that book, which so frequently and solemnly affirms all these things? We can no longer maintain, That all Scripture was given by Inspiration of GOD, since it is impossible, that the GOD of Truth, should be the Author of palpable falsehoods. So that whoever asserts the pre-determination of all human actions, a doctrine totally inconsistent with the scriptural doctrines of a future Judgment, Heaven and Hell, strikes hereby at the very foundation of Scripture, which must necessarily stand or fall with them.

6. Such absurdities will naturally and necessarily follow, from the scheme of Necessity. But Mr. Edwards has found out a most ingenious way of evading this consequence. "I grant," (says that good and sensible man,) "if the actions of men were involuntary, the consequence would inevitably follow; they could not be either good or evil: nor, therefore, could they be the proper object, either of reward or punishment. But here lies the very ground of your mistake their actions are not involuntary. The actions of men are quite voluntary: the fruit of their own will. They love, they desire evil things; therefore they commit them. But love and hate, desire and aversion are only several modes of willing. Now if men voluntarily commit theft, adultery, or murder, certainly the actions are evil, and therefore punishable. And if they voluntarily serve GOD, and help their neighbours, the actions are good, and therefore rewardable."

:

For

7. I cannot possibly allow the consequence, upon Mr. Edwards's supposition. Still I say, if they are necessitated to commit robbery or murder, they are not punishable for committing it. But you answer, "Nay, their actions are voluntary, the fruit of their own will." If they are, yet that is not enough, to make them either good or evil. their will, on your supposition, is irresistibly impelled: so that they cannot help willing thus or thus. If so, they are no more blameable for that Will, than for the actions which follow it. There is no blame, if they are under a necessity of willing. There can be no moral Good or Evil, unless they have Liberty as well as Will, which is entirely

a different thing. And the not adverting to this, seems to be the direct occasion of Mr. Edwards's whole mistake.

8. GOD created Man an Intelligent Being; and endued him with Will as well as Understanding. Indeed it seems, without this, his understanding would have been given to no purpose.i Neither would either his Will or Understanding have answered any valuable purpose, if Liberty had not been added to them, a power distinct from both; a power of choosing for himself, a self-determining Prin ciple. It may be doubted, whether GOD ever made an intelligent creature, without all these three faculties? Whether any Spirit ever existed without them? Yea, whether they are not implied in the very nature of a Spirit? Certain it is, that no Being can be accountable for its Actions which has not Liberty, as well as Will and Understanding,

How admirably is this, painted by Milton supposing GOD to speak concerning his new-made Creature.

"I made him just and right,

Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
Such I ereated all th' ethereal powers-
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have given sincere
Of true allegiance, constant faith and love,

Where only what they needs must do appear'd,

Not what they would. What praise could they receive,
What pleasure 1, from such obedience paid,
When Will and Reason (Reason also is Choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil'd
Made passive both, had serv'd Necessity,
Not me? They therefore, as to right belong'd,
So were created.

So without least impulse or shadow of fate
Or ought by me immutably foreseen

They trespass, authors to themselves in all,
Both what they judge and what they choose: For so
I form'd them free; and free they must remain,

Till they enthrall themselves. I else must change

+

Their Nature and reverse the high decree,
Unchangeable, eternal, which ordain'd

Their freedom: they themselves ordain'd their fall."
Paradise Lost, Book III.

9. It seems, they who divide the faculties of the human Soul, into the Understanding, Will, and Affections, unless they make the Will and Affections the same thing; (and then how inaccurate is the Division?) must mean by Affections, the Will, properly speaking, and by the term Will, neither more nor less than Liberty: the power of Choosing either to do or not to do, (commonly called Liberty of Contradiction,) or to do this or the contrary, Good or Evil, commonly called Liberty of Contrariety. Without the for mer at least, there can be nothing good or evil, rewardable or punishable. But it is plain, the doctrine of Necessity, as taught either by ancient Heathens, or by the moderns, (whether Deists or Christians,) destroys both, leaves not a shadow of either, in any soul of man. Consequently it destroys all the Morality of human Actions, making man a mere Machine, and leaves no room for any Judgment to come, or for either Rewards or Punishments.

IV. 1. But whatever be the consequences deducible from this, That all human actions are necessary, how will you answer the Arguments which are brought, in defence of this position? Let us try, whether something of this kind, may, not be done in a few words.

