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the enquiry how external objects operate upon the senses, or the senses upon the mind, Mr. Locke gave the name of ideas of SENSATION, in allusion to the source from which they are derived.

But the mind, as we have already observed, has various powers or faculties as well as the body; and they are quite as active and lively in their respective functions. In consequence of which the ideas of external objects are not only perceived, but retained, thought of, compared, compounded, abstracted, doubted, believed, desired; and hence another fountain, and of a very capacious flow, from which we also derive ideas, namely, a reflex act or perception of the mind's own operations; whence the ideas derived from this fountain are denominated ideas of REFLECTION.

The ideas, then, derived from these two sources, and which have sometimes been called OBJECTIVE and SUBJECTIVE*, constitute all our experience, and, consequently, all our knowledge. Whatever stock of information a man may be possessed of, however richly he may be stored with taste, learning, or science, if he turn his attention inwards, and diligently examine his own thoughts, he will find that he has not a single idea in his mind but what has been derived from the one or the other of these two channels. But let not this important observation be forgotten by any one ; that the ideas the mind possesses will be fewer or more numerous, simpler or more diversified, clear or confused, according to the number of the objects or subjects presented to it, and the extent of its reflection and examination. Thus, a clock or a landscape may be for ever before our eyes; but unless we direct our attention to them, and study their different parts, although we cannot be deceived in their being a clock or a landscape, we can have but a very confused idea of their character and composition. The ideas presented to the mind, from which of these two sources soever derived, or, in other words, whether objective or subjective, are of two kinds, SIMPLE and COMPLEX,

* “ On appelle, dans la philosophie Allemande, idées subjectives celles qui naissent de la nature de notre intelligence et de ses facultés, et idées objectives toutes celles qui sont excitées par les sensations.” — Mad. de Staël Holstein, De l'Allemagne, tom. iii. p. 76.

Mad. de Staël, however, has fallen into the common error of the French philosophers, from whom she appears to have generally informed herself of the principles of Locke's system, in supposing that he derived all ideas from sensation. “ A l'époque où parut la Critique de la Raison pure, il n'existoit que deux systêmes sur l'entendement humain parmi les penseurs; l'une, celui de Locke, attribuoit toutes nos idées à nos sensations ; l'autre, celui de Descartes et de Leibnitz, s'attachoit a démontrer la spiritualité et l'activité de l'âme, de libre arbitre, enfin toute la doctrine idéaliste.” — Id. p. 70.

SIMPLE IDEAS consist of such as are limited to a single notion or perception; as those of unity, darkness, light, sound, hardness, sweetness, simple pain, or uneasiness. And in the reception of these the mind is passive, for it can neither make them to itself, nor can it, in any instance, have any idea which does not wholly consist of them; or, in other words, it cannot contemplate any one of them otherwise than in its totality. Thus, on looking at this single sheet of paper, I have the idea of unity; and though I may divide the single sheet of paper into twenty parts, I cannot divide the idea of unity into twenty parts; for the idea of unity will and

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must as wholly accompany every part as it accompanies the collective sheet. And the same remark will apply to all the rest.

COMPLEX IDEAS are formed out of various simple ideas associated together, or contemplated derivatively. And to this class belong the ideas of an army, a battle, a triangle, gratitude, veneration, gold, silver, an apple, an orange: in the formation of all which it must be obvious that the mind is active, for it is the activity of the mind alone that produces the complexity out of such ideas as are simple. And that the ideas I have now referred to are complex, must be plain to every one; for

every one must be sensible that the mind cannot form to itself the idea of an orange without uniting into one aggregate the simple ideas of roundness, yellowness, juiciness, and sweetness. In like manner, templating the idea of gold, there must necessarily be present to the mind, and in a complex or aggregate form, the ideas of great weight, solidity, yellowness, lustre; and if the idea be very accurate, great malleability and fusibility.

Complex ideas are formed out of simple ideas by many operations of the mind; the principal of which, however, are some combination of them, some abstraction, or some comparison. Let us take a view of each of these :

And, first, of complex ideas of COMBINATION. Unity, as I have already observed, is a simple idea; and it is one of the most common simple ideas that can be presented to the mind, for every object without, and every idea within, tend equally to excite it. And, as being a simple idea, the mind, as I have also remarked, is passive on its present


it can neither form such an idea to itself, nor contemplate it otherwise than in its totality: but it can combine the ideas of as many units as it pleases, and hence produce the complex idea of a hundred, a thousand, or a hundred thousand. So beauty is a complex idea ; for the mind, in forming it, combines a variety of separate ideas into one common aggregate. Thus Dryden, in delineating the beautiful Victoria, in his “ Love Triumphant:"

Her eyes, her lips, her cheeks, her shape, her features,
Seem to be drawn by Love's own hand; by Love
Himself in love.

In like manner the mind can produce complex ideas by an opposite process, and that is, by ABSRACTION, or separation. Thus chalk, snow, and milk, though agreeing, perhaps, in no other respect, coincide with respect to colour ; and the mind, contemplating this agreement, may abstract or separate it from the other properties of these three objects, and form the idea which is indicated by the term whiteness ; and having thus acquired a new idea by the process of abstraction, it may afterwards apply it as a character to a variety of other objects: and hence particular ideas become general or universal.

Other complex ideas are produced by COMPARISON. Thus, if the mind take one idea, as that of a foot, as a determinate measure, and in imagination place it by the side of another idea, as that of a table, the result will be a formation of the complex idea of length, breadth, and thickness. Or if we vary the primary ideas, we may obtain, as a result, the secondary ideas of coarseness and fineness.

And hence complex ideas must be almost infinitely more numerous than simple ideas, which are their elements or materials, as words must be always far more numerous than letters. I have instanced only a few of their principal kinds; but even each of these kinds is applicable to a variety of subjects, of which Mr. Locke mentions the three following:

I. IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES; or such as we have uniformly found connected in the same thing, and without which, therefore, such thing cannot be contemplated. To this head belong the complex ideas of a man, a horse, a river, a mountain.

II. IDEAS OF MODES; or such as may be considered as representative of the mere affections, or properties of substance; of which the idea of number may once more be offered as an example: the ideas of expansion or extension and duration belong to the same stock; and in like manner those of power, time, space, and infinity, which are all modes, properties, or affections of substance; or secondary ideas derived from or excited by the primary idea of substance of some kind or other.

III. IDEAS OF RELATIONS ; which are by far the most extensive, if not the most important, branch of subjects from which our complex ideas are derived; for there is nothing whatever, whether simple idea, substance, mode, relation, or even the name of any of them, which is not capable of an almost infinite number of bearings in reference or relation to other things. It is from this source, therefore, that we derive a very large proportion of our thoughts and words. As examples under it, I may mention all those ideas that relate to or are

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