corrupted by untamed desires and affections; and then ye may soon convince yourselves, that reason is a sure guide and judge in divine things."

Here is the proper place to enter our protest against this last sentiment, at least against what Professor Krug means to assert by the expression which he uses, and to state our grounds for it. And we do this the more readily, because we wish our views about the nature and province of reason to be explicitly understood, in order that they may not be misinterpreted; and because we feel, that the whole subject has an immediate bearing on the state of our own religious community, and the great questions of dispute, which are now agitated among us.

We take the Professor at his word, viz. that reason is a faculty, "at one time dark, and at another clear; at one time weak, and at another strong;" or in other words, that as it is developed in man, during his present state, "it is in an unfolding, improving, advancing state." In this statement, we think all the Rationalists, in Germany and in our own country, must concur.

Taking this, then, as a true account of the matter, we ask, in what stages of the progression through which reason is to pass, she becomes competent of herself to be "a sure guide and judge in divine things?" Is she so, whenever her possessor imagines her to be competent? But Dr. Krug himself confesses, that imagination not unfrequently usurps the throne of reason, and gives out her conceits and phantasms as the productions of reason. Who then is to give us the assurance, when, in any particular case, reason asserts her sufficiency to be " a sure guide and judge in matters of religion," that she is indeed really so? The possessor himself, who makes this obtrusive claim? or some other person, whose reason, in like manner, is yet in its "unfolding" state, or whose imagination has usurped her throne? Is it not lawful to appeal from the judgment of either of these tribunals, and to demand that the judge should fully understand the case, before he decides upon it? Who then is ultimate umpire here? Is it Dr. Krug himself, who is to be the high court of appeal; and are we to find in him, reason no longer in its "unfolding" state, but in its absolute perfection-in the very άnpa TEλEIÓтиTOS? Or if not, in whom is that state of knowledge to be found, which qualifies him to be "a sure guide and judge in divine things?" The greater part of men, obviously, are still in the "unfolding" state, with their reason more or less "dark and weak;" they, plainly, are not competent to be "sure guides." Who then are the particular individuals, that may assert a just claim to this prerogative? We long to know. We wish to be humble learners of those, who are "certain guides and judges." Let the advocates of Rationalism point them out, and we will turn to them at once a listening ear.

Dr. Krug himself confesses, that "men are somewhat corrupt,

and that the corrupt affections of the heart have a tendency to stifle the voice of reason." Indeed! When men, then, have some corruption, and, so far as this goes, it tends to stifle the voice of reason, is reason in them "a sure guide?" And if not, in such men, then who are the men that have not some corruption in them, and to whom may we commit ourselves for sure instruction, in the all important matter of religion?

But here the Professor comes in, and avers, that "it is not reason, which is proud, or dark, or self-confident; men themselves are all this; reason, not at all." Indeed! And is not reason a part of man? or is not man a reasonable being; or is it only reason, which is reasonable; while man himself sustains a different character ? But to pass by the distinction made by the Professor here; we ask again, and once more for all, at what stage of man's perfectibility, in regard to the faculty of reason, has he attained to such a degree of perfection, as shall afford himself and others sufficient evidence to believe and trust, that he is of himself "a sure guide and judge," in the awfully momentous concerns of religion? When this is satisfactorily answered, our great difficulty is removed; but until it be answered, we must remain in the humble belief, that a revelation is indispensable, in order to give that certainty which we need. Philosophy may scoff at our weakness, if she please so to do; but we call on her to point out a source of confidence, equivalent to the witness given by the Spirit of the living God, and by the testimony

of Jesus.

We have not yet done, however, with the subject. The claims of Rationalism; above all, the arrogant pretensions, by which she invests herself with the attributes of the infallible God; we regard with high disapprobation, and with a most thorough conviction of their injustice, as well as arrogance. But we dissent, on the other hand, very widely from those, who are in the habit of decrying reason, and of uttering strong reproaches against her, as though she were the great corrupter of the human race, and the determined opposer and enemy of revelation. Things like these we have heard and read, to our deep regret and utter astonishment; and we would fain put all the friends of evangelical sentiment on their guard, against uttering or countenancing them.

Nothing can be farther from the truth, than that revelation requires us to abandon reason. Nay, so far is the case from this, that revelation addresses itself, first of all, to the faculty of reason. It is admitted on all hands, that the Bible does not prove the being of a God; it assumes this truth, as already known and conceded. But to what faculty of man, are the evidences that a God exists, addressed? Surely to his reason. Then, as to the fact of a revelation itself, (we mean, the question whether one has actually been made,) to what faculty are the evidences of this addressed? To reason. What is it, that weighs and compares the various

testimonies and evidences, that a God exists, and that he has revealed himself in the Scriptures; and then deduces conclusions from this? Reason. What is it which ascertains the laws of interpretation, for that book which professes to be a revelation from God? Reason. What determines, that God has not members of a physical body like our own, when the Bible seems to ascribe them to him? Reason; i. e. reason, by comparing the various principles of interpreting human language, draws from them the conclusion, that the sacred writers meant to use such expressions respecting the Deity, as ascribe human parts and passions to him, in a figurative manner. Reason, then, is our highest and ultimate source of appeal, in the judgment that we form of things, which are fundamental in regard to religion. Even if a revelation were to be made to us in particular, we must appeal to reason to judge, whether the evidences of its reality were sufficient.

Such being most plainly the fact, we can never join with those, who think they are doing God service when they decry the faculty of reason; a faculty which we regard as one of the highest and noblest proofs, that our nature was formed in the image of God. Shall we say, now, that reason can never be trusted; that she is always so dark, so erring, that we can have no confidence in her decisions? If so, then why should we trust her decisions in favor of the being of a God, or of his spiritual nature, or of his moral attributes, or of the truth of Revelation? If reason does not decide in favor of all these and many more truths, then what is the faculty of our nature which does decide? and is that other faculty any more secure against error, than the faculty of reason?

