ingots to the value of 1,269,672 dollars, which, together with what was lost by the blowing up of the Mercedes, was a grievous loss to Spain. Instead, however, of the line-of-battle ships above cited, it was a mere frigate action, and these were the combatants

Sir John Barrow then relates the following tragic incident :

"To the fatality of this squadron was added a most melancholy and distressing event. The Mercedes blew up with a tremendous explosion, and sunk. A wealthy Spaniard, with his lady, five sons, and four daughters, each beautiful and amiable, and the sons grown up to manhood, all, with the exception of the husband and father, with one son, perished. With a large fortune, the savings of twenty-five years in a foreign country, did this unhappy gentleman embark to return to his native country. Shortly before the conflict, the father and one of his sons went on board the Admiral's ship, and there this unfortunate man became the spectator of a calamity involving the fate of his wife, his daughters, and four of his five sons, together with all his treasure-the whole he beheld enveloped in flames and sinking into the abyss of the ocean. This wretched victim of misfortune arrived at Plymouth in Sir Graham Moore's cabin, who had been-as all who knew him will readily believe-unceasing in his attentions and condolence; using his best endeavours to administer consolation and whatever was in his power to the alleviation of his suffering; which, however, it is hardly necessary to observe, were of a nature and extent not to admit of consolation; nor need I observe that Lord Melville was most painfully afflicted at this domestic calamity, occurring on his first entrance upon the administration of the Navy."

This is substantially true, but circumstantially incorrect, inasmuch as the family of Captain Alvear, of the Spanish navy, consisted of his wife, three sons, and five daughters; of whom only one son was saved by accidentally going with his father on board the Admiral's ship, where the veteran had been summoned by signal to give counsel. We recollect meeting this officer some years afterwards, and are rather surprised that among the condolences enumerated by Sir John, the having 30,000l. restored to him out of the prize proceeds, did not obtain a mention in the autobiography. No man spoke in higher terms of

England, than Captain Alvear.

The justice or injustice of seizing upon the "Dollar Frigates," as seamen designated them, forms no part of our Author's theme; nor, indeed, after all the law, vituperation, attack, and defence which have been expended, could anything new be started on the subject. There were trading patriots who chafed and bellowed worse than a raging sea; but it was a party of more noise than number, and one which ought to have been made to produce their title to the pure virtues they claimed credit for. One immaculate statesman was very burly-like a hen cackling at an ovation-on the unexampled breach of honesty committed; but surely the act of commencing hostilities under strong grounds of suspicion before a declaration of war, however questionable in its moral, is not at all unprecedented in the general conduct of modern nations. We will cite a couple of instances between the parties in question, namely, the mission of Sir George Byng to Sicily in 1718, and the seizure of the British vessels on their coast by the Spaniards,

Such was the deplorable and even perilous recommencement of hostilities with France a Melville seized the tiller with a firm grasp. randum, laid nautical affairs upon a proper warm and sincere upon this point, but we one of his assertions, as the Treasury beri Pitt opened his formidable fire upon them. lous for such a writer, that we are comp ipsissima verba

king back.

nd actually ostile intenLut-and-dried

nilarity which

and the same

ben Oliver had verish Spain by owned Blake was

"Perhaps there was not another individual in the smaller calibre percapable, by his exertion and talent, his aptitude for bus, nor far from the to look at difficulties with a determination to overcomes Melville. But it was his fate, at the very commen ising ground before tration, to have the feelings of humanity strongly wese port to procure there was no relief. The precious Peace of Amienser in the Speaker, the restless spirit of the French leader had drive and four smaller vessels, first instance of which was of a most deplorable look-out, they fell in collision which took place between two hostilom South America, Graham Moore, consisting of four sail of the list action, one was sunk, guns, and three others of 74 guns-and that of red, so that two only of the same force, in which three of the Int fourth sunk." Sked, were found to have sands of 600,000l., and a

which was burnt was the i was returning from with all the wealth and unate gentleman, with his the young Duke of Medina Centers, with his two sons, Sals together with nearly a

waves This melancholy one of his most vigorous The imagery were omitted, to the zeal of "our naval thus told :and rent,

