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plished its purpose. No statesman of the 'time, no public man either in or out of Parliament, no public writer, so far as I am aware, ever expressed an opinion adverse to this view of our foreign policy. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that such was the policy suited to that period. Among the indirect means of counteracting the Family Compact, none appeared so effectual as the aggrandisement of Russia. That was the opinion of Chatham, who certainly beyond any other statesman of his age, if not of any period, understood the interests of England, and upheld her ascendancy in the scale of Europe. Burke, acutely sensitive as he was to oppression and wrong, while reprobating the iniquity of the transaction and the violence with which it was attended, felt bound to admit that the immediate effect of the Partition was to lower France by elevating Russia and Prussia in the balance of power.* The Secretary of State administered a severe rebuke to the Ambassador at Constantinople for his officiousness in urging the Porte to continue the war against Russia, which had been instigated by France for the purpose of effecting a diversion in favour of Poland. The nation itself was wholly indifferent to the wrongs of a people of whom they knew little or nothing, whose case they did not understand, and whose fate was a subject of as little interest as that of any barbarous, or semibarbarous race at the extremity of the globe. The ministers both of France and England were inferior men; but though Louis may have thought, that, had Choiseul been in power, an event so disastrous to the interests of France might have been prevented, it is certain that the partitioning powers would not have been turned from their purpose, which they were fully prepared to accomplish, except by force of arms, France indeed did affect to make warlike demonstra

* Annual Register, 1772.

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tions, but it was notorious that she was in no condition to prosecute hostilities against either of the great military monarchies, whose alliance was cemented by the strongest bonds of interest. England, too, stood in need of rest to recruit her military strength, impaired by the prodigious efforts of the Seven Years' War. Still, for an adequate object, she could have rallied her powers; nay, even in a worthless quarrel, she might, as aforetime, have awakened the vigour and energy which had too often been wantonly displayed; but neither England, nor any other nation, ever undertook hostilities merely to defend another sovereignty from aggression. It has been a common practice, indeed, to make use of such a pretence in a declaration of war; while the real, if not obvious, motive has been interest or ambition. In the most recent instance, the independence of Turkey was menaced by Russia: England took up arms avowedly to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; really, to check the further advance of a power already too great for the safety of Europe. So far as the mere interests of civilisation were concerned in this quarrel, the merger of a barbarous and infidel power into a semi-barbarous and superstitious rule would have been a step in the course of progress. In either case there was no question as to the liberties of the people. A war, therefore, merely to vindicate the right of one despot in preference to the claim of another, would have been utterly futile; but a war to restrain inordinate ambition, to preserve the balance of Europe, to prevent the propagation of political maxims adverse to the cause of freedom, was justified by reasons which, as long as the sword is appealed to as the last arbiter of civil rights and interests, are of undoubted weight and urgency. In the absence of such considerations, the Czar might have reigned at Constantinople as absolutely as he has long reigned at Cracow.

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The question, then, in 1772, was precisely similar to that which arose in 1854. Were the Present opinion interests of England concerned in the in- on the partition. tegrity of Poland? In the present age, the neutrality of Great Britain in the affairs of Poland has been censured as the capital error of her foreign policy. Yet such a view of this country's interests never presented itself to any statesman or patriot of that generation; and it is difficult to believe that contemporary politicians were wholly ignorant of, and indifferent to, the interests of their country. Strange, too, that it never seems to have suggested itself to any Court in Europe, that England was negligent of a golden opportunity of advancing her own influence, or diminishing that of a rival. The truth is, that the cause of Poland has been recommended to modern sympathy on sentimental grounds; and we may look in vain for any reason which should have urged a minister of this country to interfere, either by negotiation or by arms, in the affairs of the Republic. For two centuries past, Poland had ceased to occupy an independent place among the states of Europe; and, in fact, the balance of power was better adjusted by dividing the dominions of the Republic among the neighbouring sovereignties, than by leaving the whole to the preponderating influence of Russia, Austria, or France. So sensible, indeed, was Catherine of the impolicy of exchanging the virtual government of Poland for the acquisition of a part in absolute sovereignty, that it seems certain the project of partition would never have originated at St. Petersburg, had not a concurrence of circumstances disclosed the increasing difficulty of maintaining the preponderance of Russian influence at Warsaw. Stanislaus himself, the creature of the Czarina, had openly espoused the cause of the patriotic party; Frederick, while in close alliance with the Czarina, strongly urged the settlement of those domestic differences, upon the

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perpetuity and aggravation of which the ascendancy of Russia in the affairs of Poland mainly depended. The Empress Queen, also, who has been sometimes represented as an unwilling party to the Treaty of 1772, had advanced very extensive pretensions to the territory of Poland two years before the date of that compact, and had actually seized upon a province which for nearly four hundred years had formed part of the dominions of the Republic. The Court of Versailles, likewise, which had always maintained, with more or less success, a rivalry with that of St. Petersburg in the political intrigues of Poland, had lately instigated the Porte to declare war against Russia, for the purpose of effecting a diversion in favour of the party opposed to Russian influence at Warsaw. Such considerations as these, probably, rather than any premeditated scheme of conquest, determined the sagacious and politic Catherine, in proposing the dismemberment of a state which could not govern itself, and yet was impatient of foreign intervention. Russia was, doubtless, actuated in all her relations with Poland by the lust of rule; but it would be difficult to maintain that the pretence upon which she justified this violation of the law of nations was altogether destitute of plausibility and force. A people in a state of anarchy is dangerous to neighbouring governments, and may justify, on their parts, the application of that ultimate law of self-preservation which neither municipal nor public law can repeal.

If the modern invectives against the passive acquiescence of this country in the partition of Poland were the mere ebullition of sentimental clamour, I should have been satisfied with little more than a passing allusion to an event in which the interests of Great Britain were not immediately concerned. Yet practical statesmen, as well as writers of credit and authority, have loaded this transaction with every

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epithet of vituperation as one of unmitigated and unprecedented iniquity. But if the partition of Poland must receive unqualified condemnation, how are we to defend similar transactions in which we have been ourselves repeatedly engaged, either as principals or parties? Is there one public law for Europe and another for Asia? It is in vain to urge that our vast Indian Empire, though wrested from native princes, has been more beneficial to the people than that of the rulers whom we deposed or put to death. A similar apology might be made for the partition. If regular government of any description is preferable to anarchy; if the condition of a free labourer is under any circumstances better than that of a serf, then it may be argued with plausibility, that Poland was well deprived of an independence which she abused. But, in truth, all such pretences are alike hypocritical and false. The welfare of the conquered people never was the motive of a conqueror; although in the ultimate dispensation of human affairs, the happiness and prosperity of the people have often been the results of violence, rapacity and oppression. Ambition or political convenience, or both, have dictated almost every invasion of the rights of independent states; and if such motives and arguments are wholly insufficient to justify or palliate these acts of power, then must not only the partition of Poland by three neighbouring sovereignties, and the annexation by this country of every province in the East, from Benares to Oude, but the partition of Saxony, the union of Holland and Belgium, and the annexation of Norway to Sweden by the Congress of 1815, be equally condemned. The whole history of such transactions is stamped with one general character. England, for her own purposes, recognised and adopted the acts. of her lieutenants, who assumed to confiscate or dispose of vast territories in Asia, to which this country