however, he had succeeded in effecting the appointment of the late Dr Brown as his associate and successor. From this time, until his death in 1828, he was employed, as his health would permit, in preparing for the press a number of his works, which we shall notice in their order.

Before proceeding to our account of the writings with which he has favoured the world, we would dwell on one or two circumstances of his education. The first is, in reference to the free intercourse he was allowed with his professors and other eminent men. This rendered his advantages superior to those of almost any with whose history we are acquainted. Many have studied at more celebrated universities, but few have enjoyed the instruction, much less the personal friendship, of such men as Robertson, Smith, and Reid. He probably derived more improvement from their private conversations than their public prelections. By the latter, principles may be learned, but not the method of their deduction. We have placed before us the result of labour-the most advanced efforts of superior mind. Yet even this is but of little use. The object of education is to learn to perform similar labour. Unless we know the process by which these truths are acquired, we cannot perform it, and proceed to the development of others more abstruse. A splendid edifice may be shown us, its different parts designated, and the rules of its proportion made known. But will this enable us to begin at the quarry, and construct one similar or superior? In order to this, the process must be spread before us. So in regard to principles of science. We wish to know the manner in which they are acquired; the mode of pursuit which the successful have adopted. Then we are prepared to proceed in our own deductions, and these and the principles we have learned are valuable aids.

Another circumstance in the education of Stewart which we shall briefly notice, was the fact of his being called at so early an age to impart instruction. This was doubtless highly conducive to his mental improvement, and laid the foundation of his character as a teacher, on which his reputation most firmly rests. It gave him a command of his acquired knowledge, which young men seldom attain. Though their knowledge may be accurately stored in their memories, yet it seldom passes through that process of assimilation which is essential to mental growth. To this process, the attempt at communication is favourable. A definiteness of conception,

and clearness of arrangement is then sought for, the need of which was never before experienced. Were our young men to spend a few years in this employment before engaging in the active duties of their profession, we think they would find it of great advantage.

We now proceed to treat of the writings of Professor Stewart in the order of their appearance. In 1792, seven years after he had been made professor of moral philosophy, he published the first volume of his "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind." With this it is probable our readers are better acquainted than with any other of his works, as it has been studied in most of our colleges, and had a very general circulation. We consider it as the most valuable of his productions. It contains, indeed, few principles. which are not to be found in Reid, or preceding writers, yet they are more clearly brought forward, in a style, if not the best adapted to philosophical writing, at least idiomatic, flowing, and melodious. Some of the subjects are treated in a manner exceedingly interesting: we refer in particular to the chapter on association, imagination, and memory. The first of these recommends itself in an especial manner to the student of belles lettres and criticism. Indeed the volume abounds with valuable remarks, though to all it contains we do not yield our assent. On a discussion of the points of difference it is unnecessary to enter at present, as we have, for the most part, treated them in a former number of our work, to which we refer our readers for our views on attention, conception, abstraction, association, nominalism, &c.

More than twenty years elapsed before the second volume of his Elements appeared. In the mean time, he was called to the melancholy task of writing the biography of three of his distinguished friends; that of Adam Smith in 1793, of Robertson in 1796, and of Reid in 1802. These consist of notices of their lives, brief, because the incidents of a literary life are few, and of general observations on their works, for the most part too general for utility. The power of nicely portraying character is not apparent. Hence these efforts of Mr Stewart have properly been termed "a union of general criticism with literary history."

In 1793 he also published his "Outlines of Moral Philoso phy," which is a syllabus of the course of lectures he was accustomed to read before the university. It contains most

of the principles which are expanded and illustrated in the "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," and "The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers." It was designed only for the students attending on his lectures.

In 1810 appeared his Philosophical Essays, which were written at Kinneil House, a seat belonging to the duke of Hamilton, on the banks of the Frith of Forth, whither he had retired on resigning his professorship. In this work, he informs us, it was his intention to expand and illustrate more fully some of the doctrines contained in the first volume of his Elements, and to discuss some collateral subjects.

The preliminary essay contains an able vindication of the utility of mental philosophy from the attacks of the Edinburgh Review. The volume, then, is divided into two parts. The subjects treated in the first are the origin of our knowledge, the idealism of Berkely, the influence of Locke on the French systems of philosophy, the theories of Hartley, Priestley and Darwin, and the philological speculation of Horne Tooke. In these essays there are many remarks interesting to the lovers of mental science, but no very definite impression follows their perusal.

