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son scarce at all. A madman, fancying himself a king, with a right inference, requires suitable attendance, respect, &c. acting like a man who reasons right from wrong principles.

These, I think, are the first operations of the mind; and though they are exercised about all its ideas, yet the instances I have given have been chiefly in simple ideas,-1. because these faculties being exercised at first about simple ideas, we might, by following nature, trace them in their rise, progress, and improvements; 2. because observing how they operate about simple ideas, which are more clear than complex ones, we may better learn how the mind exercises itself about those which are complex; 3. because these operations of the mind are another set of ideas, derived from that source which I call reflection, and, therefore, fit to be considered after the simple ideas of

sensation.

Thus have I given a short history of the first beginnings of human knowlege, wherein I must appeal to experience and observation whether I am in the right. This is the only way that I can discover in what manner ideas are brought into the understanding. If other men have innate ideas they have reason to enjoy them. I can speak but of what I find in myself. I pretend not to teach but to inquire; and I confess that external and internal sensation are the only passages that I can find of knowlege to understanding. These are the windows by which light is let into this dark room for methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet shut from light, with only some little opening left to let in external visible resemblances of things without would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found on occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight and the ideas of them.

CHAPTER XII.

Of complex Ideas.

In the reception of simple ideas the mind is only passive, having no power to frame any one to itself, nor to have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. But about these simple ideas it exerts several acts of its own, whereby, out of them, as the materials and the foundations of the rest, the others are formed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these:-1. it combines several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus complex ideas are made; 2. it brings two ideas, whether simple or compound, together, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them, by which it gets its ideas of relation; 3. it separates them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence, and thus all its general ideas are made. This shows man's power to be the same in the intellectual and the material world in both he can neither make nor destroy; all he can do is to unite, to compare, to separate.

As simple ideas exist in several combinations, so the mind has power to consider several of them as one idea; such ideas I call complex, as beauty, gratitude, an army, &c. which, though complicated of various ideas, yet may be considered as one idea, and signified by one name. In this faculty the mind has power to multiply the objects of its thoughts, still confined however to those simple ideas which are the materials of all its compositions. It can have no ideas of any other sensible, objects than what come by the senses, nor of operations of thought but what it finds in itself; but it may put together those ideas it has, and make complex ones which it never received so united.

Complex ideas may be reduced under three heads: 1. modes; 2. substances; 3. relations.

Locke.

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First, modes I call such complex ideas as are considered dependent on, or affections of substances, as triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. Of modes there are two sorts: 1. those which are variations or combina

tions of the same simple idea, as a dozen, a score, I call simple modes; 2. others, compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, as beauty, consisting of a certain composition of color and figure, &c. I call mixed modes.

Ideas of substance are such combinations of simple ideas as represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves, in which the idea of substance is the chief:-thus a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with powers of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, make the idea of man. Of substances there are two sorts of ideas; one of single substances, as a man; the other of several of these put together, as an army, which is as much a single idea as that of a man.

The last sort of complex idea is relation, or comparing one idea with another.

If we will attentively trace the progress of our minds, we shall find that the most abstruse ideas are only such as the understanding frames to itself by repeating and joining ideas that it has from sensation or reflection. This I shall endeavor to show in the ideas we have of space, time, and infinity, and some others that seem most remote from those originals.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of simple Modes; and first, of the simple Modes of Space.

The modifications of a simple idea are as perfectly distinct ideas in the mind as those of the greatest contrariety. The idea of two is as distinct from that of one as blueness from heat.

We get the idea of space by our sight and touch. Space considered barely in length is called distance;

considered in length, breadth, and thickness, it may be called capacity. The term extension is applied to it in what manner soever considered. Each different distance is a different modification of space, and each idea of any different distance or space is a simple mode of this idea. The terms, inch, foot, yard, &c. are so many distinct ideas made up of space. When such measures are familiar to men's thoughts, they may repeat them as often as they will, and enlarge their idea of space as much as they please. This power is that which gives us the idea of immensity.

Another modification of space is taken from the relation of the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, among themselves. This is called figure. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies which come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colors whose boundaries are within its view, where observing how the extre mities terminate either in straight lines, which meet at discernible angles, or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived; by considering these as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, we have the idea called figure, which affords to the mind an indefinite variety.

Another idea coming under this head is place, in which we consider the relation of distance between any thing and any two or more points which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another and so considered as at rest: though, vulgarly speaking, we do not observe the distance from precise points, but from large portions of sensible objects to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation. Thus a company of chess-men standing on the same squares where we left them, are in the same place, though the board may have been removed, because we compared them to the parts of the chess-board. The board itself we say is in the same place, if it be in the same part of the cabin, though the ship has

been sailing. A ship is also said to be in the same place, if it has kept the same distance with the parts of the neighboring land, though the earth has turned round. Thus they may be said to be in the same place in some respects, though their distance from other things being varied, they have changed place in that respect.

This modification of distance called place, being made to design the particular position of things, men determine this place by reference to those adjacent things which serve their present purpose. Thus in the chess-board the place of each man is determined within that chequered piece of wood; but when the chessmen are put into a bag, their place is determined by the part of the room in which they are. So if any one should ask in what place is the story of Nisus and Euryalus, it would be improper to say they were in such a part of the world or in such a library; but the proper answer would be that they are in the middle of the ninth book of Virgil's Æneis, where they always have been, though the book has moved a thousand times.

That our idea of place is but a relative position of any thing is plain, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe, because beyond it we have not the idea of a distinct object to which it can have relation of distance. The idea therefore of place we have, as we have that of space, by our sight and touch, by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance.

Some would persuade us that body and extension are the same. If by body and extension they mean what other people do, viz. by body, something solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable; and by extension, the space between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them, they confound different ideas one with another. The idea of space is as distinct from

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