Surely the venerable ex-Secretary is here the parallel between 1655 and yet the topic is too grave for a hon tortion of historic facts, that the adding trust, be looked upon more as the duty o caviller. Now, we pretty well remember small personal acquaintance with ma knowing the several ships. At the f who has immemoriably suffered from disguised enemy, for she was lickin The offensive and defensive Treaty powers, was of a decidedly hostile direct violation of the law of dictated everything, and deprived Our Minister received informatio waiting the arrival of some t new world to the old, to fill the war: whereupon, with a bolder evince, he ordered the seiz abundant supply from its State. Captain Graham M to cruize off Cadiz, for the ships; and in the very Cornwallis, he most dist acquaint you, that I hav to charge me with." W This, however, is not th fatigable had actually to Castilian honour to out of the question, s action was carried on carried into Plymou copper, seal-skins, and

s? We must at once

"THE NEW EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY, AND THE REVOLUTION IT IS DESTINED TO PRODUCE IN THE

SYSTEM OF MODERN TACTICS.

ICATED TO FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT PASKEVITCH ERIVANSKY, PRINCE
OF WARSAW,

::FLT.-GENERAL OKOUNEF, AIDE-DE-CAMP TO HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF ALL THE RUSSIAS, AND AUTHOR OF THE

ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN GENERAL ACTIONS. THE employment of artillery, with reference to the present question, must be considered under a different point of view to the ordinary cases which present themselves to the solution of the tactician, and it is owing to this diversity that it must be submitted to several principles independent of those on which I have already dwelt in the "Examen Raisonné des trois Armes.”

On examining with attention the field of battle occupied by two armies, it is easy to seize its strong and its weak points, to discover the topographical advantages or difficulties which the accidents of the ground engender, and to select the point of the enemy's line where a breach may be most easily effected.

The selection of this point and the position of our artillery belongs to the topographical section, upon which, in the preceding chapter, we have already expressed our ideas; we have, therefore, now to examine,

1st. The duties of the different arms considered as preliminary to the action of the reserve.

2ndly. The most advantageous mode of bringing about the decisive

moment.

In every engagement, the main object is to form a plan and to combine all our movements for its successful execution. In the present instance, the principal part will be assigned to the artillery, and I shall therefore endeavour to place 80 to 100 guns in position to make a gap on a point of the enemy's line previously selected.

This operation being a consequence of the tactical combinations of the battle, and not a sudden inspiration that may be accomplished at the beginning of the action, it behoves the General-in-Chief never to lose sight of his primitive object, so that all the movements that will precede the decisive blow may be in strict harmony with the original conception.

The integrity of that section of the ground from whence the grand blow will be struck, is the sine qua non of the success of the operation; it must, therefore, be sedulously protected from the hostile intentions of the enemy. This refers to the individual as well as to the combined action of the three arms for the attack and defence of the different accidents of the ground, a thesis upon which it will be unnecessary to dilate here, having already devoted so much space to it in the "Examen Raisonné." To solve such a question, it would be necessary to recapi

tulate all that I have advanced in a work, of which the present is but an episode. Thus we may frankly examine the question of the most advantageous mode of producing the decisive moment.

The skilful employment of a mass of 80 to 100 guns is the most favourable preliminary for the action of the other arms; for to resist the overwhelming fire of such a battery, it must be opposed by equal elements, which becomes extremely difficult. Experience has more than once demonstrated, that if we succeed in the first instance in acquiring a great preponderance over the enemy's fire, he is so overwhelmed by the tempest of projectiles vomited against him, that he is unable to bring up a fresh mass of artillery to the succour of the troops engaged or compromised, and loses during the movement required for the occupation of the position an immense number of men and horses.

To support my assertion, I shall quote as an example the battle of the Borodino. It is selected in preference, because derived from the highest competent authority and eye witness, the Marshal Prince of Warsaw, and because I do not wish to incur the charge of vanity, by attributing the effect produced to the Russian artillery. On the contrary, in the instance in question, it was the Russian artillery that was overwhelmed by that of France.

