confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, distrust, and disbelief.

That proposition then is probable, for which there are arguments or proofs to make it pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives to this sort of propositions is called belief, assent, or opinion. Probability then being to supply the defect of our knowlege, is always conversant about propositions, whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true.

The grounds of it are in short these two following. 1. The conformity of any thing with our own knowlege, experience, or observation.

2. The testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others, is to be considered, 1. the number; 2. the integrity; 3. the skill of the witnesses; 4. the design of the author, if it be a testimony cited out of a book; 5. the consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation; 6. contrary testimonies.

The mind before it rationally assents or dissents to any probable proposition, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make, more or less, for or against it; and on a due balancing of the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, according to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other.

CHAPTER XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

The grounds of probability laid down in the foregoing chapter, as they are the foundations on which our assent is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are (or ought) to be regulated. Only we are to take notice, that no grounds of probability operate any farther on the mind which

searches after truth, and endeavors to judge right, than they appear; at least in the first judgment, or search that the mind makes. It is indeed in many cases impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have admirable memories, to retain all the proofs, which, on a due examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It suffices that they have once, with care and fairness, sifted the matter as far as they could; and having once found on which side the probability appeared to them, they lay up the conclusion in their memories, as a truth they have discovered; and for the future remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion, that by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it.

It is unavoidable, then that the memory be relied on in this case, and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall: without this the greatest part of men must be either sceptics, or change every moment, when any one offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not presently able to answer.

It must be owned that men's sticking to past judgments is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not, that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect together, all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he has a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information? And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on one side or other: the conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay. For those depend for the most part on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we

are not capable of certain knowlege, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace one side or the other.

The propositions we receive on inducements of probability, are of two sorts: 1. concerning some particular existence, or matter of fact, which falling under observation, is capable of human testimony; 2. concerning things which, being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable of human testimony.

Concerning the first of these, viz. particular matter of fact:

1. Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation of ourselves and others in the like case, comes attested with the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly on it, as if it were certain knowlege. Thus, if all Englishmen who have occasion to mention it, should report, that it froze in England last winter, or the like, I think a man would as little doubt of it, as that seven and four are eleven.

The first and highest degree of probability then is, when the general consent of all men, in all ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a man's own constant experience in the like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact, attested by fair witnesses such are the stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature; this we call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what we and others always observe to be after the same manner, we conclude with reason, to be the effects of steady and regular causes, though they come not within the reach of our knowlege. As, that fire warmed a man, or made lead fluid; that iron sunk in water, swam in quicksilver. A relation affirming any such thing to have been, or a predication that it will happen again in the same manner, is received without doubt or hesitation: and our belief thus grounded, rises to assurance.

2. The next degree of probability is when, by my own experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing is found to be for the most part so; and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses. Thus history giving us such an account of men in all ages, and my own experience confirming it, that most men prefer their own private advantage to the public. If all historians that writ of Tiberius, say that he did so, it is extremely probable: and in this case, our assent rises to a degree which we call confidence.

3. In matters happening indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or that way: when any particular matter of fact comes attested by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is in Italy such a city as Rome; that about one thousand and seven hundred years ago there lived such a man in it as Julius Cæsar, &c. A man can as little doubt of this, and the like, as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.

Probability, on these grounds, carries so much evidence with it, that it leaves as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as demonstration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. But the difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another. Here diligence, attention, and exactness, is required to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the evidence and probability of the thing, which rises and falls, according as the two foundations of credibility favor or contradict it. These are liable to such variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, tempers, designs, oversights, &c. of reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees wherein men give their assent. This in general may be said, that as the proofs, on due examination,

shall to any one appear in a greater or less degree, to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainments, as are called belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, &c.

I think it may not be amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of England, which is, that though the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy never so well attested, and by never so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, viz. That any testimony, the farther off it is removed from the original truth, the less force it has and in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof. There is a rule quite contrary to this, advanced by some men, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older. On this ground, propositions, evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of probability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which deserved little credit from the mouths of their first relators, are thought to grow venerable by age, and are urged as undeniable.

But certain it is, that no probability can rise above its first original. What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one witness, must stand or fall by his only testimony, though afterwards cited by hundreds of others; and is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it becomes the weaker. Because passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, which capricious men's minds are acted by, may make one man quote another's words or meaning wrong. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed on slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated.

The second sort of probability, is concerning things