delivery of his wife and the sickness of his children. It was at Nice that he heard of the French designs against his former comrades in St. Philip's; he immediately exclaimed, “They will want engineers!" and determined at all risks to rejoin them; first expending what money he had in purchasing timber for the platforms, and other things needful for defence, and in hiring a ship for the voyage, nor did he hesitate, where his country's service was at stake, to leave his wife and children sick in a land of strangers.

Admiral Byng, on anchoring at Gibraltar, found there Commodore Edgcumbe, and thus learnt the particulars of the French descent upon Minorca. Before he again set sail he was anxious, according to his instructions, to take on board a battalion of troops as a reinforcement to St. Philip's, but General Fowke, who commanded at Gibraltar, having consulted a Council of War, refused to spare them. Fowke had received two orders on this subject from Lord Barrington as Secretary at War, but he afterwards alleged in his defence, though, as I think, without sufficient foundation, that these two orders were confused and contradictory, and left him a full discretionary power.* Byng, therefore, proceeded without these expected succours, but was joined by Commodore Edgcumbe with one man-of-war, and by Captain Harvey with another. On the 19th of May the Admiral came in sight of St. Philip's. He descried with pleasure the British colours still flying from the castle, while the

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*These two orders are dated March 21. and 28. 1756, and were produced at Byng's Trial. (See p. 10. of the Minutes.) It appears from the unpublished Life of Lord Barrington by his brother, the Bishop of Durham (p. 23.), that the first order had been sent out, together with the second, through an official oversight of Mr. Sherwin, the Deputy Secretary at War. "This," says the Bishop, "was certainly a mistake, but it did not appear a material one, for the "last order alone was valid." And he adds elsewhere, "General "Fowke owned to Lord Barrington afterwards, and to several other persons, that he was prevailed on just before his trial, to make this "defence (of his orders being contradictory and unintelligible), and "that it was the action of his life of which he was most ashamed. "His advisers probably did not know that he had written letters "which fully contradicted the justification they had suggested, and "that these letters would be laid before his judges."

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1756.

ADMIRAL BYNG.

67

French standards appeared on several bomb-batteries that were playing against it. In reality the enemy had not as yet made much progress in the siege. By the direction of some unskilful engineers, they had raised their first batteries near Cape Mola on the opposite side of the harbour, from whence they could have but little effect against the castle, whilst themselves were exposed to a galling fire. Accordingly they soon thought proper to change their plan of attack,—to relinquish their first batteries, and to raise others on the place where the windmills had been destroyed; but these new batteries were not ready to open until the 12th of the month.

At

The Admiral now made an attempt to communicate with the Governor, and the Governor another attempt to communicate with the Admiral. Both attempts, however, appear to have been faint and slack, and much too readily despaired of. That same evening M. de La Galissonière had come in sight; next forenoon (the 20th of May) he bore down with all his ships; and Byng drew out his own in line of battle. The two fleets were almost equally matched, but the French, as was alleged, a little superior in weight of metal and in number of men. a signal from Byng the engagement was begun by Rear Admiral West, who was second in command on the British side. So impetuously did he attack the enemy with his division that the ships opposed to it were in a short time driven out of their line. But the other division, commanded by Byng, kept aloof at this critical time, and West found himself unable to pursue his advantage. Thus the engagement was interrupted, and the French Admiral showed no disposition to renew it. Next morning the French fleet was out of sight, and Byng, perplexed and irresolute as to his movements, adopted that favourite resource of incapable commanders, Council of War. He urged to the assembled officers his inferiority in men and weight of metal to the enemy,his loss on the foregoing day of 42 killed and 168 wounded, -the damaged or unsound condition of his ships. He stated his opinion that if even he should succeed in beating the French fleet, that victory would not suffice to raise the siege of St. Philip's, and upon the whole, therefore, he proposed to leave Minorca to its fate,

and to steer back to Gibraltar, which might be in equal need of protection. In these views the Council acquiesced, and to Gibraltar accordingly the fleet returned.

