explained to them, as clearly as inspired men could do it, deliberately reject it. We speak of ministers of the Gospel, who read the Bible every day, and profess to explain it; and we say there is no resemblance between such, understandingly rejecting the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, and those who have never had the subject distinctly brought before their minds.

It is frequently said, that by refusing to exchange, the Orthodox minister assumes the right of judging the heart, and of condemning his brethren; although he is commanded to judge not, that he be not judged.

Suppose a man were to present himself for admission to a Unitarian church, who maintained that he had no particular preference for the Christian religion over heathenism and Mahometanism, and that it was of little importance to which of these religions a man attached himself, provided he was sincere. But being in a Christian country, he wished to make a profession of Christianity, since he believed that some religious forms were important. Certainly a Unitarian church in this country would reject such a man. But what right have they to judge and condemn this man; for they are commanded to judge not, that they be not judged. If this direction of Christ prevents the Orthodox minister or church from refusing fellowship to any, on account of their belief, it alike prohibits the Unitarian from requiring anything as fundamental in belief. Though a man deny the existence of God, yet must he be admitted to Christian fellowship, if he ask it. For this rule of Christ applies as well to a creed of one article, as to one of fifty.

But the truth is, this precept of our Lord was never intended to prohibit us from forming a judgment of the characters of others, as far as their principles and practice will enable us to do it. It merely prohibits the indulgence of a censorious spirit, and means essentially the same as that other scriptural direction, Judge righteous judgment. Nor does the Orthodox minister, by withholding fellowship from Unitarians, assume, the prerogative of Jehovah, and judge their motives, and declare that no one among them can be pious. As a general principle, he maintains, that those who understandingly reject any of the essential truths of the Bible to the end of life, cannot be saved. But he does not attempt to decide in respect to every individual case, how far the head may be wrong, while the heart is right. But because a certain dose of poison may not in a particular instance destroy life, the physician does not therefore conclude that it will not generally destroy it. And if in particular instances there is reason to hope that gross error of faith may not destroy the soul, the minister must not hence conclude that it will not generally be fatal.

Another plea in favor of exchanges, is, that to refuse them, is inconsistent with the charity of the Gospel.

What is the charity of the Gospel? Its essence, as all will agree, is love. Now does Christian love require, or forbid the Orthodox minister to exchange with Unitarians? Suppose two physicians are called to visit a person dangerously sick, and one of them recommends certain prescriptions which the other sincerely believes will destroy the patient. Does charity for his professional brother require the physician who thus believes, to acquiesce in having the poison administered; or does charity towards the patient require him plainly to make known his opinions, and refuse to have anything to do with such practice? There can be but one opinion in this case. And why does charity any more require the minister to approve and patronise those who teach errors, which, in his opinion, are destructive to the soul.

How, in regard to those who differed from them, did charity prompt the apostles to act? When the difference did not extend to essentials, their language is, Let not him that eateth, judge him that eateth not. Who art thou, that judgest another man's servant? Why dost thou judge thy brother, or why dost thou set at naught thy brother? But when this difference extended to fundamentals, their language is, Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. If there come any unto you and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed. Having a form of godliness but denying the power thereof: from such turn away.

Is a minister uncharitable when he declares to the irreligious part of his people, that except they repent, they will perish; and on the ground of their impenitence, refuses to regard and treat them as Christian brethren? Is not this rather one of the strongest proofs of his charity which he can give? Certainly it does not prevent him from holding a friendly intercourse with the impenitent part of his people, and frequently there is between him and them a strong mutual attachment. And why should a refusal to exchange with Unitarians prevent the Orthodox minister from cherishing toward them the most friendly feelings? As members of civil society, as engaged in similar literary and scientific pursuits, why may there not exist between them a mutual esteem and friendship, producing an interchange of all the civilities and kindnesses of social life? Since the Orthodox minister is only obeying the dictates of conscience in this matter, no feelings inconsistent with such frienship ought to have a place in his bosom, any more than in relation to the impenitent part of his people. Nor ought it to lessen the Unitarian's respect and esteem for the Orthodox, that he follows, what he conceives to be the path of duty, in despite of the solicitations of interest and friendship.

But to refuse exchanges is, in reality, a sort of persecution: for it holds up to the world as damnable heretics, those who, by

their talents, their liberality, and exemplary lives, can lay a fair claim to the name and fellowship of Christians. Hence they are regarded with suspicion, their good name is cast out as evil, and they are subjected to many privations and hardships.

Let us again recur to the case of the two physicians mentioned above. Did he, whose honest convictions and regard for the safety of the patient compelled him to protest against administering the poison-did he persecute the other physician? Suppose the latter, in consequence of this refusal to co-operate in his practice, should lose much of his business, and even be reduced to want; could any reasonable man regard this as the result of persecution? Paul went among the heathen, and told them that their opinions were fundamentally wrong, and exhorted them to turn from dumb idols, to the service of the living God; and the consequence was, that some of the idolaters were subjected to inconvenience and trouble, through the defection of many of their number. But was Paul, therefore, a persecutor of the heathen? At Ephesus, the silversmiths and craftsmen found their employment of making shrines diminishing, and themselves and families exposed to want. Was the apostle, therefore, engaged in persecuting these silversmiths? Faithful ministers are in the habit, in every age, of telling irreligious men that they are in dangerous errors, both of doctrine and practice, and. of warning others against them. But who ever thought this to be persecution on the part of such ministers? Usually, the persecution, that is, the intentional personal injury on account of conscientious religious belief, lies on the other side. In the case under consideration, the Orthodox minister says to the Unitarian, I cannot exchange with you, because I believe you have embraced dangerous errors; and I dare not do anything that will appear like encouraging your opinions, or lead any to suppose I do not look upon them as dangerous.' But he does not deny to the Unitarian the same right he claims for himself, the right of private judgment, the right of deciding for himself what doctrines are true, and what are essential, and of acting accordingly. True, there may be cases, even in this free country, where the Unitarian is intentionally and unnecessarily injured on account of the exercise of the right of private judgment. But he is no more liable to this injury than the Orthodox; and the question now is, whether the mere refusal to exchange is persecution.

