swear that we will do quite another thing another day, would be conduct unworthy of a mighty nation. It would best befit one of Falstaff's ragged regiment. And the terms of the motion irresistibly remind one of the declaration of Ancient Pistol, while eating the leek under the compulsion of Fluellen's cudgel, that he would yet have his revenge. The rule of "free ships free goods" is the leek which the honorable and learned gentleman is eating, but he vows he will have his revenge by future confiscation. (Hear, hear.) I am convinced, therefore, that the House ought not to consent to the resolution of the learned gentleman; for I have shown that it contains a proposition condemned by the majority of civilized nations - one of doubtful truth to the upholding of which the House ought not to pledge the honor of the country; that the resolution, if carried, may be mischievous, can never be useful, and is both impolitic and undignified. (Hear, hear.) The right honorable gentleman concluded by moving the previous question.

Mr. R. PHILLIMORE trusted the House would listen to him for a few moments, while he expressed, for the first time, his opinion on a subject interesting to that House, and to the country at large, and with which his professional studies might be supposed to have made him in some degree acquainted. He could not assent to many of the propositions which the right honorable gentleman had enounced to the House; but he was happy to say that he entirely concurred in the wisdom and expediency of the course pursued by the government, in waiving the andoubted belligerent rights of the crown in the present instance, as well as in all that had fallen from the right honorable gentleman, as to the necessity of acting in harmony with our ally, France, and in making, for that object, mutual concessions. (Hear.) He was, however, at a loss to reconcile the language of her Majesty's declaration of March last, with the speech of the right honorable gentleman. (Hear.) In that declaration her Majesty was made to say, in very temperate and appropriate terms, that she was willing, for the present, to waive part of the belligerent rights appertaining to her by the law of nations; but the whole tenor of the right honorable gentleman's argument was, that those rights were such as the crown ought never to have exercised; and when the right honorable gentleman taunted his (Mr. Phillimore's) honorable relative with something like swaggering, the right honorable gentleman ought to have recollected that he had a pretty little leek of his own to devour, if he had any thing to do with the drawing up of her Majesty's declaration. (Hear, and a laugh.) Two things could not be conceived more inconsistent than her Majesty's declaration and the right honorable gentleman's speech. If, as it was insinuated, his honorable relative had wandered out of the way, he had the consolation of knowing that he had wandered out of the way with such men as Mansfield, Stowell, Grenville, and other distinguished jurists and statesmen. It might be that all the doctrines laid down by Lord Stowell in the last war were wholly unworthy of adoption by the right honorable gentleman, who to-night had expressed the opinions of the government; but this was certain, that those doctrines had given the law to Europe and America. So far from American jurists expressing the opinions put into their mouths by the right honorable gentleman, no one could study their opinions without seeing that they maintained all the doctrines laid down by Lord Stowell. The Americans, who suffered the most from their application, were the first to acknowledge their wisdom; and the foremost act of the American Republic was

