fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing; for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the sound light or red by itself. For to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears; a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Pança, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of definition. The only way is by applying to his senses the proper object, and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours which often came in his way, bragged one day that he now understood what scarlet signified. Upon which his friend demanding what scarlet was? the blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.

§ 12. The case is quite otherwise in complex ideas; which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the several ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind which were never there before, and so make their names be under

The contrary showed

in complex ideas, by instances of

a statue and rainbow.

seas, passing under eaching the signification Cers, has place, and may es of tunes which never I tenses: und frame ideas : mis vien they use Terms of the me liens, which he mas never yet had in ste nay be explained ren picture cannot; ze isa igure, but mourns cannot excite in unter against me for the excel

mene that his victed arther, and es could met perceive to refer himmu; who being nude the one, te vas frst led to na us bands all the nu with great adDe e versman. But meus hands laid ei the bead, and is bands moved te tech, without ecca he cried reto de a very ad

Sup which could tere be could nei

veri rainbow to one

had never seen Perading the figure, te celcurs, so well e perfectly under

stood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind man understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one, being such as he never received by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

The same of

ideas when

to be made intelligible

by words.

§ 14. Simple ideas, as has been showed, can only be got by experience, from those complex objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When by this means we have our minds stored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple idea, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it; there another name, of the same idea which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name, of any simple idea, capable of a definition.

4. Names of

least doubtful.

15. Fourthly, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of defini- simple ideas tion to determine their signification, yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed modes and substances; because they standing only for one simple perception, men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the

VOL. II.

tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce their ideas by more senses than one.

6. Names of simple ideas

not at all arbitrary.

§ 17. Sixthly, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes, have also this difference; that those of mixed modes stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary; those or substances are not perfectly so, but refer to a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

They stand for abstract ideas, as

other gene

ral names.

§ 1. THE names of mixed modes being general, they stand, as has been shown, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been showed, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve

our attention.

§ 2. The first particularity I shall observe in them is, that the abstract ideas, or, if you please, the essences of the several species of mixed modes are made by the understanding, wherein they differ

1. The ideas

they stand

for are made

by the understanding.