The second part of the volume treats of the more interesting subjects of beauty, sublimity, and taste. Believing in the original adaptation of certain objects to awaken the emotions of sublimity and beauty, and which would therefore be denominated beautiful and sublime, he proceeds to illustrate the manner in which he supposes these terms were applied, "by transition," to other objects. Colour and altitude, he thinks, occasioned the first ideas of beauty and sublimity, and hence received the first application of these terms. It is interesting to follow him in this supposed process of generalization, though we know not that it sheds any new light on the philosophy of the mind.

TASTE, the subject of the next essay, is not considered as an original faculty of the mind. He first proceeds to trace "the gradual progress by which it is formed." But this and the succeeding essay, "On the culture of certain intellectual habits connected with the first elements of taste," do not possess sufficient connection, and embrace too great a variety of topics to allow of an analysis. There is, however, exhibited by the writer, an elegance of mind, a correctness of judgment, a familiarity with the objects of taste, that induce

us to believe that his talents were adapted to excel in the departments of belles lettres and criticism, rather than in the abstruse labours of metaphysical disquisition.

We would here briefly remark on taste, as perhaps there may exist on this subject a want of distinct apprehension, that when it is asserted that taste is not an original faculty, the idea arises that it is entirely arbitrary and conventional. But this is far from truth, for its principles are evidently laid in human nature. The difficulty is occasioned through want of a distinct notion of the meaning of the term faculty, a term which even Stewart, notwithstanding his usual precision, has employed in a very indefinite manner. It expresses, as we have before had occasion to observe, the action of the thinking principle in reference to particular objects, or perhaps we should rather say, particular classes of objects. The operations of the mind, though multifarious, are capable of arrangement into certain classes, from their relation to certain objects. All those, therefore, which are exercised on, or occasioned by particular objects, and are thus distinct from others, are for convenience referred to a separate faculty. Now, the question is, whether the operations of mind, in reference to what are termed objects of taste, are sufficiently distinct from all others to be referred to a separate faculty? That there are principles of taste is admitted by all. The question relates to the amount of difference between the result of these and other principles. We shall leave it to our readers to decide for themselves.

In 1813 appeared the second volume of his "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind." This would have attracted little attention, but for the previous fame of the author. As it is, we believe, it is seldom read. It contains some valuable thoughts, but they are familiar to those who are acquainted with the works of Reid, Beattie, and Campbell. There is a precision in the use of terms which is commendable, but this cannot atone for its diffuseness and want of connection. It is proper to state, that this may in part be owing to the frequent interruptions to which the author was subject while composing. He remarks in his preface, "I have re peatedly had occasion to regret the tendency of this intermitted and irregular mode of composition, to deprive my speculations of those advantages, in point of continuity, which, to the utmost of my power, I have endeavoured to give them But I would willingly indulge the hope, that this is a blemish

more likely to meet the eye of the author than the reader; and I am confident, that the critic who shall honour me with a sufficient degree of attention to detect it, where it may occur, will not be inclined to treat it with an undue severity."

There is certainly less connection apparent than the author seems to suppose. Every train of thought in a well disciplined mind has some degree of connection; but that this may be rendered apparent to other minds, a more rigorous process of condensation is necessary than Stewart was accustomed to exercise.

About the same time, we believe, were published the Preliminary Essays to the Supplement to the Encyclopedia Brittannica. In this it was intended to exhibit "A General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Moral and Political Philosophy in Europe, from the Revival of Letters." This work has received high commendations, but without reason. It can with no propriety be termed a "History of Philosophy," but should rather be entitled Miscellaneous Observations on various Writers. We expect a history of philosophy to afford us a condensed and clear account of the various systems that have been adopted, and the peculiar opinions of successive writers. Mr Stewart assumes the reader's possession of this knowledge, and proceeds to criticism and general remark. Hence the work is far less valuable than Enfield's imperfect abridgement of Brucker. We hesitate not to affirm, that from the most attentive perusal of the work, the reader will not become acquainted with the peculiar system of a single philosopher.

We are not pleased with the importance which, in these essays, is attached to the writings of the infidel Hume. In this, Mr Stewart is censurable, in common with Reid and Brown. They all seem to forget his scepticism in their admiration of his talents. We are unable to account for this in men of such sound principles, and who would seem to have had at heart the good of the human race. When a man honestly errs, even on points of fundamental importance, he should be treated with kindness and respect; but if he wilfully pervert the truth, and task his mind to perplex the distinctions of right and wrong, and to tear asunder the bonds that unite society and government, he never should be mentioned but with indignant scorn.

The third volume of his Elements appeared in 1827. The subjects are "language, imitation, the varieties of intellec