CHAPTER VII.

Of Particles.

Besides words, which are the names of ideas in the mind, there are others made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas or propositions one with another, and to intimate some particular action of its own at that time relating to those ideas. This it does several ways, as 'is,' 'is not,' are marks of the mind affirming or denying; besides which, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of the proposition, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependences, to make a coherent discourse.

The words signifying that connexion the mind gives to several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are called particles; and it is in the right use of these that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style. To express the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings, one on another, a man must have words to show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse.

Of

These cannot be understood rightly, without a clear view of the postures, stands, turns, limitations, exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind. these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by; for which reason it happens, that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations, Thus the particle but' in English has several very different, and sometimes almost opposite significations; as, But to say no more:' here it intimates a step of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it. I saw but two planets' here it shows that the mind limits the sense to

what is expressed, with a negation of all other. You pray, but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion, but that he would confirm you in your own' the former of these intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before. All animals have sense; but a dog is an animal :' here it signifies the connexion of the latter proposition with the former. To these, divers other significations of this particle might be added, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude.

I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs: the instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of abstract and concrete Terms.

The ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its ideas whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract idea being distinct, so that the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowlege, perceive their difference: and therefore in propositions, no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another; nor does the common use of language permit that any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, should be affirmed one of another. All our affirmations are only inconcrete, which is the affirming one abstract idea to be

joined to another; which abstract ideas, in substances, may be of any sort, though the most of them are of powers in all the rest these are little else but relations.

All our simple ideas have abstract, as well as concrete names, as whiteness, white; sweetness, sweet, &c. The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations, as justice, just; equality, equal, &c. But as to our ideas of substances, we have very few abstract names at all. Those few that the schools have forged, as animalitas, humanitas, &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of names of substances, and could never get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of public approbation; which seems to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas. It was only the doctrine of substantial forms, and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowlege they had not, which first coined and then introduced animalitas, humanitas, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

From what has been said it may be perceived how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be of doubtful signification. To examine their perfection or imperfection, it is necessary to consider their use and end. We have, in a former part of this discourse, mentioned a double use of words; one for recording our thoughts, and another for communicating them. For the recording our own thoughts any words will serve our turn: for since sounds are voluntary signs, man may use what words he pleases to signify to himself his own ideas; and there will be

no imperfection in them, if he always use the same sign for the same idea.

2. Communication of words has also a double use, civil and philosophical. By their civil use, I mean such a communication of ideas as may serve for the ordinary affairs and conveniences of life. By their philosophical use, I mean such as may convey precise notions of things, and express satisfactorily general propositions. These uses are very distinct; less exactness being required in the one than in the other.

The chief end of language being to be understood, words serve not to that end when they do not excite in the hearer the same idea that they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Now since sounds have no natural connexion with our ideas, the uncertainty of their signification has its cause in the ideas they stand for; and therefore the idea which each sound stands for must be learned and retained by those who would discourse intelligibly. But this is hardest to be done, 1. where the ideas they stand for are very complex ; 2. where the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in nature, and no standard to adjust them by ; 3. where the signification of the word is referred to a standard not easy to be known; 4. where the signification of the word, and the essence of the thing, are not exactly the same.

The names of mixed modes are liable to great obscurity 1. Because of that great composition these complex ideas are often made up of. When a word stands for a very complex idea, it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea, so as to make the name stand for the same precise idea without variation. Hence names of compound ideas, such as moral words, have seldom, in two different men, the same precise signification. 2. Because the names of mixed modes want standards in nature. They are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, not to copy any thing really existing, but to

rank things as they agree with the archetypes the mind has made. What the words murder, sacrilege, &c. signify, can never be known from the things themselves. Many parts of these complex ideas are not visible in the actions themselves: the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, has no necessary connexion with the outward action of him who commits either. They have their combination only from the understanding, which unites them under one name. Common use, that is the rule of propriety, may be supposed to settle the signification of language, and it does for the purposes of common conversation; but common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses; there being scarcely any name of any very complex idea, which may not be made the sign of far different ideas. From which it is evident that the names of such ideas are liable to be of doubtful signification. Though the names glory and gratitude be the same in every man's mouth, yet the complex ideas which every one intends by those names, are different in men using the same language.

The way also in which the names of mixed modes are learned, contributes to the doubtfulness of their signification. To make children understand the names of simple ideas and substances, people show them the thing, and then repeat the name. But of mixed modes, especially moral words, the sounds are learned first, and their meaning is left to the explication of others or to their own observation and industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true meaning of names, these moral words, in most men's mouths, are little more than bare sounds. Where shall one find any controversial debate or familiar discourse concerning honor, faith, grace, religion, church, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them? And hence we see that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, comments beget comments, and explications make new