Wounded.

General Staff-1 Lieutenant, 1 Officer's Horse. 1st Regiment of Light Cavalry-1 Captain, 2 Havildars, 6 Rank and File, 2 Ófficer's and 10 Regimental Horses.

Detachment of His Majesty's 65th Regiment-l Lieutenant, 2 Serjeants, 7 Rank and File. 2d Battalion 3d Regiment-6 Rank and File. 1st Battalion 5th Regiment-1 Rank and File. Pioneers--1 Rank and File.

Total wounded-l Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 2 Havildars, 21 Rank and File, 3 Officer's and 10 Regimental Horses.

Names of Officers wounded.

Captain Soilleux, ist Light Cavalry, severely. Lieutenant Marriott, acting Personal Brigade Major, severely.

Lieutenant Cassan, His Majesty's 65th Regiment,

severely

E. G. STANNUS,

Assistant Adjutant-General

Extract from a Dispatch from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, dated December 15, 1820.

WE have the honour of transmitting to your Honourable Court, Copies of a Dispatch from the Political Agent at Kishma, confirming the intelligence we had previously received of the failure of the expedition against the Arabs of Alashkarah*.

* In the Gulf of Persia.

Copy

Copy of a Letter from Captain T. P. Thompson, of the 17th Light Dragoons, to Francis Warden, Esq. Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay, dated Muscat, the 18th of November 1820.

SIR,

I HAVE to communicate the ill success of the attempt to co-operate with His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, against the Arabs of the tribe of Beni Ben Ali, after appearances which led to expect a different result.

In my last letter, I stated that the Messenger, sent with the communications directed by your letter of the 8th of June 1820, had been cut to pieces, and that six companies of Sepoys, with eight pieces of artillery had, in consequence, been conveyed to Muscat.

The landing at Alashkarah, at this season of the year, as described in the letter of Lieutenant Collinson, of the 29th of September, already transmitted to Government, and confirmed by other accounts, appeared to be really impracticable. In addition to this, it has been stated by Lieutenant Collinson, though not included in his letter above alluded to, that he saw a force of five or six hundred men collected behind the sand-hills, from which it was apparent that the force of the enemy would be nearly the same, whether it was encountered at Alashkarah or at their residence in the interior. The landing at Soor was secure, and the road to the principal residence of the tribe lay through a line of country in possession of the Imaum, who had a town within three miles of the enemy, to which he had already been transmitting his preparations for an attack. Under these circumstances, the chances appeared to be more favourable for advancing against the hostile force from Soor, backed 1821.

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by the power of the State of Muscat, than for meeting the same force on the beach at Alashkarah, under the disadvantages of a precarious disembarkation, without the conjunction of the Imaum, and with exceedingly inferior results in the event of

success.

The Detachment sailed from Muscat on the 22d of October, and arrived at Soor on the 24th, where it was disembarked. The Imaum's force had previously proceeded towards Soor by land.

On the 25th of October information was received that the Arabs had abandoned and set fire to Alashkarah, together with fourteen of their boats, and had retired to their principal residence. The crews of the Imaum's vessels landed, aud brought off two boats and three guns, and destroyed such fortifications as were left.

His Highness the Imaum, who had directed his force towards Soor, for the purpose of marching against the principal residence of the tribe, in conjunction with the British detachment, arrived there on the 26th, bringing with him one thousand fighting men, besides men to draw the guns, six hundred camels for the use of the detachment, and three hundred other cattle.

On the 1st of November the whole force marched from Soor, carrying with it two six-pounders, two howitzers, and two iron eighteen-pounders. The remaining two eighteen-pounders were left at Soor.

After considerable difficulties in transporting the guns, the force entered the level Province of Jablan on the 5th of November.

On the 8th of November the whole force arrived at a town belonging to His Highness, named Balad Beni Bon Hussan, within three miles of Balad Beni Bon Ali, the residence of the hostile tribe, without any loss, either by sickness or accident.

The evening before arriving at Beni Bon Hussan, a report had been circulated that the enemy intended

to

to attack the camp in the night. On arriving at Beni Bon Hussan with the Imaum, I directed the camp to be pitched in an entrenched position, consisting of a ditch flanked with towers, which included a space sufficient for a camp between it and the town, and as the camp had been begun to be pitched in the open plain before our arrival, I caused it to be removed.

A summons was the same evening conveyed to the enemy from His Highness, demanding the sur render of the persons who had killed the Sheik of Rasal Hadd (the Messenger mentioned in the former part of this letter), and of the fortifications of the tribe, with their arms.

His Highness proposed that the summons should be sent in the name of the Officer commanding the British troops, but I represented to him that it was desirable to avoid the appearance of a double command, and that His Highness, as a Sovereign, must, of necessity, take the lead. At the same time I communicated the substance of some points which I was anxious to cause to be explained in the summons; and he desired me to give them in writing, and caused them to be inserted,

What I was thus anxious to insert was an explanation of the motives which had induced the appearance of the British troops in conjunction. with those of His Highness. It briefly stated, that the causes of the war, on the part of the Imaum, were already known. That the causes of war, on the part of the British, were the piracies of the tribe by sea, their refusal to answer when remonstrated with, and their having killed the Messenger; that the causes on the part of the two Powers were distinct and separate; but that, each having cause, their forces were united.

The Messenger returned on the same night, and brought for answer from the hostile Sheiks, that the first Messenger had been killed without any

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orders

orders from themselves, and that they were ready to give up the persons concerned that they had no desire to be at war with the British: that they. were willing to surrender their fortifications; but that they could not surrender their arms, because the Imaum would, in that case, give them up as prisoners to the British.

Under these circumstances, I felt considerable expectation that the terms I had demanded would be finally complied with. At the same time it appeared that the way to promote this effect, would not be by exhibiting any thing like an anxiety to come to terms. On His Highness, therefore, asking my opinion; I told him that I thought it would be best to proceed, without delay, before the place, with which he entirely coincided, and directions were issued for marching on the following morning.

In concurrence with the opinion of His Highness, I directed that the heavy guns should be left in the entrenched camp, which, for the present, was to be considered as the depôt : that such stores only should be taken forward as the officers at the heads of departments should judge necessary for present use; that the tents should be left standing in the entrenched camp, with the exception of such as might be desired by the Medical Department, and of a laboratory tent for the Artillery: and that men should be warned to take with them the tools which they used for cutting wood, in addition to such as might be furnished by the departments for the purpose of sheltering themselves from the sun.

The Imaum's forces, and the people of Beni Bon Hussan, were, of course, perfectly acquainted with the position of the enemy's town. The representation given was, that it was placed with its back to a deep date grove, which lay between it and Beni 3on Hussan: that it was, consequently, necessary o go round the town, in order to come at the asailable front, and that this front was in a sandy

plain