A CLEAR AND CONCISE DEMONSTRATION OF THE DIVINE INSPIRATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

THERE are four grand and powerful arguments which strongly induce us to believe that the Bible must be from God, viz. miracles, prophecies, the goodness of the doctrine, and the moral character of the penmen. All the miracles flow from Divine Power; all the prophecies from Divine Understanding; the goodness of the doctrine from Divine Goodness; and the moral character of the penmen from Divine Holiness.

Thus Christianity is built upon four grand pillars, viz. the Power, Understanding, Goodness, and Holiness of God: Divine Power is the source of all the miracles; Divine Understanding of all the prophecies; Divine Goodness of the goodness of the doctrine; and Divine Holiness of the moral character of the penmen.

I beg leave to propose a short, clear, and strong argument to prove the Divine Inspiration of the Holy Scrip

tures.

The Bible must be the invention either of good men or angels, bad men or devils, or of God.

1. It could not be the invention of good men or angels, for they neither would nor could make a book and tell lies all the time they were writing it, saying, Thus saith the Lord, when it was their own invention.

2. It could not be the invention of bad men or devils, for they would not make a book which commands all duty, forbids all sin, and condemns their own souls to hell to all eternity.

3. Therefore I draw this conclusion, That the Bible must be given by Divine Inspiration.

SOME THOUGHTS ON AN EXPRESSION OF ST. PAUL, IN THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE. THESSALONIANS, CHAP. V. VER. 23.

1. THE words, as literally translated as the English tongue will bear, run thus: May the whole of you, the spirit, and the soul, and the body, be preserved blameless.

What does St. Paul here mean, by dividing man into three parts, the spirit, and the soul, and the body?

This creates what has been thought an insurmountable difficulty, by those who argue thus:

"How is it possible to contradistinguish the Soul, both from the Spirit and from the Body? For it must be either material or immaterial, matter or not matter: there is no medium. But if it be matter, does it not coincide with the body? If it be not matter, does it not coincide with the spirit?"

But perhaps a way may be found of untying this knot, of unravelling this difficulty, by simply declaring the (at least probable) meaning of these three terms.

May not the Spirit mean (so it has been understood by the Christians in all ages) the highest principle in man, the immortal Spirit made in the image of God, endued (as all Spirits are, so far as we can conceive) with self-motion, understanding, will, and liberty?

Is not the Body, that portion of organized matter, which every man receives in the womb, with which he is born into the world, and which he carries with him to the grave? At present it is connected with flesh and blood. But these are not the Body. They are only the temporary clothing of the body, which it wholly puts off in the grave.

The Soul seems to be the immediate clothing of the Spirit, the vehicle with which it is connected from its first existence, and which is never separated from it, either in life or in death. Probably it consists of ethereal or elec

tric fire, the purest of all matter. It does not seem to be affected by the death of the body, but envelopes the separate, as it does the embodied spirit: neither will it undergo any essential change, when it is clothed upon with the immortal body at the resurrection.

May not the apostle have an eye to this, in those remarkable words, (2 Cor. v. 4,) We that are in this tabernacle (this corruptible flesh and blood) do groan, being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, (divested of all covering, which belongs only to the Father of Spirits,) but clothed upon with the glorious resurrection-body, covering both our soul and spirit. This will swallow up, totally destroy ro Dynor that which was mortal, namely, the flesh and blood, which alone was liable to death.

If we understood the words of the apostle in this sense, all the difficulty vanishes away. We allow, there can be no medium between material and immaterial. But still there is room for a wide and essential difference, between the soul and the body: the latter implying that original portion of matter which is now clothed with flesh and blood: the former, that vehicle of ethereal fire, which immediately covers the immortal spirit.

CONGLETON, March 31, 1786.

THOUGHTS ON SUICIDE.

IT is a melancholy consideration, that there is no country in Europe, or perhaps in the habitable world, where the horrid crime of self-murder is so common as it is in England! One reason of this may be, that the English, in general, are more ungodly and more impatient than other nations. Indeed we have laws against it, and officers with juries are appointed, to inquire into every fact of the kind. And VOL. XV.

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these are to give in their verdict upon oath, whether the self-murderer was sane or insane? If he is brought in insane, he is excused, and the law does not affect him. By this means it is totally eluded; for the juries constantly bring him in insane. So the law is not of the least effect, though the farce of a trial still continues.

This morning I asked a coroner, "Sir, did you ever know a jury bring in the deceased Felo-de-se ?" He answered, "No, Sir: and it is a pity they should." What then is the law good for? If all self-murderers are mad, what need of any trial concerning them?

But it is plain our ancestors did not think so, or those laws had never been made. It is true, every self-murderer is mad in some sense, but not in that sense which the law intends. This fact does not prove him mad in the eye of the law: the question is, was he mad in other respects? If not, every juror is perjured who does not bring him in Felode-se.

But how can this vile abuse of the law be prevented, and this execrable crime effectually discouraged?

By a very easy method. We read in ancient history, that at a certain period, many of the women in Sparta murdered themselves. This fury increasing, a law was made, that the body of every woman that killed herself, should be exposed naked in the streets. The fury ceased at once.

Only let a law be made and rigorously executed, That the body of every self-murderer, lord or peasant, shall be hanged in chains, and the English fury will cease at once. LIVERPOOL, April 8, 1790.

THOUGHTS UPON TASTE.

1. A FEW weeks ago I read with care and attention, a celebrated Essay on Taste. I cannot say, but I entered upon it with great expectation, as I knew the author to be

a man of understanding, and one whose natural abilities were improved by a considerable share of learning. I knew likewise that the performance itself had been highly and generally applauded: yea, that the Doctor had been honoured with the medal, which is yearly given by the Society, to him that produces the best performance on the subject proposed.

2. Yet to speak the plain truth, I cannot affirm, that it altogether answered my expectation. It did not appear to me, to be written upon a good plan, neither to be well digested. And there are assertions almost in every chapter, which are exceedingly disputable. Many of these I could not clearly assert: some of them I utterly deny. Neither could I find in the whole tract, any clear, just definition of the subject. So that after all he has said, one would still be puzzled to answer the question, "What is Taste?"

3. But is there any better book upon the subject extant? I do not conceive there is. At least I have not seen it: although there are some ingenious thoughts of Mr. Addison upon it in the Spectator. And nearly related to this, is his fine "Essay on the Pleasures of Imagination." But Taste is a more extensive word. It does not relate to the imagination only.

4. It may be the more difficult to understand the precise meaning of the word, because there are so few words that are synonymous to it. I do not recollect any, either in Greek or Latin; no, nor yet in the English language. Indeed we have some which are generally supposed to be nearly equivalent with it. So a man of taste is almost the same with a man of genius, a man of sense, or a man of judgment: but none of these mean exactly the same thing.

5. "Most languages," says Mr. Addison, "make use of this metaphor to express that faculty of mind which distinguishes the most concealed faults and nicest perfections in writings." But this definition is far too narrow. For taste refers to other things, as well as writings. And when he adds, It" is that faculty of the soul, which discovers the beauties of an author with pleasure, and his imperfections