sense; but not subversive of it. The words added to this text, Ye know all things, are such. And you yourself allow them so to be. But I do not allow the words wilfully and habitually to be such. These do not explain but overthrow the text. That the first Fathers thus explained it, I deny as also that I ever spoke lightly of them.

8. You proceed. "You allow in another Sermon, in evident contradiction to yourself, that the true children of God could and did commit sin." This is no contradiction to any thing I ever advanced. I every where allow, that a Child of God can and will commit sin, if he does not keep himself. "But this, you say, is nothing to the present argument." Yes, it is the whole thing. If they keep themselves, they do not; otherwise they can and do commit sin. I say nothing contrary to this in either sermon. But "hence you say, we conclude, That he who is born of God, may possibly commit sin." An idle conclusion as ever was formed. For whoever denied it? I flatly affirm it in both the Sermons, and in the very paragraph now before us. The only conclusion which I deny, is, That "all Christians do and will commit sin as long as they live." Now this you yourself (though you seem to start at it) maintain from the beginning of your letter to the end: viz. That all Christians do sin and cannot but sin, more or less, to their lives end. Therefore I do not " artfully put this conclusion ;" but it is your own conclusion, from your own premises. Indeed were I artfully to put in any thing, in expounding the word of God, I must be an errant knave. But I do not my conscience bears me witness, that I speak the very truth, so far as I know it, in simplicity and godly sincerity.

9. I think that all this time you are directly pleading for: looseness of manners, and that every thing you advance naturally tends thereto. This is my grand objection to that doctrine of the necessity of sinning. Not only that it is false, but that it is directly subversive of all holiness. The doctrine of the Gnosticks, was not that of a Child of God does not commit sin, i. e. Act the things which are forbidden

in Scripture: but that they are not sin in him; that he is a Child of God still: so they contend, not for sinless, but sinful Perfection: just as different from what I contend for, as Heaven is from Hell. What the Donatists were, I do not know. But I suspect, they were the real Christians of that age: and were, therefore, served by St. Augustine and his warm adherents, as the Methodists are now by their zealous adversaries. It is extremely easy to blacken: and could I give myself leave, I could paint the consequences of your doctrine, in at least as dark and odious colours, as you could paint mine.

10. The passage of St. Peter (mentioned Sermon XII.) I still think proves all which I brought it to prove.

"But you allow (Sermon IV.) that Paul and Barnabas did commit sin. And these were without all controversy Fathers in Christ." That is not without controversy: that either Barnabas when he left Paul, or Peter when he dissembled at Antioch, was at that time a father in Christ in St. John's sense: though by office undoubtedly they were. Their example, therefore, only proves what no one denies, viz. That if a Believer keeps not himself, he may commit sin. Would the conclusions here drawn, "be made only by a very weak Opponent?" Then you are a weak Oppo nent; for you make them all, either from these or other premises. For you believe and maintain, 1. That all the other Apostles committed sin sometimes : 2. That all the other Christians of the Apostolic Age, sometimes committed sin: 3. That all other Christians in all Ages, do and will commit sin as long as they live: and, 4. That every man must commit sin, cannot help it, as long as he is in the body, You cannot deny one of the Propositions, if you understand your own Premises.

I am, Rev. Sir,

Your affectionate Brother,
J. WESLEY.

OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THE proofs of the Immortality of the Soul are drawn, 1st, From the nature of the soul itself, and particularly its immateriality; which though not absolutely necessary to the eternity of its duration, has, I think, been evinced to almost a demonstration.

2dly, From its passions and sentiments, as particularly from its love of existence, its horror of annihilation, and its hopes of immortality, with that sweet satisfaction which it finds in the practice of virtue, and that uneasiness which follows in it upon the commission of vice.

3dly, From the nature of the Supreme Being, whose justice, goodness, wisdom, and veracity, are all concerned in this point.

But among these and other excellent arguments for the immortality of the soul, there is one drawn from the perpetual progress of the soul to its perfection, without a possibility of ever arriving at it; which is a hint that I do not remember to have seen opened and improved by others who have written on this subject, though it seems to me to carry a great weight with it. How can it enter into the thoughts of man, that the soul, which is capable of such immense perfections, and of receiving new improvements to all eternity, shall fall away into nothing almost as soon as it is created? Are such abilities made for no purpose? A brute arrives at a point of perfection that he can never pass ; in a few years he has all the endowments he is capable of; and were he to live ten thousand more, would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties to be full grown, and incapable of farther enlargements, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of

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annihilation. But can we believe a thinking being, that is in a perpetual progress of improvements, and travelling on from perfection to perfection, after having just looked abroad into the works of its Creator, and made a few discoveries of his infinite goodness, wisdom, and power, must perish at her first setting out, and in the very beginning of her inquiries?

A man considered in his present state, seems only sent into the world to propagate his kind. He provides himself with a successor, and immediately quits his post to make room for him.

-Hæres

Hæredem alterius, velut unda supervenit undam.

Hor. Ep. 2. 1. 2. v. 175.

Heir crowds on heir, as in a rolling flood

Wave urges wave.

CREECH.

He does not seem born to enjoy life, but to deliver it down
to others. This is not surprising to consider in animals,
which are formed for our use, and can finish their business
in a short life. The silk-worm, after having spun her task,
lays her
eggs and dies. But a man can never have taken
in his full measure of knowledge, has not time to subdue
his passions, establish his soul in virtue, and come up to the
perfection of his nature, before he is hurried off the stage.
Would an infinitely wise Being make such glorious beings
for so mean a purpose? Can he delight in the production of
such abortive intelligences, such short-lived reasonable
beings? Would he give us talents that are not to be ex-
erted? Capacities that are never to be gratified? How
can we find that wisdom that shines through all his works,
in the formation of man, without looking on this world as
only a nursery for the next, and believing that the several
generations of rational creatures, which rise up and disap-
pear in such quick successions are only to receive their first
rudiments of existence here, and afterwards to be trans-
planted into a more friendly climate, where they may
spread and flourish to all eternity.

There is not a more pleasing and triumphant consideration in religion than this, of the perpetual progress which the soul makes towards the perfection of its nature, without ever arriving at a period in it. To look upon the soul as going on from strength to strength; to consider that she is to shine for ever with new accessions of glory, and brighten to all eternity; that she will be still adding virtue to virtue, and knowledge to knowledge; carries in it something wonderfully agreeable to that ambition which is natural to the mind of man. Nay, it must be a prospect pleasing to God himself, to see his creation for ever beautifying in his eyes, and drawing nearer to him, by greater degrees of resemblance.

Methinks this single consideration, of the progress of a finite spirit to perfection, will be sufficient to extinguish all envy in inferior natures, and all contempt in superior. That cherub that now appears as a god to a human soul, knows that a period will come, when the human soul shall be as perfect as he himself now is: nay, when she shall look down upon that degree of perfection, as much as she now falls short of it. It is true, the higher nature still advances, and preserves his distance, and superiority in the scale of being; but he knows that, how high soever the station is of which he stands prepossessed at present, the inferior nature will at length mount up to it, and shine forth in the same degree of glory.

With what astonishment and veneration may we look into our souls, where there are such hidden stores of virtue and knowledge! Such inexhausted sources of perfection! We know not yet what we shall be, nor will it ever enter into the heart of man to conceive the glory that will be always in reserve for him. The soul, considered, with its Creator, is like one of those mathematical lines that may draw near to another to all eternity, without a possibility of touching it. And can there be a thought so transporting, as to consider ourselves in these perpetual approaches to him, who is not only the standard of perfection, but of happiness!