"done. Twice a week he threatens to impale Mr. Watts! "In short he is a compound of every thing that is bad. ".... It is a most disagreeable circumstance to find that "the troubles are likely to commence again, but the "opinion here (at Calcutta) is universal, that there can "be neither peace nor trade without a change of govern"ment."* With this conviction strongly rooted in his mind, and the danger to Bengal full before his eyes, the bold spirit of Clive determined to set aside of his own authority the instructions commanding his immediate return to Madras. He entered eagerly into the conspiracy forming at Moorshedabad to depose Surajah Dowlah, and to place on the throne the General of the forces, Meer Jaffier. It may readily be supposed that in these negotiations Meer Jaffier was liberal, nay lavish, in his promises of compensation to the Company, and rewards to their soldiers. Still more essential was the engagement into which he entered, that, on the approach of an English force, he would join their standard with a large body of his troops. It was the energy of Clive which formed the soul of the whole design-which upheld the faltering courage of the conspirators at Moorshedabad, and fixed the doubtful judgment of the Committee (or Council) at Calcutta. Thus he writes to Mr. Watts: "Tell Meer Jaffier to fear nothing, and that I will join him with 5,000 men who never turned their backs."† Yet it seems difficult to believe that Clive could really expect, at that juncture, to muster much more than half the numbers that he named. 66 66 In these negotiations between the native conspirators and the English chiefs, the principal agent next to Mr. Watts was a wealthy Hindoo merchant of the name of Omichund. A long previous residence at Calcutta had made him well acquainted with English forms and manners, while it had lost him none of the craft and subtlety that seemed almost the birthright of a Bengalee. As the time for action drew near, he began to feel, — not scruples at the treachery, — not even apprehensions as to * Letter to the Governor of Madras, April 30. 1757. † Letter to Mr. Watts, May 2. 1757. INDIA.] the success, -but doubts whether his own interests had been sufficiently secured. He went to Mr. Watts, and threatened to disclose the whole conspiracy to Surajah Dowlah unless it were stipulated that he should receive thirty lacs of rupees, or 300,000l., as a reward for his services, - - which stipulation he insisted on seeing added as an article in the treaty pending between Meer Jaffier and the English. Mr. Watts, in great alarm for his own life, soothed Omichund with general assurances, while he referred the question as speedily as possible to the Members of the Select Committee at Calcutta. There was little disposition on the part of these gentlemen to concede the grasping demands of the Hindoo. Meer Jaffier, it is true, had promised a donative of forty or fifty lacs in case of his success; but these the Committee designed partly for the army and navy, and partly for themselves. Though often at variance with each other, they were never found to disagree when their own profit was at stake. Thus, one of the Members, Mr. Becher, having moved, "That as they, the Committee, had set the ma"chine in motion, it was reasonable and proper that they "should be considered," - or, in other words, share in the spoils, the Resolution was carried with enthusiastic unanimity. Under these circumstances the Committee were equally unwilling to grant and afraid to refuse the exorbitant claim of Omichund. But an expedient was suggested by Clive. Two treaties were drawn up; the one on white paper, intended to be real and valid, and containing no reference to Omichund, the other on red paper, with a stipulation in his favour, but designed as fictitious, and merely with the object to deceive him. The Members of the Committee, like Clive, put their names without hesitation to both treaties; but Admiral Watson, with higher spirit, would only sign the real one. It was foreseen that the omission of such a name would rouse the suspicion of Omichund, and in this emergency Clive directed another person to counterfeit the Admiral's signature. For his share in these transactions Clive was many years afterwards taunted to his face in the House of * Malcolm's Life of Clive, vol. i. p. 253. 66 Commons. Unable to deny he endeavoured to defend his conduct. "It was," he said, a matter of true policy "and of justice to deceive so great a villain as Omi"chund." The villany of Omichund, however, appears mainly this, that for the treachery which the English encouraged and abetted he claimed a larger reward than the English were willing to pay. But even admitting to the fullest extent the guilt of the Hindoo intriguer, this does not suffice to vindicate the British chief; this does not prove that it was justifiable, as he alleges, to deceive the deceiver, and to foil an Asiatic by his own Asiatic arts. Such expedients as fictitious treaties and counterfeited signatures are not, as I conceive, to be cleared by any refinements of ingenuity, or any considerations of state advantage†, and they must for ever remain a blot on the brilliant laurels of Clive. Omichund having thus been successfully imposed upon, and the conspiracy being now sufficiently matured, Mr. Watts made his escape from Moorshedabad, and Clive set his army in motion from Calcutta. He had under his command 3,000 men, all excellent troops, and one third Europeans. The terror of Surajah Dowlah was increased by a haughty letter from Clive, alleging the Nabob's infraction of the recent alliance, and his new designs against the English. Much perturbed, the Nabob, however, proceeded to assemble near the village of Plassey *Speech, May 19. 