Indeed as to the first Scheme, that of the Manichees, the maintainers of a Good and an Evil God, though it was formerly espoused by men of renown, St. Augustine in particular; yet it is now so utterly out of date, that it would be lost labour to confute it. A little more plausible is the Scheme of the Stoics building Necessity upon Fate, upon the insuperable stubbornness of Matter, or the indissoluble Chain of Causes and Effects. Perhaps they invented this Scheme, to exculpate GOD; to avoid laye ing the blame upon Him;. by allowing, He would have done better, if he could: that he was willing to cure the evil, but was not able. But we may answer them short,

There is no Fate above the most High; that is an idle irrational Fiction: neither is there any thing in the nature of Matter, which is not obedient to his word. The Almighty is able in the twinkling of an eye, to reduce any matter into any form he pleases: or to speak it into nothing; in a moment to expunge it out of his Creation.

2. The still more plausible Scheme of Dr. Hartley, (and I might add, those of the two Gentlemen above-mentioned, which nearly coincide with it) now adopted by almost all who doubt of the Christian System, requires a more particular consideration, were it only because it has so' many admirers. And it certainly contains a great deal of truth, as will appear to any that considers it calmly. For who can deny, that not only the memory, but all the Operations of the Soul are now dependent on the bodily Organs, the Brain, in particular? Insomuch that a blow on the back part of the head, (as frequent experience shews,) may take away the Understanding, and destroy at once both Sensation and Reflection: and an irregular flow of Spirits may quickly turn the deepest Philosopher into a Madman." We must allow likewise, that while the very power of thinking depends so much upon the Brain, our Judgments must needs depend thereon, and in the same proportion. It must be farther allowed, that as our Sensations, our Reflections, and our Judgments, so our Will and Passions also, which naturally follow from our Judgments, ultimately depend on the Fibres of the Brain. But does all this infer the total Necessity of all human actions? "I am sorry it, says the Dr. but I cannot help it." I verily think I can. I think, I can not only cut the knot, by shewing (as above) the intolerable absurdities which this Scheme implies; but fairly untie it, by pointing out just where the fallacy lies.

for

3. But first permit me to say a word to the Author of the Essay. His grand reason, for supposing all mankind in a dream, is drawn from Analogy, "We are in a continual delusion as to the Natural World: Why not as to the Moral?" Well: how does he prove, that we are in a continual delusion as to the Natural World? Thus. All the

I

Qualities which are termed Secondary Qualities, we by a natural instinct ascribe to Matter. But it is a mere deceit. They do not belong to Matter, neither exist without us.".

As commonly as this is asserted, it is absolutely false, as will appear quickly.

You instance in Colours, and confidently say, "All this beauty of Colours with which heaven and earth appear to be clothed, is a sort of romance or illusion. In external objects, there is no other distinction, but that of the size and arrangement of their constituent parts, whereby the rays of light are variously reflected or refracted.".

But are those rays of light real? And do they exist without us? Certainly, as much as the Sun does. And are the constituent parts of those objects real? No body questions it. But are they really such a size, and arranged in such a manner? They are: and what will you infer from that? I infer, that Colour is just as real as Size or Figure; and that all Colours do as really exist without us, as trees, or corn, or heaven, or earth. "But what do you mean by Colour?" When I say, That Cloth is of a red Colour, I mean, its surface is so disposed as to reflect the red (that is, the largest) rays of light. When I say, The Sky is blue, I mean, it is so disposed as to reflect the blue (that is, the smallest) rays of light. And where is the delusion here? Does not that disposition, do not those rays as really exist, as either the Cloth, or the Sky? And are they not as really reflected, as the Ball in a tennis court? It is true, when they strike upon my eye, a particular sensation follows in my Soul. But that sensation is not Colour: I know no one that calls it so. Colour therefore is a real, material thing. There is no illusion in the case, unless you confound the perception with the thing perceived. And all other Secondary Qualities are just as real as Figure or any other Primary one. So you have no illusion in the natural world, to countenance that which you imagine to be in the moral. Wherever therefore this argument occurs, (and it occurs ten times over,) "The natural world is all illusion; therefore so is the moral," it is just good for nothing. VOL. XV.

C