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by it, &c. But I forbear, lest I should go too far "out of my depth: only adding in general, that God "cannot put things so far out of his own power; as "that he should not for ever govern transactions and " events in his own world; nor can perfect knowledge "and power ever want proper means to achieve what "is fit to be done. So that, though what I have "advanced should stand for nothing, there may still "be a particular providence, notwithstanding the "forementioned difficulty. And then, if there may “be one, it will unavoidably follow, that there is one; "because in the description of providence nothing is "supposed with respect to particular cases, but that "they should be provided for in such a manner as will "at last agree best with reason; and to allow that "this may be done, and yet say that it is not done, implies a blasphemy that creates horror: it is to "charge the Perfect Being with one of the greatest 66 imperfections, and to make Him not so much as a "reasonable being.

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"I conclude, then, that it is as certain that there is a particular providence, as that God is a Being of perfect reason. For if men are treated according "to reason, they must be treated according to what "they are: the virtuous, the just, the compassionate, "&c. as such, and the vicious, unjust, cruel, &c. ac

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cording to what they are: and their several cases must "be taken and considered as they are: which cannot "be done without such a providence."

I make no apology for the length of this quotation. The subject is so important, and has notwithstanding

been so much misunderstood and misrepresented, that every ingenious attempt to illustrate it deserves attention; and the view of it taken by Mr. Wollaston is so clear, philosophical, and satisfactory, that no man who is free from prejudice can read it without benefit, nor, I conceive, without complete conviction.

Before I entirely quit this subject, allow me to remind you, that we have not been contemplating a mere speculation, but have been pursuing a train of reasoning which is practical and highly moral in its tendency. Let the notion once fully occupy the mind of a vicious man, that God is too exalted or too remote from us to watch the progress of individual guilt, to notice and record its propensities, to counteract its designs,and with what ardour will he run the career of iniquity? While, on the other. hand, the conviction that "all things are naked and open" to the piercing eye of God,—that when transgressors say,

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surely the darkness shall cover us,” behold " even "the night shall be light about them," " the darkness "and the light being both alike to God,” (g)—that no being is too insignificant or too obscure to escape the notice of God,—that none can hide himself in gloom so thick as to be impenetrable to the glance of omniscience,―tends to appal the guilty, and check the luxuriant growth of crimes. And in a world of trial, sin, and difficulty, what can be so consoling to the good as the firm persuasion that God is the God of individuals, and the "Father of the faithful," the "refuge and strength" of all who trust in him; that (g) Psalm cxxxix. 11, 12.

He hears the cry of the suppliant, yes, of every sincere suppliant, and, wherever it is needed and duly estimated, "giveth power to the faint; "—that he, who when he promises will perform, has declared that "they "who wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength: 'they shall mount up with wings as eagles: they shall "run and not be weary, shall walk and not faint !” (h)

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(h) Is. xl. 29, 31. An objecting correspondent has called upon me to reconcile the doctrine of Providence with the existence of moral evil. I entreat his attention to the following often quoted passage from Simplicius, a pagan writer before mentioned in this letter. Simplicius asks, "Whether God may be called the author of sin, because he per"mits the soul to use her liberty?" and answers the question thus:

"He who says that God should not permit the exercise of its freedom "to the soul, must affirm one of these two things; either that the soul, 66 though by nature capable of indifferently choosing good or evil, should yet be constantly prevented from choosing evil; or else that it should "have been made of such a nature as to have no power of choosing evil.

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"The former assertion (continues he) is irrational and absurd; for "what kind of liberty would that be, in which there should be no free"dom of choice? and what choice could there be, if the mind were con"stantly restrained to one side of every alternative? With respect to the "second assertion, it is to be observed (says he) that no evil is in itself "desirable, or can be chosen as evil. But if this power of determining "itself either way in any given case must be taken from the soul, it 66 must either be as something not good, or as some great evil. But "whoever saith so, does not consider how many things there are "which, though accounted good and desirable, are yet never put in "competition with this freedom of will: for without it we should be on "a level with the brutes; and there is no person who would rather be a "brute than a man. If God then shows his goodness in giving to in"ferior beings such perfections as are far below this, is it incongruous "to the Divine nature and goodness to give man a self-determining power "over his actions, and to permit him the free exercise of that power? “Had God, to prevent man's sin, taken away the liberty of his will, "he would likewise have destroyed the foundation of all virtue, and "the very nature of man; for there could be no virtue were there not a "possibility of vice; and man's nature, had it continued rational, would

Therefore (continues he),

"have been Divine, because impeccable. "though we attribute to God, as its author, this self-determining power, "which is so necessary in the order of the universe; we have no reason "to attribute to him that evil which comes by the abuse of liberty: for "God doth not cause that aversion from good which is in the soul when "it sins; he only gave to the soul such a power as might turn itself to "evil, out of which he produces much good, which, without such a power, could not have been produced by Omnipotence itself."

Those who wish to go farther into this inquiry than the above observations of Simplicius will lead them, may turn to a very masterly "Essay 86 on the Permission of Evil," in the second volume of the "Works" of Dr. Hamilton, late Bishop of Ossory; or to part the third of Mr. Samuel Drew's valuable "Essay on the Being, Attributes, and Pro"vidence of Deity." In the latter of these works most of the objections to what is denominated the doctrine of particular providence, have received a very decisive refutation.

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LETTER XX.

On the Resurrection of the Body.

IF a being, which was constituted by the union of two substances essentially different, were appointed to continue, it must continue a mixed being, or it would be no longer the same being; so that if man is to exist in a future state, the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is a necessary consequence of his nature those who admit the immortality of the soul, and deny the resurrection of the body, therefore forget the man, and, in effect, deprive him of existence beyond the grave. Still, it has been thought, by many persons in all ages," a thing in"credible that God should raise the dead;" (i) and the contrary is no where positively asserted, but in the Scriptures received by Christians, or in writings founded upon them. There are many passages in the Old Testament which either obscurely hint at the resurrection, or immediately refer to it: (k) yet they are by no means such as produced a firm belief in the doctrine among the Jews. The Sadducees, for example, "say that there is no resurrection, (i) Acts, xxvi. 8.

(k) Such as Job, xix. 23-27. Dan. xii. 2, 3. 19. Hos. vi. 2. xiii. 14. Ezek. xxxvii. 1-14. 14, 15, and Boothroyd's note, in loc. vol. ii. p. 124 Version.

Is. xxv. 8. xxvi. See also Ps. xlix. of his Improved