love otherwise than voluntarily. When, therefore, these gentlemen use the word voluntary, it is in reference to acts of the will in the restricted sense, excluding the spontaneous exercises of the native propensities of our nature. They of course deny that Adam was created holy. The spontaneous rising of desire in his mind to God, was neither holy nor unholy. His moral character commenced with the first act of choice, that is, with his selection of God from among the various sources of happiness as his chief good. Here lies one great point of difference between them and common Calvinists. President Edwards maintains clearly that Adam was holy before this act of choice, yea, before he exercised "thought or reflection." And he says, that it is according to our natural notions of things that there could be no virtue in this choice, unless it was determined by a virtuous disposition. The common judgment of men is, that moral character belongs to the desire of moral objects. The morality lies in its nature, independently of its origin. Its being from "a kind of instinct," does not destroy its moral character. The desire of holiness is holy, no matter how it rises in the mind. If this be so, a similar tendency of mind and a similar desire, if produced in our mind by the power of the spirit in regeneration, is not "something inserted in the soul" without influence on our character. It constitutes us holy, as truly as Adam was holy at his first creation, though much of sin may yet remain. It is indeed "a mysterious gratuity;" the Scriptures call it GRACE; it is still ours, from its nature, voluntary and active.

but

It is

an inclination of the heart, and, as Dr Bellamy remarks, an "involuntary inclination of the heart is a contradiction in terms." He uses the word voluntary in its larger sense, as Edwards does, and not merely in that which applies to a decision, or selection from among different objects of desire. With him all spontaneous exercises of the mind are voluntary; self-love, the love of children, and all other similar affections. A disposition therefore to these, or any other exercises, existing prior to the exercises, in his view, does not destroy their character as voluntary, nor their morality if they have reference to moral objects; this depends upon their nature, not their origin.

We have already remarked that the opposite system destroys the moral character of the first act (in reference to moral objects) in Adam, and in regeneration. We are ready to admit, that as the desire of a holy object is from its nature holy, so the choice of such an object as holy, is from its nature good. But it is inconceivable that holiness, as such, can be chosen without a previous apprehension of its real excellence and desire for it as such. For the choice is but the determination of the desire. If therefore moral character be denied to the antecedent desire, the choice loses its moral character also. It cannot be confined to the act of choice, for there can in fact be no choice of a holy object as such, but from a desire for it in its true character, and this is a holy desire, and precedes the choice. If selflove be only so far the motive to this choice, that it " prompts to the choice, but not determines it," what, we ask, does determine it? There are but two answers to this question. The one is that the will determines itself, i. e. the choice is made in indifference, and has clearly no moral character; or it is determined by a desire of the object as such, (not mere desire of happiness, for that only prompts to the choice, not determines it) and then the whole theory is relinquished, for here is the desire of a holy object, not merely as a means of happiness, but for the object as holy, which must needs be a holy desire, and being antecedent to the choice, would be, according to the theory, anterior to the commencement of holiness.

The truth is, that this whole system is a forced and unnatural union, between Arminian philosophy and Calvinistic facts. A union which can neither be peaceful nor lasting. Nor is this the first time that it has been attempted. The

favourite principle of the opposers of the doctrines, which are now called Calvinistic, in all ages, has been, that moral character can only belong to acts of choice; and of course, that no such thing as original righteousness or original sin is possible or conceivable; that any other influence in regeneration, than that of moral suasion, by which one man is led to make a good choice, which another man, under the same influence, might refuse to make, is inconsistent with moral agency; that the doctrines of election and perseverance of the saints, presupposing that of efficacious grace, must necessarily be untrue. The first departures from these doctrines have commenced by adopting the main principle, and endeavouring to reconcile it, as far as possible, with the facts involved in the doctrines themselves; viz. that all men do sin, with absolute certainty, the moment they become moral agents; that the influence of the Spirit is infallibly efficacious: and that all whom God has chosen certainly believe and attain eternal life. But less than a generation has commonly been sufficient to break the connexion, and leave the philosophical principle undisputed master of the field.

That this principle is inconsistent with the doctrine of original righteousness is formally admitted. That it involves the denial of original sin, as this doctrine has been commonly held among Calvinists, is equally clear. According to the prevalent doctrine on this subject, original sin consists, first, in the imputation of Adam's sin: this, it seems, has been long exploded: secondly, in the want of original righteousness, this is gone too, for there never was any such thing; and thirdly, in the corruption of nature, that is, a tendency to do what God has prohibited, existing prior to all acts of choice, and independently of them, and now this is gone. There is no such tendency to sin, as can be considered a moral disposition.