But, say Unitarians, "It is to no purpose to say that these men. (the Orthodox) are very sincere in the opinion they have conceived of us; or that they cannot help their opinion; or that they cannot be consistent with it, without acting as they do. The great question still recurs: Is it right that we should suffer for other men's prejudices?" Christ. Examiner, for Sept. and Oct. 1824, p. 394.

Let it be even granted, that the opinion the Orthodox entertain of the Unitarian system is merely the result of prejudice; yet the Orthodox are not aware that such is the case. Most of them have formed this opinion, after a careful examination of the Bible, with prayer, and in opposition to their temporal interest. A refusal to exchange is, therefore, a matter of conscience. Unless, however, the Orthodox minister consents to exchange, Unitarians must suffer any bad effects, which a refusal brings along with it. But if he does exchange, he violates the dictates of conscience, whether that conscience be darkened by prejudice or not. Is it right, therefore, that Unitarians should suffer whatever unpleasant effects may result from the conscientious refusal of the Orthodox to exchange with them? Or is it right to compel the Orthodox to act contrary to the dictates of conscience? Which, we ask, is of the nature of persecution?

But who suffers the most by this refusal to exchange, the Orthodox or the Unitarian? In what other way have Orthodox ministers, in this Commonwealth, brought upon themselves more obloquy and reproach? What other cause has alienated a greater number of their people? And what other cause has operated more powerfully to produce the dismission of many? And, on the other hand, what engine have Unitarians more successfully employed than this, for building up their societies? Have not the Orthodox, then, quite as much reason as Unitarians, to inquire, "Is it right, that we should suffer for other men's prejudices?" for they do most sincerely believe, that it is prejudice alone, that prevents Unitarians from embracing the doctrines of the Gospel.

Unitarians proceed to inquire, "But ought not a man to act as he thinks? We answer, he ought not to act at all, especially in a case where the rights of others are concerned, so long as it can be shown to be his duty to hesitate." Christ. Examiner, for Sept. and Oct. 1824, p. 394.

But how is a man, whose opinion is made up on any subject, to be convinced it is his duty to hesitate? If he has not thoroughly weighed the subject, he is, to be sure, bound to re-examine it, and to listen to any arguments others may produce; and, in some cases, expediency may justify one in delaying for a time to act according to his opinion. But merely the complaint of those, whose cause is likely to suffer, and whose principles or conduct will be reproved if a man act, is no sufficient reason for hesitation. It is to be expected that such persons will complain loudly of a violation of their rights; and suppose they can prove, to their own satisfaction, that it is the man's duty to hesitate. But suppose the man himself is not convinced by their reasoning; what can release him from that obligation which lies upon every man, "to act as he thinks?" If others think their civil rights are invaded by his conduct, their remedy lies in the law of the land. If their

religious rights are violated, they can appeal to the Christian church. Or if their social rights are trampled upon, their resort must be to the justice of the community.

But in regard to exchanges, the very head and front of the Orthodox minister's offending lies in his refusal to act. Unitarians will not be satisfied unless he does act; that is, unless he exchanges. To satisfy them, therefore, it will be insufficient, "not to act at all;" he must act contrary to the dictates of his conscience.

But Unitarian writers continue, "The real question before us is, not who have adopted this measure (in regard to exchanges,) or why they have adopted it, or whether they themselves are justified in what they have done; but whether the measure itself be a good one, a just one, one which THE PEOPLE should approve and countenance." Christ. Examiner, for Sept. and Oct. 1824, p. 392.

How can any man, or body of men, be justified in adopting a measure which is not a good one, or a just one? To inquire, therefore, why the Orthodox do not exchange with Unitarians, is to inquire," whether the measure be a good one, a just one;" and if it be such, as we have abundantly shown from the word of God, then "the people" are solemnly bound to acquiesce in it. But who does not perceive, that the grand object of the extract here quoted (and we might add, of the whole essay from which it was taken,) is to excite popular odium against Orthodox ministers?

"This system of exclusion owes its existence to a combination among the clergy. The measure, we believe, was secretly determined on long ago, and has been slowly, systematically, and in some places covertly introduced, as the people would bear it Ibid. p. 384.

In regard to these declarations, we have nothing to say, except to declare them utterly false; and to challenge those writers who make them, to produce the evidence of their truth, or to retract the slanderous imputation.

It is urged in favor of exchanges, that where Unitarians assist, as is the case in some places, in supporting an Orthodox minister, they have a right to demand that preachers of their own sentiments shall be occasionally introduced into his pulpit.

It is not necessary, at this age of the world, and in this free Protestant country, to prove that no man has a right to compel another to violate the convictions of conscience, and to act contrary to his sense of duty. But the Orthodox minister says that his sense of duty will not permit him to introduce a known Unitarian into his pulpit; therefore his Unitarian hearers have no right to require this, unless they have a right to persecute him.

Some maintain that Orthodox ministers ought to consent to exchanges, that their people may hear both sides of the question.