At the moment when the Viceroy of Italy had been driven out of the grand redoubt which he had carried, he confined the action with the troops commanded by the Prince of Warsaw, to a simple cannonade, which from the intensity it soon acquired, made considerable havoc in the ranks of the Marshal, and caused him at the same time serious uneasiness, as he marked in the distance a great concentration of troops, which he looked upon as the forerunner of a grand blow, the moment the French artillery should have produced the desired effect.

At the same moment General Barclay de Tolly reached the position occupied by the 26th division. The Prince of Warsaw communicated to him his apprehensions, and requested him to move up 60 guns in order to oppose an equivalent fire to that of the enemy. General Barclay, convinced of the necessity of the measure, ordered up four batteries (48 pieces), but as they moved up by sections, they were so shattered by the enemy's fire, that it was not possible to place more than 12 guns in battery.

It is probable that if the forty-eight guns had arrived en masse, it would not have been possible to have brought more than half of them into position, and therefore the Prince of Warsaw would never have acquired that preponderance over the French artillery, which he had calculated it would require sixty pieces to achieve.

If the reader requires a still more convincing example, I will adduce the assault of Warsaw. Almost the whole of the Polish artillery had been brought into action on the redoubts; their guns, well covered by parapets, were better sheltered than ours, which were in the open field. Well, in spite of the parapets, we found the major part of the Polish carriages shattered, and consequently the guns unfit for service.

I think I may therefore lay it down as a maxim, that in order to resist artillery already in action, it must be opposed by a mass, at least, one-third superior in force, for we may reckon on the destruction of one-third before they can be brought into position. According to this

calculation 130 guns will be necessary to oppose a battery of 100 guns already in position. After the loss of one-third of the guns in the different movements that will precede the opening of their fire, there will only remain sufficient to oppose an equivalent force to the enemy. The concentration of 100 guns, being the result of a previous conception, at the very beginning of the battle, may be easily carried into execution; but the enemy, who may have not taken his precautions beforehand, will not always have at the end of the action 130 pieces at his disposition to bring to bear upon the same point. And even

should he possess them, I fearlessly maintain that he will not always succeed in occupying a position, exposed already to the concentrated fire of 100 guns: nay, I will even add that he will seldom obtain such a result, provided the 100 guns do their duty.

The initiative and a certain intensity of fire are then the principal conditions to fulfil. Having once attained that object, our next duty is to preserve both.

Let us now consider what are the easiest and most advantageous means for that purpose.

As the movements of artillery paralyze momentarily its action, and thus afford the enemy time to rally and reform, we must seek to obviate this inconvenience, by establishing the maximum distance at which the artillery of reserve will take up its first position at 400 yards.

There is nothing exaggerated in this principle. I saw it reduced to practice by the Russian artillery at Warsaw. I have no object in abusing the reader, who will be pleased to recollect that I write not to flatter the amour propre of the Russian nation, but for the benefit of

science.

But, on the other hand, what would this artillery have to fear by approaching so near the enemy's position? Nothing! for it will arrive en masse, on a point where he has not a tenth part of its force to oppose to it, and it will consequently acquire such a decided preponderance of fire, that, at least at the commencement of the action, scarcely a shot will touch it.

We have established that the surest means of paralyzing the enemy's fire, and of depriving him of the faculty of opposing an equivalent, is by overwhelming him with a storm of projectiles; for this purpose, after unlimbering, the fire must commence by half batteries*.

We shall afterwards augment our fire by imparting to it the highest intensity of which it is susceptible, and on approaching the critical moment of the battle we shall reduce our distance to 300 yards, advancing by half-battery+.

At this distance such will be the rapidity and execution of our fire, that the enemy's masses will be inevitably disorganised. It must be borne in mind, that as the ground is favourable to its action, if our guns are laid with precision shot will tell.

every

The diminution of the enemy's fire, the wavering of his troops, or perhaps their retrogade movement, will be the signal for commencing an offensive effort to complete his disorganization. I shall, therefore,

* A Russian battery is composed of eight guns.

+ In making use of the term "half battery," I mean half the number of guns in position; that is, the forward movement will be made with 50 pieces.