directly in opposition to what had been stated that night by the right honorable gentleman. In support of this view, the honorable and learned gentleman quoted the opinion of Wheaton, the American jurist; and then proceeded to say, that the House must have heard with astonishment the right honorable gentleman's proposition that, for the purpose of discovering what was the law of nations, they must look to treaties. That was the very proposition which the King of Prussia endeavored to enforce on this kingdom in 1747, and was declared by Lord Mansfield to be contrary to both ancient and modern practice, the general rule being strongly proved by the exceptions made in the treaties themselves. The House had, therefore, to decide whether, in respect to the exposition of national law, it would prefer the authority of the right honorable gentleman or that of Lord Mansfield. The right honorable gentleman's argument, if carried out to its legitimate conclusion, would prevent this country stopping neutral vessels from entering even blockaded ports. The reluctance with which the present war had been entered upon, and the vigor and activity displayed in its conduct when once it began, reflected credit on the country; but the fact was, that in this new arrangement made with respect to prizes, the government stood upon no principle, but rather upon a relaxation of a principle the relaxation of the law of nations. He should not have risen, but that he found it impossible to concur in the doctrines laid down by the right honorable baronet. It might be owing to his unenlightened mind. (Hear, hear.) The honorable gentleman cheered. (Hear, hear.) He had not, he confessed, the advantage of being illuminated by those great lights which had shed their lustre on the mind of the honorable gentleman. He had contented himself with groping in the dark with those masters of antiquity, from whose pages he was not ashamed to acknowledge he had borrowed all that he knew upon the subject. It might appear a little strange that the doctrine which the right honorable gentleman had maintained, on behalf of the liberal principles which he was known to represent, was precisely the doctrine which the Autocrat of all the Russias insisted upon in 1780. Now, he (Mr. R. Phillimore) might at least be allowed to say, that the authority of Lord Stowell, Lord Mansfield, and Lord Grenville, was as good as that of the Autocrat of all the Russias. In dealing with this question, there was a point which the right honorable baronet had not adverted to namely, that the armed neutrality, in 1780, was at a period of England's greatest peril and greatest weakness. All her enemies took the opportunity of wresting from her what they conceived to be the mainstay of her maritime renown. He could not imagine that they were influenced by any abstract love of justice; because, as Lord Stowell observed, they all endeavored to forget their own principle. Before the year 1800, there were but a small portion of those who constituted the armed neutrality of 1780, who had not abandoned their principle. And why? Because they found that it was inconsistent with belligerent rights. He heard the right honorable baronet with most unfeigned astonishment when he said that, by virtue of treaties, Spain and other countries had a right to carry any goods belonging to the belligerent

powers.

Sir W. MOLESWORTH said he had only alluded to Spain.

Mr. R. PHILLIMORE said he would take his stand there, then, and would contend that there was not any treaty existing with Spain, which would enable her to carry an enemy's goods free from seizure and confiscation. But, after all, the

principles of the law of nations were not founded upon treaties, which might be entered into under prejudiced circumstances. They were founded upon reason, upon equity, and upon convenience, and were fortified by authorities. When the right honorable baronet referred, in a sneering manner, to the law of nations, as being founded merely upon municipal regulations relating to the internal commerce of a country, he begged to say that the right honorable gentleman made a very great mistake, and one which any tyro in the law would not have made. The principles of the law of nations were those maxims of equity which had been sanctioned throughout the whole civilized globe. The law of nations was referred to for the purpose of showing that there were, both by usage and by habit, rules observed between civilized nations, which it was not competent for any one nation to repeal without the assent of other nations. If the doctrine were to prevail which he had heard advanced this night, that each and every nation had an international law of its own, which it was competent for each and every such nation to repeal, nothing would be more perilous to the peace and well being of society. The wildest republican had never maintained a doctrine more certain of producing universal war, than such a doctrine as had been broached to-night. He was surprised that the right honorable gentleman, with his acute mind and varied information, had not perceived the great value which ought to be ascribed to the recognized and acknowledged power of these laws, in irresist ibly binding together the various nations of the globe. The right honorable gentleman, at the end of his speech, slightly referred to the names of Grotius and Puffendorff, who, Sir James Mackintosh said, were valuable beyond all price; because they laid down the maxims and usages agreed to by all the nations of Europe, and to which, when one nation was at issue with another, both might with confidence refer. It was not that their authority was incontrovertible, but it was because their impartiality could never be questioned. He remembered Sir James Mackintosh saying, that no man ever questioned their authority who had not previously made up his mind to violate the rules they had laid down. In conclusion, he would suggest to his honorable and learned relative the inexpediency of pressing his motion to a division. He thought his honorable relative might be content with the statement contained in the fourth declaration of her Majesty, dated 28th March, 1854, that while it was impossible for her Majesty to forego the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of war, and of preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, and that she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade, which might be established with an adequate force against the enemy's forts, harbors, or coasts; yet her Majesty would waive the right of seizing enemy's property taken on board a neutral vessel, unless it were contraband of war.

