were read from the Hon. BENJAMIN LINCOLN, Esq.; the Hon. JOHN For the late Colony of MASSAChusetts Bay. SAMUEL DANFORTH, Esq.; † WILLIAM BRATTLE, Esq.; JAMES PITTS, Esq.; SAMUEL DEXter, Esq.; † JOSEPH Gerrish, Esq.; † THOMAS SANDERS, Esq.; † JOHN HANCOCK, Esq.; † ARTEMAS WARD, Esq.; † BENJA. GREenleaf, Esq.; † JOSHUA HENSHAW, Esq.; † STEPHEN HALL, Esq. "The list of Councillors chosen Yesterday being this day, agreeable to the Direction of the Royal Charter, presented to the Lieutenant Governor, His Honor was pleased to consent to the Election of the Gentlemen before-mentioned, except the Hon. JOHN HANCOCK, Esq., and JERATHMEEL BOWERS, Esq. JOSEPH GERRISH, Esq., declined going to the Board."- The Massachusetts Gazette, Monday, June 4, 1770. DISCOURSE III. AN ELECTION SERMON. HE THAT RULETH OVER MEN MUST BE JUST, RULING IN THE FEAR OF GOD. AND HE SHALL BE AS THE LIGHT OF THE MORNING WHEN THE SUN RISETH, EVEN A MORNING WITHOUT CLOUDS: AS THE TENDER GRASS SPRINGING OUT OF THE EARTH BY CLEAR SHINING AFTER RAIN. -2 Sam. xxiii. 3, 4. THE solemn introduction to the words now read, respectable hearers, is manifestly designed to engage your attention and regard, as given by inspiration from God, and as containing the last, the dying words of one of the greatest and best of earthly rulers, who, by ruling in the fear of God, had served his generation according to the divine will. Transporting reflection! when his flesh and his heart failed, and his glory was consigned to dust. From this and many other passages in the sacred oracles, it is evident that the Supreme Ruler, though he has directed to no particular mode of civil government, yet allows and approves of the establishment of it among men. The ends of civil government, in divine revelation, are clearly pointed out, the character of rulers described, and the duty of subjects asserted and explained; and in this view civil government may be considered as an ordinance of God, and, when justly exercised, greatly subservient to the glorious purposes of divine providence and grace: but the particular form is left to the choice and determination of mankind. In a pure state of nature, government is in a great measure unnecessary. Private property in that state is inconsiderable. Men need no arbiter to determine their rights; they covet only a bare support; their stock is but the subsistence of a day; the uncultivated deserts are their habitations, and they carry their all with them in their frequent removes. They are each one a law to himself, which, in general, is of force sufficient for their security in that course of life. It is far otherwise when mankind are formed into collective bodies, or a social state of life. Here, their frequent mutual intercourse, in a degree, necessarily leads them to different apprehensions respecting their several rights, even where their intentions are upright. Temptations to injustice and violence increase, and the occasions of them multiply in proportion to the increase and opulence of the society. The laws of nature, though enforced by divine revelation, which bind the conscience of the upright, prove insufficient to restrain the sons of violence, who have not the fear of God before their eyes. A society cannot long subsist in such a state; their safety, their social being, depends upon the establishment of determinate rules or laws, with proper penalties to enforce them, to which individuals shall be subjected. The laws, however wisely adapted, cannot operate to the public security unless they are properly executed. The execution of them remaining in the hands of the whole community, leaves individuals to determine their own rights, and, in effect, in the same circumstances as in a state of nature. The remedy in this case is solely in the hands of the community. A society emerging from a state of nature, in respect to authority, are all upon a level; no individual can justly challenge a right to make or execute the laws by which it is to be governed, but only by the choice or general consent of the community. The people, the collective body only, have a right, under God, to determine who shall exercise this trust for the common interest, and to fix the bounds of their authority; and, consequently, unless we admit the most evident inconsistence, those in authority, in the whole of their public conduct, are accountable to the society which gave them their political existence. This is evidently the natural origin and state of all civil government, the sole end and design of which is, not to ennoble a few and enslave the multitude, but the public benefit, the good of the people; that they may be protected in their persons, and secured in the enjoyment of all their rights, and be enabled to lead quiet and peaceable lives in all godliness and honesty. While this manifest design of civil government, under whatever form, is kept in full view, the reciprocal obligations of rulers and subjects are obvious, and the extent of prerogative and liberty will be indisputable. In a civil state, that form is most eligible which is best adapted to promote the ends of government-the benefit of the community. Reason and experience teach that a mixed government is most conducive to this end. In the present imperfect state, the whole power cannot with safety be entrusted with a single person; nor with many, acting jointly in the same public capacity. Various branches of power, concentring in the community from which they originally derive their authority, are a mutual check to each other in their several departments, and jointly secure the common interest. This may indeed, in some instances, retard the operations of government, but will add dignity to its deliberate counsels and weight to its dictates. This, after many dangerous conflicts with arbitrary power, is now the happy constitution of our parent state. We rejoice in the gladness of our nation. May no weapon formed against it prosper; may it be preserved inviolate till time shall be no more. This, under God, has caused Great Britain to exalt her head above the nations, restored the dignity of royal authority, and rendered our kings truly benefactors. The prince upon the British throne can have no real interest distinct from his subjects; his crown is his inheritance, his kingdom his patrimony, which he must be disposed to improve for his own and his family's interest; his highest glory is to rule over a free people and reign in the hearts of his subjects. The Peers, who are lords of Parliament, are his hereditary council. The Commons, elected by the people, are considered as the grand inquest of the kingdom, and, while incorrupt, are a check upon the highest offices in the state. A constitution thus happily formed and supported, as a late writer has observed, cannot easily be subverted but by the prevalence of venality in the representatives of the people. How far septennial parliaments1 conduce to this, time may further show; or whether this is not an infraction upon the national constitution, is not for me to determine. But the best constitution, separately considered, is only as a 1 The Septennial Bill of George I., extending the duration of Parliaments to seven years, was passed to defeat the intrigues of the Popish faction, whose "conspiracy against the House of Hanover continued," Sir James Mackintosh says, "till the last years of the reign of George II., and whose hostility to the Protestant succession was not extinguished till the appearance of their leaders at the court of George III. proclaimed to the world their hope that Jacobite principles might reascend the throne of England with a monarch of the House of Brunswick." It was the effrontery of their propaganda in New England that roused Dr. Mayhew in 1750. See his Sermon on the "Martyrdom" of Charles I., p. 102. - ED. |