1773. Parl. Hist., vol. xvii. p. 876. † See the elaborate defence of Sir John Malcolm in the sixth chapter of his Life of Clive. He argues, that Admiral Watson knew and permitted the signature of his name by another hand. But in the first place, and primâ facie, it appears utterly incredible that any man refusing on conscientious grounds his signature to a delusive treaty would give his consent to the counterfeiting of that signature. Secondly, I observe, that no such apology is ventured upon by the contemporary historian, Mr. Orme, notwithstanding his personal friendship for Clive (Hist. vol. ii. p. 155.). Thirdly, I find that the expressions ascribed to Watson by Mr. Cooke, the Secretary to Government, are merely as follows: "The Admiral said he had not "signed it, but left them to do as they pleased," - expressions which, I think, can imply no more than that the other parties might proceed or not, as they could or would, in their own course of policy, without him. Watson died of jungle-fever only a few weeks after these events. INDIA.] ADVANCE OF CLIVE. 329 his whole force amounting to 15,000 cavalry, and 35,000 foot. Nor was it merely in numbers of men that he surpassed the English; while Clive brought only eight field pieces and two howitzers, Surajah Dowlah had above forty pieces of cannon of the largest size, each drawn by forty or fifty yoke of white oxen, and each with an elephant behind, trained to assist in pushing it over difficult ground. Forty Frenchmen in the Nabob's pay directed some smaller guns. The greater part of the foot were armed with matchlocks, the rest with various weapons, —pikes, swords, arrows, and even rockets. The cavalry, both men and horses, were drawn from the northern districts of India, and, to the eye at least, appeared more formidable than those encountered by Clive in the wars of the Carnatic. But in truth these numbers were an army only in name and outward show; not cheered by military spirit, nor jealous of military reputation; with no confidence in themselves, and no attachment to their leader. The Nabob, distrustful of Meer Jaffier, had before he left the capital exacted from him an oath of fidelity upon the Koran. Either a respect for this oath, or, what is far more probable, a doubt as to the issue of the war, seemed to weigh with Meer Jaffier; he did not perform his engagement to the English, of joining them with his division at the appointed place of meeting, but kept aloof, sending them only evasive answers or general assurances. When, therefore, the English army came within one march of the Nabob's at Plassey, -with the wide stream of the Hooghly flowing between them,-can we wonder if doubts assailed even the resolute spirit of Clive, how far relying on the slippery faith of the Hindoo conspirator, or on his own brave but scanty force, he might venture to pass the river, and bring the enemy to battle? He well knew, as he said himself, that "if a defeat en"sued not one man would have returned to tell it." Under these circumstances he assembled a Council of War. Sixteen years afterwards he observed that this was the only Council of War which he had ever held, and that if he had abided by its decision it would have been the ruin of the East India Company. But these words, if taken alone, would not convey an accurate im pression of what passed. Having called together his officers, to the number of twenty, he proposed to them the question, whether it would be prudent, without assistance, to attack the Nabob, or whether they should wait until joined by some native force. Contrary to the usual form in Councils of War, beginning with the youngest Member, Clive gave his own opinion first, and that opinion was, not to venture. Twelve officers concurred with their chief; seven others, among whom was Major Eyre Coote, voted for immediate action. Thus a large majority approved the judgment of Clive; but his own doubts returned more forcibly than ever, and he began to feel that not only honour but safety pointed forwards. It was said at the time that his purpose had been changed by one hour of tranquil meditation under the shade of some trees; but Clive himself declared in his Evidence in England, that after the Council he had taken "about twenty-four hours' mature consideration." Be this as it may, he came forth fully resolved to put every thing to the hazard. The troops were led across the river; they accomplished in eight hours a toilsome march of fifteen miles, and at one o'clock in the morning of the memorable 23d of June, 1757, they reached the mangoe-grove of Plassey. The mingling sounds of drums, clarions, and cymbals, the usual tokens of a night-watch in an Indian army, convinced them that they were now within a mile of the Nabob's camp. For the remainder of that night Clive took up his quarters in a small hunting-house belonging to the Nabob, but could not sleep; while his soldiers, less concerned than their General, stretched themselves to rest beneath the adjoining trees.* 66 At sunrise Clive ascended the roof of the huntinghouse, and surveyed with a steadfast eye the rich array and the spreading numbers of his enemy. He saw them advance from several sides, as if to enclose him, but they halted at some distance, and began a cannonade, which * The proceedings of the Council of War, and the march of Clive, are in some points of less importance, differently told by different writers. These points are clearly drawn out and well discussed by Mr. Thornton in two notes. (Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 235. and 237.) Sir John Malcolm adopts two conflicting statements without explanation or remark. (Life of Clive, vol. i. p. 161. and 164.) |