Although this article has already swollen far beyond our expectations, we cannot pass this subject without a single remark on the charge of physical depravity. The futility and unfairness of the same charge, as it regards the subject of regeneration, we have endeavoured to expose above. As this rests on precisely the same grounds, it must stand or fall with the other. If there may be moral principles prior to moral acts, (as we think must be assumed, in the case of Adam, or make the commencement of holiness impossible,)

then there is not a shadow of ground for this charge. Nor is it the Calvinistic doctrine, that there is a specific propensity to sin, (analogous to the holy disposition implanted in the heart of Adam), connatural with the soul of man. None such need be assumed, and none such is believed to exist. The mere absence of a native tendency to God leaves the soul in moral confusion and ruin. There is no positive infusion of wickedness. The essential attributes and constitutional propensities are there, and nothing more. But they are there without a principle of moral order and subordination. There is no presiding spirit to turn them to the service of God. The result of this absence is all manner of evil, and a tendency to all this evil lies in this very state of the soul, and exists prior to any of its moral acts. Does the withholding this predisposition to holiness, from a being to whom all the essential attributes of his nature are left unimpaired, make God the author of sin? then must he be accused of being the author of all sin that results from the abandonment of the reprobate, and of all that by the utmost exertion of his power he could prevent. Nor is it more difficult to reconcile this fact (that God should withhold from the fallen race of man those communications which resulted in the innate tendency to holiness, which filled the soul of Adam) with the divine justice and goodness, than it is the admitted fact that he has brought, and is still bringing, the countless millions of the human family into existence under circumstances so unfavourable, that all, without exception, incur the penalty of eternal death at the first moment of moral agency. And that moment arriving too at the first dawn of intellect, and when the first faint flushes of moral feeling rise in the soul. If this be no penalty, we know not what is. "To be placed under a law," says Coleridge, (Aids to Reflection, p. 168), "the difficulty of obeying, and the consequences of not obeying which, are both infinite, and to have momently to struggle with this difficulty, and to live in momently hazard of these consequences-if this be no punishment!-words have no correspondence with thoughts, and thoughts are but shadows of each other, shadows that own no substance for their anti-type. Of such an outrage on common sense Taylor (Bishop Jeremy) was incapable. He himself calls it a penalty; he admits that in effect it is a punishment." It is a penalty too, according to this theory, without transgression; a punishment without a crime. We

cannot see, therefore, that any thing is gained by the new theory over the old doctrine, which represents our race as having enjoyed a full and fair and favourable probation in their first parent, and as being regarded and treated as an apostate race on account of his rebellion: so that the withholding those divine communications which resulted in the first man, in the moral image of his maker, is a penal evil, from which, it is true, utter ruin results, but it is the ruin, not of innocent, but of fallen human beings. This doctrine involves no mysterious confusion of the identity of the race with that of Adam, and no transfer of moral character from him to us. His act was personally his own and only his; it is ours only on the representative principle, which is recognised not only by Dr Hopkins and his followers distinctly, but by Arminians and Pelagians*, and is so clearly taught by the fact, that the race fell when Adam fell, that it is admitted in reality even by those who formally deny it.

But to return to our subject. This theory not only overthrows the doctrines which we have just mentioned, but it throws the Spirit's influences almost entirely out of view. We are not speaking of the opinions of its advocates, but of the tendency of the theory. According to their views, regeneration consists in the choice of God as the supreme portion of the soul. This requires that the soul should view him as supremely desirable. This the sinner is, not only naturally, but morally, able to do; for his corruption does not blind him to the excellence of holiness, or its adaptedness to promote his happiness. To secure this happiness is the only impulse or motive necessary to make this choice, and he is urged to make it, assured that if he will summon all his powers to the effort, the result, by the grace of God, may follow. We think the grace of God acts a part scarcely more conspicuous in all this scheme, than it does in the enumeration of the titles of an European monarch. There is no blindness to the excellence of the object of choice to be removed, no holy motive is necessary for the grand decision; all that is required is a practical conviction that it will be for the sinner's interests. Firmly as these brethren may believe in the necessity of the Spirit's interference, it is evident that necessity is left out of view almost entirely in

See Whitby on Romans, v. 12.