Such were the transactions which in their result lost Byng both his reputation and his life. In reviewing them at this distance of time with complete impartiality and calmness, we may in the first place dismiss with a smile of contempt the insinuation ventured by party violence, that Byng or his employers, or both, had some secret interest in betraying Minorca to the enemy. The charge of cowardice against Byng himself may deserve more serious consideration. But it appears by the evidence at his Court Martial that Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, and other officers who were near his person on the 20th of May, did not perceive any backwardness in him during the action, nor any marks of fear or confusion either in his countenance or behaviour, and that he seemed to give his orders coolly and distinctly.* It appears also that his delay in giving succour to West arose partly from his becoming accidentally entangled amidst some of his own ships, and partly from an overstrained idea of discipline as to the importance of all advancing in line. Nor does the Admiral seem to have shown any mean and unworthy jealousy of his second in command; he wrote the very evening of the action a letter of thanks to Admiral West, acknowledging most warmly his "fine and gallant conduct." "Your behaviour," he adds, 66 was like an angel "to-day."† But though Byng was a man perfectly honest and sufficiently brave, we may acknowledge, without disrespect to the name of an unfortunate officer, that he wanted capacity. Even before reaching St. Philip's he had already, as appears from his own letters produced at his trial, despaired of relieving it. Even from Gibraltar on the 4th of May, writing to the Lords of the Admiralty, he had stated his opinion that "throwing men into the castle will only add to the numbers that "must fall into the enemy's hands,”—and that, "if I

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Sentence of Court Martial, January 26. 1757. 124.) † Minutes of Trial, p. 19.

(Minutes, p.

1756.

SIEGE OF ST. PHILIP'S.

69

"should fail in the relief of Minorca I shall look upon "the security and protection of Gibraltar as my next object." He trembled not at danger,-but like many other weak men in high posts he did tremble at responsibility. He thought far more of shunning failure than of gaining success. On the 20th he might have advanced more eagerly to the support of West. On the 21st he might have been tempted by the partial success of West's division, even unassisted, to a renewed and vigorous attack. He should not have taken for granted that no naval victory would suffice to save the island. And, above all, he should have felt that even a defeat, had he sustained one, would be less ignominious to the British arms than a retreat without a blow.

The garrison of St. Philip's, however mortified at the disappearance of Admiral Byng from the coast, and at the FEUX DE JOIE which they heard fired on this account from all the French lines, still cherished a hope that the English fleet would be reinforced and sail back to their relief. Meanwhile they continued their defence with unabated spirit, insomuch that the Duke de Richelieu found it necessary to obtain further reinforcements from France. Thus the castle became invested by an army of 20,000 men, and battered day and night from 62 cannon, 21 mortars, and four howitzers, besides the small arms. Nevertheless the loss of men amongst the besieged was inconsiderable, since they could for the most part secure themselves in the subterranean works which were impervious to shells or shot. The works above ground, however, ere long, presented more than one practicable breach. On the 27th of June the French marched up to the assault, headed by the Duke de Richelieu in person. Up to this time Richelieu had gained but slight distinction in arms. His conquests had been only those of gallantry; he could boast of thirty-five years' incessant campaign in the saloons of Paris and Versailles. A fit general, no doubt, where Louis the Fifteenth was King! Yet on this occasion it must be owned that he displayed both courage and conduct. He still persevered in the attack, while whole ranks fell around him, while the

*Minutes of Trial, p. 6.

entire glacis was covered with dead and dying, some from the musketry and grapeshot poured upon them in front, others from the mines sprung beneath their feet, and at length he stood victorious on the summit of the Queen's redoubt. Hitherto the two officers who had mainly contributed to the brave defence were Colonel Jeffreys and Major Cunningham, but in this assault the former was surrounded and taken prisoner, and the latter maimed in the right arm by the thrust of a bayonet. Thus the Governor was deprived at once of the most important outwork, and of his two principal assistants.

Under these circumstances, a short truce being granted at Richelieu's request, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, -General Blakeney summoned a Council of War. Here opinions were much divided. The one party represented that every expectation from the fleet was vain,-that the outworks were ruined,— that the body of the castle was shattered, that the garrison, always insufficient in numbers, was now exhausted by hard duty and constant watchings; and that, therefore, it would be expedient to accept, if the enemy were disposed to offer, honourable terms of capitulation. On the other side, it was contended that as yet not above 100 of their men had fallen; and that the question whether or not there were any hopes of relief, was not for the Governor and garrison to determine; their duty was at all hazards to hold out the place to the last extremity. But the former arguments prevailing with the majority, a conference ensued, when the Duke de Richelieu agreed to grant good terms in consideration of the gallant defence. Thus the fortress was delivered over to the French, while the English marched out with all the honours of war, and were, according to the articles, conveyed by sea to Gibraltar.

When the tidings of Byng's retreat, and the consequent loss of Minorca, arrived in England, loud and fierce were the clamours. Justice, or something more than justice, was indeed done to Blakeney for his sturdy defence. But the Ministers were condemned for having neglected or procrastinated the proper measures of precaution; and, above all, the largest vials of popular wrath were poured on the devoted head of Byng. The only