Mr. BOWYER said, that after the speech of the right honorable baronet, (Sir W. Molesworth,) no very lengthened argument was necessary to be urged on this subject, though he considered the question of sufficient importance to be fully discussed, in order that the practice of nations, with regard to maritime war, should be adapted to the progress of civilization and to the present condition of Europe. He would address himself at once to the immediate point before the House. On what authority did the doctrine rest, which was contended for by his honorable and learned friend the member for Leominster? It was stated by

Wheaton, the authority whom he had himself quoted, by which it appeared that the position, that an enemy's goods in neutral vessels were subject to capture, rested upon usage and custom alone. Kent also asserted the principle, that neutral vessels did not save an enemy's goods; but he added that England had pushed that doctrine very far, that America did not agree with the decisions of the English Court of Admiralty, though it was probable that, when America's maritime power became greater, she would assert the same doctrine. It appeared from these authorities that that doctrine did not rest upon any sound principle of public law, but upon what nations found convenient, and upon usage. But usage was only binding when based upon justice and equity. In fact usage could only by an impropriety of language be called a part of the law of nations. It was only binding so long as nations chose to follow it. Any nation that did not wish to be bound by it had only to give due notice, so as to prevent any inconvenience or wrong being inflicted upon those with whom it dealt. With regard to the custom of nations, if they went back to the customs of former ages, to what absurdities would they come? Why, the system of slavery was from the usage of nations. There was a time when the usage of nations made prisoners of war slaves, and when it justified putting prisoners of war to death. But we must not, in our time, follow mere usage; but must see what justice and what the present position of the world required, and what the progress of civilization required on the grounds of common sense. During the last war, the Court of Admiralty, under the presidency of Lord Stowell, extended the rights of belligerents as far as possible. Now, however, we were pursuing an opposite course, and, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, were opening a new era in the law of nations, by extending the rights of neutrals. We had embarked in a wise course, but we must not stop short. The rights of neutrals must be extended further, and the rights of belligerents further restricted. By allowing neutrals to trade with the enemy, we placed them in a more advantageous position than that occupied by our own subjects. This was absurd.

London Times, July 5, 1854.

ADDENDA TO THE NOTES.

PAGE 30, NOTE a.

[Whether the Treaty, of 1783, was the origin of the territorial sovereignty of the States of the American Union, was discussed during the long pending controversy in relation to the North-Eastern Boundary of Maine. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Aberdeen, having assumed, in his note of August 14, 1828, as the ground for claiming exclusive possession till the award of the arbiter was rendered, that the American title to the territory in dispute was to be deduced solely from the treaty of peace, it was replied:

"Before the independence of the United States, not only the territory in dispute, but the whole of the adjoining Province and State, was the property of a common sovereign.

"To use the words of a celebrated authority, 'When a nation takes possession of a distant country, and settles a colony there, that country, though separated from the principal establishment, or mother country, naturally becomes a part of the State equally with its ancient possessions.'

"From the principle here established, that the political condition of the people of the mother country and of the colonies during their union is the same, the inference is unavoidable that, when a division of the empire takes place, the previous rights of the common sovereign, on matters equally affecting both of the States, accrue as well to the one as to the other of them.

"From the possession of the disputed territory by his Britannic Majesty, anterior to 1776, a title by prescription or first occupancy might, therefore, with the same propriety, be asserted for Massachusetts, of which the present State of Maine was then a component part, as for Nova Scotia, through which latter Province the pretensions of New Brunswick are deduced.

"The undersigned cannot admit that the United States rest their claim to the possession of the territory upon the Treaty of 1783,' in any other sense than that in which his Britannic Majesty founds, on the same treaty, his claims to New Brunswick. By the instrument in question, which, besides being a treaty of peace, was one of partition and boundaries, the title of the United States was strengthened and confirmed, but it was not created. It had existed from the settlement of the country. Where this treaty is applicable, it, equally with all other conventional agreements between nations, is of paramount authority, and many of its provisions are, from their nature, of a permanent character; but its conclusion,