this subject. The Scripture acquaints us with the original rectitude, and first apostasy, of the human race, The Apostle ascribes the universal sinfulness and mortality of mankind to the first offence of the first man, Adam. "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. For until the law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed where there is no law. Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. Therefore, by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; for by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." The one offence of Adam, which the Apostle here so often mentions, and which he represents as so fatal to mankind, was the offence of his eating the forbidden fruit; of which we have a particular account in the third chapter of Genesis. And he expressly declares, that that single act of our first Parent, introduced sin and death among all his natural descendants, from generation to generation. I proceed,

III. To show how we became sinners by Adam. The text says, that "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." This plainly implies, that Adam's first offence was, some way or other, the occasion of the universal sinfulness of his future offspring. And the question now before us is, how his sin was the occasion of ours. This is the most difficult branch of our subject; and in order to proceed upon plain and sure ground, I would observe,

1. That Adam did not make us sinners, by causing us to commit his first offence. His first offence, we know, was his eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. And since he committed that transgression

before we were born, it is a plain dictate of common sense, that we had no concern in it. We could no more eat of the forbidden fruit, before we were born, than Adam could have eaten of it, before he was created. And though we have been guilty of many and great offences; yet we are all conscious, that we never sinned with our first Parent, in his first transgression. Neither our reason nor experience, therefore, will allow us to believe, that Adam made men sinners, by causing them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which they never saw, in a place where they never were, and at a time before they existed.

Nor can we more easily believe,

2. That he made his posterity sinners, by transferring to them the guilt of his first transgression. Guilt is a personal thing, which belongs to him alone, who does a sinful action. The guilt of any action can no more be transferred from the agent to another person, than the action itself. It has just been observed, that Adam could not transfer his first act of disobedience to his posterity; and if he could not transfer the act itself, it is equally evident, that he could not transfer the guilt of it. As he could not have made himself guilty of eating the forbidden fruit, without his choosing to eat of it; so he could not make his posterity guilty of eating of the forbidden fruit, without their choosing to do the same action. But we know, that he never made them choose to commit his first sin; and, therefore, he could not bring them under the guilt of his first transgression. It was as much out of the power of Adam, to transfer his own personal guilt to his posterity, as it is now out of the power of any other parent, to transfer his own personal guilt to his children. So far we all have clear and distinct ideas upon this subject.

But here some may say, Though Adam himself could not transfer the guilt of his first offence to his posterity; yet God, who is a Sovereign, might transfer the guilt of that sin to all his descendants. It is true, indeed, that God is a Sovereign, and hath a right to act as a Sovereign, in governing all his creatures and all their actions. But may we suppose, that his sovereignty allows him to do injustice, or treat any moral agents contrary to the eternal rule of right? It was unjust, in the nature of things, that the Supreme Being should transfer the guilt of Adam's sin to his posterity. And no constitution which he could make could render such a mode of conduct consistent with his moral rectitude. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? Shall he, therefore, transfer the guilt of the father to the son? or shall he punish the son for the father's sin? No, the soul that sinneth, it shall die for its own iniquity. God has a sovereign right, to transfer a favor from one person to another; but it is beyond the province of his Sovereignty, to transfer the guilt of an action from the proper agent, to an innocent person. His Sovereignty is limited by his Justice, in his treatment of moral and accountable creatures. Hence we may safely conclude, that the guilt of Adam's first sin was never transferred from him to his posterity, by the authority, or appointment of God.

Some, however, may still further ask, Does not the Scripture speak of Imputation? and does not imputation suppose, that God may, and does, transfer both righteousness and unrighteousness, from one person to another?

Though the Scripture speaks of good and bad actions being imputed, yet it never speaks of their being transferred. This will appear, if we consider the Scripture account of imputation. According to Scrip.

ture, a man's own actions are imputed to himself, when he receives the due reward of his deeds. "Abraham believed God, and it was counted, or imputed, to him for righteousness." That is, he was rewarded for his own virtue, or received the benefit of his own goodness. Shimei, who had deserved to die for cursing David, came to him and said, "Let not my lord impute iniquity unto me." That is, let me not suffer the just consequence of my own personal criminality. Thus men's own actions are imputed to themselves, when they receive the good or evil, which their actions deserve. And according to Scripture, the actions of one man are imputed to another, when one man receives benefit, or suffers evil on account of another's conduct. David imputed the virtue of Jonathan to his son, when he shewed kindness to the son, for the fa ther's sake. And God imputed the iniquities of the fathers to the children, when he made the children of Korah, Dathan and Abiram suffer, in consequence of their father's rebellion. But it is here to be observed, that in these instances of imputation, there is no trans ferring of righteousness or unrighteousness, from one person to another. The virtue of Jonathan was not transferred to Mephibosheth; nor the guilt of Korah to his children. But the virtue of Jonathan rendered it proper for David to shew kindness to Mephibosheth; and the guilt of Korah rendered it proper God to shew his displeasure at him, by punishing his children according to their own desert. This is the true and proper idea of imputation. sense of the word, it is granted, that God does impute the first sin of Adam to his posterity. Accordingly we read in the context. "By the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation." But though both sin and death come upon us in conse

for

And in this

quence of Adam's first sin; yet that sin is not transferred to us, nor are we punished for it. The doetrine of imputation, therefore, gives us no ground to suppose, that all mankind sinned in and fell with Adam, in his first transgression; or that the guilt of his first sin was, either by him, or by the Deity, transferred to his posterity. Nor can we suppose,

3. That Adam made men sinners, by conveying to them a morally corrupt nature. Moral corruption is essentially different from natural corruption. The latter belongs to the body, but the former belongs to the mind. Adam undoubtedly conveyed to his posterity, a corrupt body, or a body subject to wounds, bruises, and putrifying sores. But such a body could not corrupt the mind, or render it morally depraved. There is no morally corrupt nature, distinct from free, voluntary, sinful exercises. Adam had no such nature, and therefore could convey no such nature to his posterity. But even supposing, that he really had a morally corrupt nature, distinct from his free, voluntary, sinful exercises; it must have belonged to his soul, and not to his body. And if it belonged to his soul, he could not convey it to his posterity, who derive their souls immediately from the fountain of Being. God is the father of our spirits. The soul is not transmitted from father to son, by natural generation. The soul is spiritual; and what is spiritual is indivisible; and what is indivisible is incapable of propagation. Adam could not convey any part of his soul to his next immediate offspring, without conveying the whole. It is, therefore, as contrary to philosophy as to Scripture, to suppose, that Adam's posterity derive their souls from him. And if they did not derive their souls from him, they could not derive from