Whoever will soberly consider these suggestions, and the sequel of thoughts to which they will necessarily lead, if he has ever been a reproacher of reason, he will learn to feel, that he has used a two-edged sword, as easily turned against himself as against his antagonists. It is a most plain and palpable fact, that if we could undo all our confidence in the decisions of reason, we should, of course, shake all our confidence in the belief that God exists, or that he has made a revelation to men; for of the probability of both these truths, we judge by means of our reason.

If we are right in these positions, (and to us the case seems a very plain one,) then does it follow, that there are two extremes in regard to this important subject, into which men may easily run. Indeed, nothing is more common than to find them running into both. Dr. Krug and the Rationalists are in the one, (a most dangerous one too, in our apprehension ;) while some of their antagonists, nauseated with the high and obtrusive claims of a reason which scoffs at Revelation, have fallen into a very undeserved abuse of this most noble and essential of all the human faculties.

Is there not, now, some aurea mediocritas, some golden mean, which we may choose, and avoid the offensive and dangerous er

rors of these excesses? It is a question replete with thrilling interest, to the ardent inquirer after truth and certainty. We cannot but think, that it may be answered in the affirmtive. Yet it is a question replete with difficulties of no small magnitude; difficulties which indeed are not met with by him who never stops to inquire into the ultimate grounds of the confidence he puts in his own conclusions; but, at the same time, difficulties which every fundamental investigator must cope with, and which he ought to understand.

With the Rationalists, we would unite in applauding reason, and in ascriptions of gratitude to God for this gift, which is one of the brightest evidences of our present resemblance to him. But it is reason, kept within its own province, and exercised with becoming humility and discretion, that we applaud. For the noble faculty in question, we do thank and praise the boundless goodness of God. For the abuse of it, we find fault with and condemn man. And when we are called upon to renounce all that is peculiar and distinguishing in Christianity, because, as it is confidently asserted, reason decides against its peculiarities, and never would have devised them or discovered them; we reply, without hesitation, that to us this seems to be the decision of perverted reason; of reason viewing things in a discolored light. The God who made us in his image, and made us immortal, and placed us in a state of moral probation, either intended to give us some knowledge of our duty, and of himself, and of his purposes toward us; or he did not. We avow, without hesitation, our full conviction, that reasonable men cannot be made to believe that he did not. But if he did mean to give us a knowledge of himself, and of our duty and condition; then we ask, whether reason can shew, that in communicating such knowledge, he has obliged himself to make the material creation, and the dumb and material elements only, to be our sole instructers; or whether he may not have reserved to himself the power and the right, to held out to our view some other book besides that of nature, in which he has pourtrayed his character and designs, and made known his will? Reason, even in a very imperfect state, is surely able to satisfy herself on this question.

We ask again, then, whether the faculties of man, limited, erring, imperfect as they are, in many respects, while in their natural state and their gradual unfolding, are competent to discover and enforce all necessary truth, respecting the invisible world, the tribunal of God, the conditions of acceptance with him, and the final destiny which awaits us? If not, (and we confidently avow our full conviction, that reason decides in the negative ;) then we need a revelation. Here is the grand point of difference between us and the Naturalists or Rationalists. We have no umpire, indeed, to whom we can appeal, in order to decide the question between us; except the common sense, i. e. the reason, of our fellow

beings. We must submit, and we do cheerfully submit, the question to be decided by this tribunal.

But if a revelation has been made, and reason decides that the evidences of its having been made are such as ought to satisfy our minds, then may we receive many truths on the authority of that revelation, for the discovery of which, reason, not divinely instructed, had never been competent. We are aware, here, that the point of disagreement between us and the Rationalists, is, whether the evidences that a special revelation has been made, are satisfactory? We aver that they are so; they deny it. Here again, there is no umpire between us. Our assertion does not make that true which we assert; nor does theirs and we must appeal here, then, to the reason and understanding of our fellow beings; we must lay before them the grounds of our belief, and call on them to decide for themselves, in a case of infinite moment, which of the views in question is most consonant with what they consider to be true reason, acting in the province which the Creator has assigned to it. If we can satisfy our own minds and theirs, that a revelation from God was needed, and has been made, and is of supreme obligation, and this by appealing to their reason, while we make use of our own; then we attain, in respect to this subject, all that is attainable by the faculty in question. It is the Power above, that must move the heart.

When the mind has become satisfied as to revelation, then of course the claims of Rationalists to set aside the authority of the Scriptures, in respect to everything which it is above the reach of the human mind to discover or to prove, will come to be regarded as unreasonable; and it will be felt, that they have but little claim to the appellation, in which they appear so much to glory.

We may trust reason, then, influenced by our moral susceptibilities, and employed in this manner, in the conclusions which she makes, with regard to the great truths of religion. We are obliged to do this; for what is it we do trust, or can trust, if it be not reason? We cannot then degrade or vilify this godlike faculty; nor countenance any who may think they are doing God service, while they are loading it with the epithets of reproach. We must trust the decisions of reason, in regard to the nature of evidence about religious truth of all kinds. Reason nay, and must judge, of what is proposed to her. But it is one thing to be judge of the evidence of truth, when it is proposed; and another thing, to claim the power of discovering or excogitating all the truths, which we are to believe. Here we are widely at variance with the Rationalists. Reason judges; reason interprets; reason combines and arranges; we may add, reason, legitimately used, weighs, and. is satisfied with the proper evidence of moral and religious truths, which are proposed to her. Such we believe reason to be. All beyond this, i. e. all claims above this, as to judging or deciding,